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Abstract (in the form of FAQ)
What is this book?
This is an article-based dissertation. It explores issues which are foundational for the 
theory of comparative law. Ideas drawn from neighbouring disciplines (philosophy, 
social sciences epistemology, anthropology) are made to interact with law: the con-
ception of otherness, the understanding of pluralism and the meaning of context are 
basic – in this sense underground – theoretical issues that determine the subsequent 
methodological choices of the comparatist.
What is theory of comparative law? 
The comparative study of laws brings forth various compelling theoretical issues. For 
example, these concern questions about what is the conception of law in foreign cul-
tures: through comparison domestic notions are put into question, as the comparatist 
faces the fact that in other places things are organized differently. Moreover, compar-
ison brings about issues on the very possibility to understand the other, in addition 
to questions about the comparatist’s own ideas and tacit prejudices. Can the other be 
understood on its own terms? How does the comparatist relate new knowledge to what 
she already knows? Her pre-understanding is something she cannot completely get rid 
of, so she needs to acknowledge its influence on the process of acquisition of knowl-
edge. Furthermore, the comparatist exits the normative legal sphere she was trained 
in and faces other normative spheres. She has to reconsider what normativity means; 
being “out” of the normative domestic legal system does not mean to be entirely freed 
from normativity.
Are other scholars concerned about those issues?
Indeed. Recently, comparative law has been described as the Cinderella that became 
the Queen. This has happened for various reasons. Classical comparative law drew 
much on legal material produced by nation states, while nowadays the law is created 
at multiple levels; its general structure appears more like a net rather than a pyramid. 
To face the challenges of globalisation, the study of comparative law (and of law in 
general) has to transform itself by assuming the transnational dimension of the legal 
and including in the analysis normative phenomena existing on a smaller scale too. 
Legal theorists and comparatists are needed in order to develop analytic tools which 
can make sense of the new normative structures studied. 
Furthermore, the last 30 years have also witnessed a deeply unravelling internal 
debate concerning the very fundaments of the discipline, its directions and purposes. 
Sharp disagreements have been manifested concerning the nature of the legal compara-
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tive scholarly endeavour and its aims and reasons: is it a method or a discipline? Does it 
further knowledge or use in practice? Other debated issues are: micro- and macrocom-
parison (which one to favour in different circumstances); functionality (whether it is a 
meaningful starting point); structuralism (whether to adopt it as a background theo-
ry); differences vs. similarities (what to focus on); tertium comparationis (what it is and 
is it necessary to have one for comparing); and translation (practical and ethical issues). 
Moreover, debates have considered the possibility and desirability of legal transplants 
and of legal convergence. The unrest is due to influences coming from among others 
the following: post-modern philosophy; critical schools of thought such as critical le-
gal studies, post-colonial studies, discourse theory and orientalism; economic analysis 
of law, behavioural economics and neo-institutional economics; and the debate on 
objectivity carried out in philosophy of science.
What to learn from this internal debate?
According to the author, this debate resulted in a double complexification. On the one 
side, the understanding of the compared laws is complexified. This entails perceiving 
the laws as radically other and therefore not fully comprehensible. Laws have to be ana-
lysed without assuming their internal coherence but rather giving voice to the silenced 
disagreements and placing them within their context, without thereby crystallising it 
in an unmovable monolith. On the other side, the position of the comparatist has been 
complexified as well. This leads to the acknowledgment of her responsibility in choos-
ing the appropriate analytical tools for her cognitive interests and stresses the ethical 
dimension connected to comparative legal research. These two complexifications when 
combined create the methodological basis against which the articles included in this 
dissertation have to be read.
Are these two complexifications accepted in the literature?
Overall, while the complexification of the concept of law has now reached a relatively 
higher level of acceptance (at least most comparatists would agree that good comparison 
has to look further then black-letter, legislated rules), the same cannot be said for the 
complexification of the position of the comparatist. Indeed the more easily spottable 
political implications of legal comparison have been unveiled, as have the parochialism 
and ethnocentrism of certain scholarship. Still, not many are willing to stop pondering 
on the epistemological position of the comparatist as a knower. The methodological 
debate within comparison seems to have really digested only the first complexification. 
This is the historical conjuncture where this dissertation can be located. It contributes 
to this debate by claiming that the two complexfications actually travel together. A 
broadened understanding of law requires a rethinking of the role of the comparatist as 
well: the field of study gets so broadened that the comparatist herself is included in it. 
What is the overall aim of this dissertation?
Although each article stands on its own, the overall aim of this dissertation is to advance 
a certain attitude toward comparativism as an academic endeavour. It aims at raising 
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awareness of the risks connected to reductionism and simplification and argues for a 
conception of legal comparative knowledge that embraces complexity theory and that 
reflects on its own epistemological status. Both the understanding of the compared 
laws and the ethical position of the comparatist need to be reflected upon, which is 
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This book is the result of a long research journey. As the word “research” suggests, this 
intellectual journey consisted of innumerable searches. Searches for the right argument, 
searches for the own words, searches for books, articles, cases. Searches for conferences, 
for publishers, for funding. For homes, places to stay overnight, flight tickets. For one-
self, maybe even. Along the way, many encounters have helped me, commenting on my 
work and offering collegial support and inspiration. 
This journey would never even have started if Professors Juha Karhu and Jaakko 
Husa had not created the Legal Cultures in Transnational World (LeCTra) doctoral 
programme at the Faculty of Law of the University of Lapland. Their “Call for Appli-
cations” referred to an approach to comparative law that was in a way exactly what I was 
looking for (the first search!), and could not resist applying. Not only they believed in 
the potential of my chaotic proposal, but also their trust in my work has been constant, 
even in moments when I didn’t have any myself. The many seminars, symposia, con-
ferences that were organized at the Faculty brought to Lapland illustrious authors and 
thinkers who stimulated enlightening discussions. Also the informal meetings among 
doctoral students have always been fruitful and inspiring. I express my gratefulness to 
all the participants and organizers of such events. In all of these years my supervisor 
Jaakko Husa has managed to strike a balance between supporting the writing process 
and at the same time allowing a maximum degree of academic freedom. I am thankful 
for his feedbacks, insights and expertise, which he has always been ready to share. I 
would also like to thank him for agreeing to act as the Custos at my defence. 
Sincere gratitude goes to the pre-examiners, Professors Geoffrey Samuel from the 
Kent Law School and Jørn Øyrehagen Sunde from the University of Bergen. It was 
a privilege for me that they took the time to comment on my work and to share their 
expertise with me. I am also thankful to Geoffrey Samuel for agreeing to act as the 
Opponent at my defence. 
Without the excellent proofreading work of Nick Kirkwood my chances of pub-
lishing in international peer-reviewed journals would have been much slimmer, I am 
really indebted to him for his work. Thanks are also due to the staff of the Library 
of the University of Lapland, and of the all the other libraries I have visited, such as 
the one of the Max-Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law in 
Hamburg, the Cujas Library and the French National Library in Paris, as well as the 
University Library in Berlin. For the financial support received I need to thank the 
LeCTra doctoral programme, the Suomalainen Lakimiesyhdistys, and the Rector of the 
University of Lapland. 
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This work would also not have been possible without non-institutional support, that 
is the closeness of friends and relatives. Unsurprisingly, as this is also included in the 
meaning of the word “research” itself: it is namely composed by the intensive prefix “re-
“, and “search”, which means “to seek for”. Its etymology is to be drawn back to the Latin 
word circare, whose meaning is to “go about, wander, traverse”, and in Late Latin “to 
wander hither and thither”, from circus, which means “circle”. Therefore research work 
also necessarily involves wandering around, taking hikes, traversing rivers, spinning in 
circles, overcoming mental loops, going to circus. All things that one usually does with 
chosen and unchosen family members. My warmest thank you goes to you all. 
Hamburg, 26 September 2017
Emma Patrignani
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1. General introduction –  
(un)definition of comparative law
“Theatrum legale”1;
“Vergleichung der Gesetze und Rechtsgewohnheiten der verwandesten [sic],
wie der fremdartigsten Nationen aller Zeiten und Länder”2;
“Leges legum” or “biologia delle leggi”3;
“Constatation des diversités législatives [..][et] conséquences [..][:] 
quel profit doit en résulter pour le progrès de la science et celui de la civilisation générale”4;
“Le droit comparé [..] c’est la méthode comparative 
appliquée dans le domaine des sciences juridiques”5;
“Es handelt sich um einen geistigen Vorgang, der einerseits mit dem Recht zu tun hat 
und andererseits eine Vergleichung zum Inhalt hat. [..] 
die Rechtsvergleichung [stellt sich] dar als das Miteinandervergleichen 
von verschiedenen Rechtsordnungen der Welt”6;
1 Gothofredi Guillelmi Leibnitii, “Nova methodus discendae docendaeque jurisprudentiae”, in Opera Om-
nia, Tomus Quartus (Genoa: Fratres de Tournes, 1667/1748), p. 192. [“Legal theatre” (if not otherwise spe-
cified, translations are mine)].
2 Anselm Von Feuerbach, “Blick auf die deutsche Rechtswissenschaft”, in Kleine Schriften vermischten Inhalts 
(Nuremberg: Theodor Otto, 1833), 152-177, p. 163. [“Comparison of legislations and legal customs of the 
most related, as well as the most alien, nations of all times and countries”].
3 Emerico Amari, Critica di una scienza delle legislazioni comparate (Palermo: Edizioni della Regione Sicili-
ana, 1969 [1857]), p. 216. [“Laws of the laws” or “biology of laws”].
4 Raymond Saleilles, “Rapport présenté à la commission d’organisation sur l’utilité, le but et le programme 
du congrès”, in Procès-verbaux des séances et documents du Congrès International de Droit Comparé tenu à Paris 
du 31 juillet au 4 août 1900 (Paris: L.G.D.J. Pichon et Durand-Auzias, 1905), 9-17, p. 9. [“Ascertainment of 
the legislative differences and consequences: what kind of advantage does this produce for the progress of the 
science and of civilization in general”].
5 René David, Traité élémentaire de droit civil comparé: introduction à l’étude des droits étrangers et à la méth-
ode comparative (Paris: L.G.D.J. Pichon et Durand-Auzias, 1950), p. 4. [“Comparative law is the comparative 
method applied in the domain of legal sciences”].
6 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung auf dem Gebiete des Privatrechts 
(Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1984), pp. 1-2. [“The words suggest an intellectual activity with law as its object and 
comparison as its process. […] comparative law is the comparison of the different legal systems of the world”, 
as translated in Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, trans. Tony Weir, 3rd 
ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 2].
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“Comparative Law is a body of potentially ‘universal’ knowledge about the law, 
acquired by observing the legal phenomenon as it appears in a variety of social and geographic 
contexts. It is an approach to legal institutions or to entire legal systems that study them 
in comparison with other institutions or legal systems as they exist elsewhere”7;
“La comparaison, ça nous tombe dessus: c’est une expérience”8.
The only thing for sure that these disparate definitions of comparative law make clear 
is that there is no consensus of what comparative law means9, and this pertains not 
only to its definition, but to its subject-matters and methods as well. Many of the 
most recent mono-authored textbooks on comparative law avoid giving a clear cut 
definition of comparative law10. Concerning the name of the discipline, René David 
was unsatisfied with droit comparé11 and envied the German Rechtsvergleichung, with 
which Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz were not completely happy either12. Rudolf 
Schlesinger’s textbooks start by calling “Comparative Law” a misnomer, which is ac-
cepted only because it became custom, while “Comparison of Laws and Legal Systems” 
would have been preferable13. In this text no substantive differentiation of meaning will 
be attached to the expressions “comparative law” and “comparative legal studies”, even 
though the latter might be understood as implicitly advancing a broader definition of 
law in contrast to the former, more strictly positivist, term. As it will hopefully emerge, 
this dissertation advances certain theoretical stances concerning both the nature of law 
and the nature of comparativism as an academic endeavour. Still, the two denomina-
tions are used interchangeably.
7 Ugo Mattei, Teemu Ruskola and Antonio Gidi, Schlesinger’s Comparative law : cases, text, materials, 7th ed. 
(New York: Foundation Press, 2009), p. 7.
8 Pierre Legrand, Comparer les droits, résolument (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2009), p. 35. [“com-
parison falls on us: it’s an experience”].
9 The agreement on the existence of disagreements is so wide that it goes from Edouard Lambert, “Séance du 
1er aout “, in Procès-verbaux des séances et documents du Congrès International de Droit Comparé tenu à Paris 
du 31 juillet au 4 août 1900 (Paris: L.G.D.J. Pichon et Durand-Auzias, 1905), 26-60, p. 29, to Esin Örücü, 
“Developing Comparative Law”, in Comparative Law - A Handbook, eds. Esin Örücü and David Nelken 
(Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2007), 43-65.
10 For example Geoffrey Samuel, An Introduction to Comparative Law Theory and Method (Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2014); Mathias Siems, Comparative Law (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2014); and Günter Frankenberg, Comparative Law as Critique (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2016), all dedicate some pages to a general introduction about the discipline but do not define 
it precisely. Jaakko Husa takes the risk: “Comparative Law is a part of social sciences and more extensively 
part of the study of humankind. To be more exact, comparative law is part of the entity that consists of legal 
disciplines: a part of the organised attempt to understand human law, a special normative phenomenon that 
is not limited to a certain state or cultural sphere”. Jaakko Husa, A New Introduction to Comparative Law 
(Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2015), p. 18.
11 See David, Traité élémentaire de droit civil comparé: Introduction  à l’étude des droits étrangers et  à  la 
méthode comparative, p. 2.
12 Zweigert and Kötz, Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung auf dem Gebiete des Privatrechts, p. 2.
13 Rudolf Schlesinger et al., Comparative Law: Cases-Text-Materials, 6th ed. (New York: Foundation Press, 
1998), p. 2.
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1.1.  What is theory of comparative law?
The comparative study of legal cultures brings forth various compelling theoretical issues. 
These concern questions about what is the conception of law in foreign cultures, and as 
such one’s general theory of law is complexified: through comparison domestic notions 
are put into question, because one necessarily has to face the fact that things could be 
otherwise14. Moreover, comparison brings about issues on the very possibility to under-
stand the other, in addition to questions about one’s own ideas and tacit prejudices. Can 
the other be understood on its own terms? How do we relate new knowledge to what 
we already know? Our pre-understanding is something we cannot completely get rid 
of, so we need to acknowledge its influence on the process of acquisition of knowledge. 
Furthermore, the comparatist exits the normative legal sphere she was trained in and faces 
other normative spheres. She has to reconsider what normativity means; being “out” of 
the normative domestic legal system does not mean to be entirely freed from normativity.
Recently, comparative law has been described as the Cinderella that became the 
Queen15. This has happened for external reasons: classical comparative law drew much 
on legal material produced by nation states, while nowadays the law is created at multi-
ple levels; its general structure appears more like a net rather than a pyramid16. To face 
the challenges of globalisation, the study of comparative law (and of law in general) has 
to transform itself by assuming the transnational dimension of the legal and including 
in the analysis normative phenomena existing on a smaller scale too. Legal theorists and 
comparatists are needed in order to develop analytic tools which can make sense of the 
new normative structures studied. 
Furthermore, the last 30 years have also witnessed a deeply unravelling internal 
debate concerning the very fundaments of the discipline, its directions and purposes. 
Sharp disagreements have been manifested concerning the nature of the legal compara-
tive scholarly endeavour and its aims and reasons: is it a method or a discipline? Does it 
further knowledge or use in practice? Other debated issues are: micro- and macrocom-
parison (which one to favour in different circumstances); functionality (whether it is a 
meaningful starting point); structuralism (whether to adopt it as a background theo-
ry); differences vs. similarities (what to focus on); tertium comparationis (what it is and 
is it necessary to have one for comparing); and translation (practical and ethical issues). 
Moreover, debates have considered the possibility and desirability of legal transplants 
and of legal convergence. The unrest is due to influences coming from among others 
the following: post-modern philosophy17; critical schools of thought such as critical 
14 Q.v. George P. Fletcher, “Comparative Law as a Subversive Discipline”, The American Journal of Compar-
ative Law 46, no. 4 (1998), 638-700; Horatia Muir-Watt, “La fonction subversive du droit comparé”, Revue 
Internationale De Droit Comparé 52, no. 3 (2000), 503-527.
15 Frankenberg, Comparative Law as Critique, pp. 3–7.
16 François Ost and Michel Van de Kerchove, De la pyramide au réseau? Pour une théorie dialectique du droit 
(Bruxelles: Publications des Facultés universitaires Saint-Louis, 2002).
17 See for example Pierre Legrand, “Paradoxically, Derrida”, Cardozo Law Review 27 (2005), 631 and Pierre 
Legrand, “Siting Foreign Law: How Derrida Can Help”, Duke Journal for Comparative and International Law 
21 (2011), 595-629.
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legal studies18, post-colonial studies19, discourse theory and orientalism20; economic 
analysis of law21, behavioural economics22 and neo-institutional economics23; and the 
debate on objectivity carried out in philosophy of science24. 
The theoretical issues to be discussed are already manifold even before actually 
starting the activity of comparison and before choosing which comparative method 
to deploy. Even though indeed the separation line between preliminary or definitional 
issues and methodological issues is very thin, if existent at all, it has to be acknowledged 
that the accent of this dissertation is set on foundational matters. Basic definitional 
contentions and reflections on the role of analytical tools are focused on. The word 
“underground” in the second half of the title refers exactly to the basicness or prelim-
inarity on which the main focus of this research is set. Underground in this context 
should not be understood in the sense of marginal, as indeed for example issues con-
nected with legal pluralism are nowadays emerging to the fore in many branches of 
legal scholarship. Rather, the term refers to issues which are primordial. Their lying 
underground implies that they pertain not only to legal comparison when narrowly 
defined, but that they can also be of use to the study of law in general and certainly 
aim at having some kind of relevance also in law as conceived by anthropologists and 
philosophers25. Nevertheless, they concern also legal comparison, in the sense that they 
determine what kind of legal comparison can be carried out. In this sense, those issues 
belong to the methodology of comparison. Although the theory of comparative legal 
studies as a field is the underlying research basis of each paper, there are three main 
sub-themes represented in the dissertation: otherness, pluralism and context. Overall, a 
fundamental approach to legal comparativism is suggested, one that attempts to bypass 
the risks connected with simplification.
18 David Kennedy, “New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and International Governance”, 
Utah Law Review 2 (1997), 545-638.
19 Upendra Baxi, “The colonialist heritage”, in Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions, eds. 
Pierre Legrand and Roderick Munday (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 46-75.
20 Teemu Ruskola, “Legal Orientalism”, Michigan Law Review 101, no. 1 (2002), 179-234; Teemu Ruskola, 
Legal Orientalism: China, the United States, and Modern Law (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard 
University Press, 2013).
21 Ugo Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997).
22 Julia De Coninck, “Overcoming the Mere Heuristic Aspiration of (Functional) Comparative Legal Research? 
An exploration into the Possibilities and Limits of Behavioral Economics”, Global Jurist Topics 9, no. 11 (2009).
23 Irene Biglino, “Formants and Institutions: Intellectual Meeting Points between Rodolfo Sacco and Doug-
lass North”, Global Jurist 11, no. 2 (2011).
24 Günter Frankenberg, “Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law”, Harvard International Law 
Journal 26 (1985), 411-455.
25 In this way issues such as “countering ethnocentricity, responding to the challenges of multiculturalism, 
and recognizing legal pluralism” have brought comparative legal studies into areas of debate that are familiar 
in contemporary legal theory. Roger Cotterrell, “Comparative Law and Legal Culture”, in Oxford Handbook 
of Comparative Law, eds. Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford Universi-
ty Press, 2008), 710-737, p. 728; and also Richard Hyland, “Comparative Law”, in A Companion to Philosophy 
of Law and Legal Theory, ed. Dennis Patterson, I ed. (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 1996), 184-199, p. 197. 
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1.2. Structure of the thesis
This is an article-based dissertation in which each article stands on its own and aims to 
make a different point, although certain basic concerns are common. The purpose of 
this synthesis is to highlight these common themes. The articles are reproduced with 
the permission of the journals in the second part of this thesis as they have been pub-
lished. This opening section aims to provide a common space where the general project 
underlying the scattered articles is discussed in detail. 
One very relevant underlying thread is a sensibility for issues surrounding the 
cognoscibility of the laws to be compared and the historicity of comparative legal 
knowledge. This epistemological concern is presented in the articles as referring to the 
subject matter of each of them, but due to word-count restrictions it was not possible 
to dedicate space to my own lengthy reflexive disclosures. This is done, once and for 
all, in “2.1. Method as path” section, and the posture is then further contextualised in 
“2.2. Method ¬ objectivity”. The following section “2.3. Method as methods” sketches 
a possible critique of method without going too much into details; as this thesis focuses 
on methodology I wanted to spare the reader from the dazzling feeling of standing 
in-between two mirrors facing one another. Following this, the articles are then 
shortly presented: in section “2.4. The articles” the focus is not so much on their main 
subject-matter, but rather the aim there is to highlight what is the cognitive exercise 
performed in each article and to make explicit how the epistemological concern men-
tioned above is manifested. At that point of the synthesis, the reader will probably have 
a clear enough vision of what my project is about, and the fatidic “research question” 
issue can be approached. This is done mainly by presenting doubts concerning the pos-
sibility and opportunity of formulating a research question for the kind of theoretical 
work undertaken in this dissertation. 
Chapter 3 presents a brief history of the discipline of comparative law, with the aim 
of bringing out the variations in method that have taken place and to situate within this 
history the recent methodological discussion to which my writings also belong. The 
purpose of this chapter is to show how much theory of comparative law has changed 
over time. At times, legal comparison has drifted along with the currents of its own 
Zeitgeist; for example, displaying encyclopaedic and ethnocentric tendencies when it 
was practiced under the name of Rechtsethnologie in the eighteenth century or when it 
adopted the enthusiastic tones of belief in progress during the Paris Congress in 1900. 
Its development has sometimes been the result of the accidents of personal stories, such 
as those of the scholars who fled the Nazi-regime and were confronted with a new legal 
environment. At times it also has been in clear opposition to the dominant approach-
es to law, fighting to overcome the narrow national focus or the even the narrower 
black-letter focus. That this relatively recent academic practice has undergone such 
radical methodological vicissitudes speaks for its substance. There is something there, 
some theoretical matter that deserves to be studied. 
Chapter 4 tackles the three underground issues in comparative legal studies men-
tioned in the title. Otherness, pluralism and context are given independent standing, 
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regardless of the way they had to be squeezed, bent and manipulated in order to fit the 
article-format. The synthesis allows for a broader scope and a more didactic style of 
writing, which hopefully will help to overcome certain shortcuts that were necessary in 
the drafting of the articles.
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2.  Method 
2.1. Method as path
My personal interest in research was originally ignited when encountering the theoret-
ical debate on methodology that has taken place within the comparative law field. This 
discussion provided a point of access to many philosophical matters that had remained 
until that moment impossible to grasp. The Legal Cultures in Transnational World 
(LeCTra) Doctoral Programme offered a very well-tailored environment for such re-
search interests as its fourth paradigmatic area is devoted to the theories and methods 
of multicultural legal studies. This refers to questions related to “culturally transmitted 
information about what is law (ontology), where do we acquire knowledge of it (episte-
mology), and what kind of approaches we should use while seeking information about 
law and different understandings of law (methodology)”. LeCTra “draws heavily on 
these discussions when developing and testing its specific theories and methods and 
approaches looking under the surfaces of formal law”26. My publications are based 
on the writings of the many authors who have visited LeCTra seminars and events in 
Lapland over the years. An important part of the research process is the realisation that 
the material we work on is written by living humans with whom one can discuss and 
exchange ideas. 
A 10-month research visit in Paris in 2012-2013 allowed me to become acquainted 
with the comparative approach propounded by Pierre Legrand, which is an approach 
partly in opposition with the Trento thesis27, the Manifesto28 of Italian legal comparison 
drafted at the very university were I studied. It is in that time that my readings delved 
deeper into Emmanuel Levinas’ philosophy, and I tried to combine it with the theory of 
legal comparison. The subsequent intellectual inquiry led naturally towards legal theo-
ry and in particular towards questions concerning the understanding, conceptualising 
and rendering of very different notions of the legal. The encounter with radically differ-
ent normativities brings about questions about the researcher’s own assumptions and 
preconceptions. This jurisprudential debate is truly total in nature: it includes not only 
the confrontation of different general theories of law but also different methodologies 
of legal research, and ultimately it includes epistemological questions concerning our 
very capability to know or what is the nature of our knowledge about law. It has been 
26 LeCTra Action Plan, p. 2.
27 Pierre Legrand, “Questions à Rodolfo Sacco”, Révue Internationale De Droit Comparé 47, no. 4 (1995), 
943-971.
28 It will be presented below.
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interesting to discover that analogous challenges and debates had been also troubling 
legal anthropologists. And based on my readings and reflections of the intersection be-
tween empirical approaches to law and analytical (dogmatic) legal theory, I produced 
two papers on legal pluralism. Eventually, I actually carried out a comparison, with 
the main focus being the issue of diversity. However, instead of dealing with diversity 
among different laws, the comparison concerned the diversity among different people 
as seen through legal lenses. I chose to focus on France and Germany as they provide 
suitable historical examples of opposite approaches to issues of belonging to the na-
tional community and legal reactions to inhomogeneity of society due to immigration. 
I deemed myself to have sufficient understanding of the two systems to tackle them as 
I had studied law and lived in both countries. Further, research visits to both countries 
while drafting the article have allowed deeper insights into the respective literature. 
What follows is the intellectual and physical path that led me to this point: I was 
trained as a comparative lawyer in Italy by Rodolfo Sacco’s disciples, became interested 
in theory and the critical approach and then in legal anthropology and legal theory, 
which led me to travel and visit both France and Germany. Finally, I tried to use the 
substantive knowledge and sensibility gained about those continental European legal 
systems to compare them. This brief narration should serve as a sort of disclaimer of 
what my standing point is. Everything that is written in this dissertation is very much 
the product of the rarely coherent, never efficient path just depicted. To paraphrase 
Legrand, every single word of this compilation is the result of 
My Very Best Interpretation of the [issues at hand, presented below] as I s[a]
t in [the] [Rovaniemi,] Paris [and Berlin] Libraries at this Stage in my Early 
Career and at this Juncture in My Life; in the Light of my overall Education 
Including my Institutionalization into ‘Law’ and into ‘Comparative Law’, My 
Linguistic Competence in French [, English, German and Italian] and my Cul-
tural Familiarity With France [and Germany]; on the Basis of My Experience as 
a Comparatist-at-Law and of My Acquaintance with [Italian,] French [and Ger-
man] Law in Particular; Given What I Wanted to Establish; and by Reference 
to the Materials I Came Across in [Rovaniemi,] Paris [and Berlin], the Texts I 
Decided to Use, the Arguments I Chose to Mobilize, the Evidence I Elected to 
Retain, the Quotations I Opted to Feature and the Words I Preferred to Deploy 
in Order to Account for What Inevitably Remains Less Than the Whole29.
In other words, this method as path signifies that this chapter is not the result of a 
misprint of what should have been included in the Acknowledgements30. Those (ap-
parently) external details of the circumstances under which the texts have been written 
29 Pierre Legrand, “Negative Comparative Law”, Journal of Comparative Law 10, no. 2 (2015), 405-454, p. 
426.
30 Finnish doctoral dissertations feature the ”Acknowledgements” at the very beginning, and this part of the 
manuscript is usually devoted to giving thanks to the various people and institutions that have followed and 
supported the researcher.
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are actually already part of the content31. A (short) story about the writer is methodo-
logically relevant, as it is a statement on the conditions that limit the knowledge pro-
duced in this dissertation. This work opts for an understanding of knowledge (more 
precisely, academic scholarship on the topics of the meta-theory of laws and of legal 
comparison) that highlights its situatedness. This is not necessarily always the case in 
comparative law32, but the stance taken here is that the meaning of objectivity in legal 
and comparative legal studies cannot be taken for granted and deserves to be reflected 
upon. 
2.2.  Method ¬ objectivity
At least since Günter Frankenberg’s seminal article appeared in 1985 in the Harvard 
International Law Journal, objectivity has become a central issue in the methodological 
debate. His article explicitly states at the outset that 
because of comparative legal scholarship’s faith in an objectivity that allows 
culturally biased perspectives to be represented as ‘neutral’ the practice of com-
parative law is inconsistent with the discipline’s high principles and goals. In 
response, this essay will suggest a critical approach that recognizes the problem 
of perspective as a central and determinative element33. 
Along similar lines the present work asserts its own situatedness within the legal cul-
ture(s) I was exposed to and my own experience as a researcher. Moreover, this dis-
sertation distances itself from the idea that the comparative perspective would allow 
the comparatist to attain a “bird’s eye view”. The reasons and the implications of this 
approach are discussed more in detail in the first three essays (presented below), which 
all address from different angles the epistemological position of the comparatist. The 
title of this section thus means that method is not a way to achieve objectivity, which 
is therefore negated by the logical “not” sign ¬. In a way, objectivity is taken away from 
the idea of method34.
In contrast to this stance, various schools of thought of juridical comparison have 
tried to urge the comparatist to abandon her prejudices in order to produce neutral and 
31 Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-Thinking Comparative Law, 411-455, p. 434.
32 For an example of an approach that completely refuses to take into consideration its own situatedness, see 
Otto Pfersmann, “Le droit comparé comme interprétation et comme théorie du droit “, Revue Internationale 
De Droit Comparé 53, no. 2 (2001), 257-288.
33 Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-Thinking Comparative Law, 411-455, p. 441.
34 The use of the logical sign is mainly meant to be ironical. However, it also signifies that often, even when 
trying to go beyond a certain way of looking at things, we still need to use the language of the paradigm to be 
overcome. Thirdly, the use of the logical sign is also a way to re-evoke the significance of objectivity as a key 
theme, as an indirect way to maintain the importance of the avoided theme (I am indebted to Juha Karhu for 
making me notice this third point).
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objective knowledge35. In this way for example the conception of knowledge advanced 
by Zweigert and Kötz has been shown to rely on the one of René Descartes36, as in their 
classic textbook comparison is presented as a “school of truth”37. According to Legrand, 
the German authors share the Cartesian ambition to elaborate a pure thought, freed 
from distortions caused by subjectivity. Their epistemological sophistication foresees 
that the knowing subject gets rid of all preconceptions, of all emotional attachments 
and of all distractions of bodily origin in order to reach, following a clear method, 
incontestable knowledge38. 
Another example is provided by the Trento theses, the cultural manifesto of Italian 
comparison developed by Sacco in 198739. The second thesis, for example, is formulat-
ed as follows: 
Comparison focuses its attention on the different legal phenomena as they 
have been concretely realized in the past or in the present, following a criterion 
according to which it is considered real what has concretely happened. In this 
sense, comparison has the same validation criterion of historical sciences40. 
Such an approach does not take into account the broad scope of the epistemological 
debate in the historical sciences41 but refers to a very precise validation criterion, the 
verum ipsum factum by Giovanni Battista Vico42. This stance was motivated by the 
will to overcome strict positivism and to extend the scope of legal comparison beyond 
unverifiable dogmatic statements and to make space for sociology of law and law-in-
action43. This is assuredly a laudable intent, but unfortunately it causes a setting aside 
35 Zweigert and Kötz, Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung auf dem Gebiete des Privatrechts, p. 36.
36 Legrand, Paradoxically, Derrida, 631, pp. 645–54. 
37 Zweigert and Kötz, Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung auf dem Gebiete des Privatrechts, p. 14 [“école de 
verité”].
38 Legrand, Paradoxically, Derrida, 631, pp. 645–46.
39 http://www.jus.unitn.it/dsg/convegni/tesi_tn/le_tesi.htm [14/1/2017]. For an authentic interpretation 
of the theses see Antonio Gambaro, Pier Giuseppe Monateri and Rodolfo Sacco, “Comparazione Giuridica”, 
in Digesto delle discipline privatistiche - sezione civile, Vol. III (Turin: UTET, 1990), 51-56.
40 “La comparazione rivolge la sua attenzione ai varii fenomeni giuridici concretamente realizzati nel passato 
o nel presente, secondo un criterio per cui si considera reale ciò che è concretamente accaduto. In questo 
senso, la comparazione ha lo stesso criterio di validazione delle scienze storiche”.
41 See for example Jacques Revel, “Les sciences historiques”, in Épistémologie des sciences sociales, ed. 
Jean-Michel Berthelot (Paris: P.U.F., 2012), 21-76. It is interesting to note that the expression which descri-
bes history as the attempt to present things “the way [they] really happened” [”wie [sie] eigentlich gewesen 
[sind]”], attributed to Leopold von Ranke, was not intended as an “epistemological programme” or as the 
rallying cry it has become. Id., p. 45. 
42 Rodolfo Sacco, “Comparazione e conoscenza del dato giuridico positivo”, in L’apporto della comparazione 
alla scienza giuridica, ed. Rodolfo Sacco (Milan: Giuffré, 1980), p. 246. See also Rodolfo Sacco, “Legal For-
mants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law (Installment I of II)”, The American Journal of Compara-
tive Law 39, no. 1 (1991), 1-34, p. 26. 
43 Antonio Gambaro, “The Trento Theses “, Global Jurist Frontiers 4, no. 1 (2004). Still, every time the aut-
hor tackles the question of the epistemological foundations of the second thesis, he sets the problem aside as 
if it would concern only the preconceptions and the mentality underlying the studied laws and not those of 
the comparatist herself.
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of the necessarily biased perspective of the comparatist. Furthermore, the fifth thesis 
foresees that: 
Knowledge of a juridical system is not the monopoly of the jurist belonging to 
the system; if, on the one hand, he is advantaged by the abundance of infor-
mation, on the other hand he will be hindered by the bias that the theoretical 
statements of the system are completely coherent with the operational rules of 
the considered system44. 
The insider and the comparative jurists do not work in the same way: the latter is 
supposed to look at the law neutrally, while the former is a biased participant in the 
normative system45. To summarise: the second thesis refers to the comparandum as that 
what has “concretely happened”, and the fifth to the comparatist as an external observ-
er. As a result, the epistemological status of knowledge acquired through comparison is 
considered to be objective and scientific46.
In opposition to the two approaches presented here which strive to develop an 
objective and descriptive comparative methodology, the articles develop a different 
perspective which problematises the comparatist’s position. That is, the nature of the 
knowledge produced depends also on the perspective and on the theoretical framework 
of the researcher. This “epistemological awareness” is developed throughout the articles, 
but while there it is applied to the topics treated respectively, here the aim is to state it 
also for the whole work undertaken in this dissertation. As the possibility of objectivity 
as absolute knowledge is negated, the whole idea of method has to be re-thought. 
2.3.  Method as methods
Once the unavoidability of methodological issues connected with the perspective of 
the researcher is acknowledged, comparison can start – or continue, since it has always 
already started – following various further paths. While in the previous sub-chapter 
the emphasis was set on the importance of the departing point, now the modi operandi 
(in plural) will be put in the spotlight. As the title already suggests, the first contention 
is that there is not one preferred method, but many. This may sound like a very naïve 
and commonsensical contention, but it is not that long ago when comparative lawyers 
were arguing normatively in favour of the one right method47. Still, in the comparative 
44 “La conoscenza di un sistema giuridico non è monopolio del giurista appartenente al sistema dato; se da 
una parte è favorito dall’abbondanza delle informazioni, sarà però impacciato più di ogni altro dal presup-
posto che gli enunciati teoretici presenti nel sistema siano pienamente coerenti con le regole operazionali del 
sistema considerate”.
45 See also Antonio Gambaro, Rodolfo Sacco and Louis Vogel, Le droit de l’Occident et d’ailleurs (Paris: 
L.G.D.J., 2011), p. 3.
46 Gambaro, Monateri and Sacco, Comparazione Giuridica, 51-56.
47 For one recent example see Oliver Brand, “Conceptual Comparison: Towards a Coherent Methodology 
of Comparative Legal Studies”, Brooklyn Journal of International Law 32, no. 2 (2007), 405-466.
24 | Patrignani: Otherness, Pluralism and Context – Underground issues in comparative legal studies
literature many methods are used. This is shown also by the presence of scholarly pub-
lications that present and discuss a variety of available methods48. The purpose here 
is not to repeat what has already been done by others, so in the following I will not 
provide a list of possible methods. Instead, the question that will be discussed here is: 
where does the pluralisation of methods stem from? 
To begin with, the pluralisation of methods has come about in connection to the 
pluralisation of contemporary laws and normative phenomena in Europe49 and beyond. 
National legal systems are not the only type of normative orders that can possibly be in-
cluded in the sphere of interest of the comparatist. There are also “large scale organised 
normativit[ies]”50, such as international organisations. But it has to be stressed how 
the differentiation between national and international is fading as many norms imple-
mented at national level are of international origin (and vice versa), and overall global 
relations of interdependence between different levels have given rise to transnational 
legal phenomena. The same can be said about small-scale organised normativities, 
which exist within or across state boundaries. They might be of a more or less official 
nature, and the kind of recognition they might enjoy at state level also varies51. Overall, 
these transformations in the legal world “out there” challenge the Westphalian concep-
tion of the world and of law not only ontologically but also epistemologically: because 
the legal and normative phenomena are so different, the way to study and compare 
them has to always be re-adjusted. There is no method that would be valid for every 
legal domain. As it is not possible to separate the method from the context, there is a 
plurality of methods depending on the laws studied.
Moreover, the pluralisation of methods is partly a consequence of the pluralisation 
of the cognitive aims of comparison itself. Depending on the specific purposes of the 
research there is a “sliding scale of methods”52 among which to choose. The depth of 
the study is determined by the knowledge-interest: no approach is right or wrong as 
such, but each provides only partial access to reality and therefore permits a concrete 
phenomenon to be understood only partially53. The choice of method is one of the 
first that needs to be met by each scholar for herself. For example, if a scholar compares 
for a practical purpose or in connection with the drafting of legislation or in view of 
harmonisation, she will need a different method than someone who compares with the 
48 For a quick attempt to present a list of possible methods see for example Mark Van Hoecke, “Methodology 
of comparative legal research”, Law and Method (2015). For an encompassing overview of the different met-
hods that have concretely been deployed in comparative legal studies see Siems, Comparative Law. For older 
overviews of methods see Anne Peters and Heiner Schwenke, “Comparative Law beyond Post-Modernism”, 
The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 49, no. 4 (2000), 800-834 or Vernon Valentin Palmer, 
“From Lerotholi to Lando: Some Examples of Comparative Law Methodology”, The American Journal of 
Comparative Law 53, no. 1 (2005), 261-290.
49 Jaakko Husa, “The Method is Dead, Long Live the Methods - European Polynomia and Pluralist Method-
ology”, Legisprudence 5 (2011), 249-271.
50 Husa, A New Introduction to Comparative Law, p. 110.
51 On the pluralisation of the concept of law, see the dedicated subchapter below (4.2.).
52 Palmer, From Lerotholi to Lando: Some Examples of Comparative Law Methodology, 261-290, p. 290.
53 Samuel, An Introduction to Comparative Law Theory and Method, pp. 92 – 95. Geoffrey Samuel, “Taking 
Methods Seriously (Part Two)”, Journal of Comparative Law 2, no. 2 (2007), 210-237, pp. 232-233.
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aim of understanding the cause of similarities and differences or of classifying legal cul-
tures or of developing further the theory and method of comparative law itself54. Husa 
draws the conclusion that there are as many different fields in comparison as there are 
legitimate ways to compare. Instead of a “ready-made choose-and-use or one-size fits all 
methodology”55 the scholar has the final responsibility to choose what analytical tools 
to deploy, based on the subject matter and her cognitive interests.
Simone Glanert calls for a total resignification of method as methods depend on 
the studied domain and on the purposes of the research as mentioned above, added 
to the fact that method does not guarantee objectivity and scholarly work is never a 
mere description and is instead a re-presentation (a presentation anew) and a fictional 
discourse56. According to the author, “method” is in need of a re-signification that goes 
against its own etymology57: sure enough the word originates from the Greek “metho-
dos”, which is a compound of the prefix “meta-“ (means after, behind and also beyond 
and expresses also development) and the suffix “hodos” (means the way or manner). It 
thus signifies a pursuit, a following after and later also a way of inquiry58. In opposition 
to such an understanding of method as being “the road to knowledge”, Glanert prob-
lematises its very utility. Drawing further on the importance of pre-understanding and 
prejudices in the theory of modern hermeneutics as developed by Hans-Georg Gad-
amer and on the instability of meaning as theorised by Jacques Derrida, she concludes 
that method proves to be rather an “epistemological obstacle”59. Alternatively she 
envisages a “post-methodological configuration which […] would allow comparatists 
to reclaim an agential space as they assume responsibility for their own strategic deci-
sion”60. Unless one wants to disregard completely the debates in philosophy of science, 
hermeneutics and the contribution of the schools of thought such as legal realism and 
critical legal studies, the “innocence” of method is to be considered as “unveiled” and 
comparison recognised as ethical performance and a political act61. This seems to be in 
line also with Husa’s assertion that “the most important and possibly the only actual 
tool for study is an open and inquisitive mind”62 together with sound research ethics. 
To sum up, from method being the one right way we have gone to the pluralisation 
of methods and now arrive at the conclusion that the theory and methodology of com-
54 Husa, A New Introduction to Comparative Law, pp. 140 – 143. See also Maurice Adams, “Doing What 
Doesn’t Come Naturally. On the Distinctiveness of Comparative Law”, in Methodologies of Legal Research - 
Which Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline?, ed. Mark Van Hoecke (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: 
Hart Publishing, 2011), 229-240, p. 236.
55 Husa, A New Introduction to Comparative Law, p. 142.
56 Simone Glanert, “Method?”, in Methods of Comparative Law, ed. Pier Giuseppe Monateri (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2012), 61-81.
57 Id., p. 65.
58 See entry “method” in Ernest Klein, A Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of the English Language , 
Vol. II (Amsterdam: Elsevier Publishing Company, 1967), p. 973.
59 Glanert, Method?, 61-81, p. 81.
60 Ibid.
61 Günter Frankenberg, “The Innocence of Method - Unveiled: Comparison as an Ethical and Political Act”, 
The Journal of Comparative Law 9, no. 2 (2014), 222-258, p. 231.
62 Husa, A New Introduction to Comparative Law, pp. 142-143.
26 | Patrignani: Otherness, Pluralism and Context – Underground issues in comparative legal studies
parative legal studies is of a heuristic nature63, which calls for a strong research ethics. 
This theme is recurring in the articles and has been at the very centre of my research 
interests for many years. Following the debate on the role and nature of methods in 
comparative law, I have tried to figure out what research ethics entails. The first three 
essays are small contributions to the reflexion on the difficult position of the researcher 
once the pluralisation and fragmentation of method has left her alone with a multi-
plicity of (possibly conflicting) analytical tools. The fourth article is different as it tries 
to carry out a comparison taking these almost-paralysing methodological caveats into 
account. I have not followed any specific method as it would have been in contradic-
tion with everything written above, and I had to heuristically make my political and 
ethical choices. 
Overall, my aim has never been to provide solutions or ways out but rather to critical-
ly analyse the constraints under which the comparatist has to take her methodological 
choices and strategic decisions. The articles could be read as reminders to comparative 
lawyers about what it is that they have to acknowledge, or take into account, when 
embarking on comparison. Hence, in a way they are contributions on methodology 
or on what is left of it after the resignification of method described above: a bunch of 
analytical tools and research ethics. This much is what can be said about all of them on 
the whole: more specific methodological reflection has to be carried out separately for 
each of them. 
2.4.  The articles
The dissertation contains three articles and a book chapter; each looking at one par-
ticular topic. Given the nature of the issues dealt with and the arguments made this 
approach was favoured over a monograph. In this subchapter, the content of these 
essays is presented, and particular attention is devoted to the way in which each of 
them incorporates the sensibility for epistemological reflection as presented in the 
three preceding sub-chapters.
2.4.1.  Levinasian alterity
The contribution “Alterity according to Emmanuel Levinas and Comparison of Laws”64 
was first written in French, then shortened and translated into English. The starting 
point is the idea that a conception of otherness is necessary for any comparison. The 
main theoretical assertion is that the relationship to the Other suggested by Levinas can 
help the comparatist position herself in regard to the foreign laws under consideration. 
Three aspects of Levinas’ thinking are developed in the text, the first of which is the rad-
ical heterogeneity of the Other. According to the kind of idea of otherness adopted, the 
63 Id., pp. 145–146.
64 Emma Patrignani, “Alterity according to Emmanuel Levinas and Comparison of Laws”, in Le droit comparé 
et.../ Comparative Law and.., eds. Alexis Albarian and Olivier Moréteau (Aix-en-Provence: Presses Universi-
taires d’Aix-Marseille, 2016), 437-446.
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jurist will opt for a different definition of comparison and will conceptualise the laws 
differently. A conception that recognises the radical heterogeneity of the Other avoids 
imposing domestic legal conceptions on the foreign laws studied. Secondly, the critical 
assessment of knowledge conceived as appropriation is thematised, as it influences the 
epistemological situation of the comparatist, her ideas about what she can understand 
of the different and the kind of knowledge she focuses on. Lastly, the conceptualisation 
of otherness brings about consequences concerning the responsibility of the knowing 
subject or, in Levinasian terms, the establishment of an ethical relation to the Other.
This paper carries out a sort of interdisciplinary work in the sense that a certain spe-
cific idea taken from a neighbouring discipline, namely philosophy, is made to interact 
with theory of legal comparison. Primary and secondary literature by and about Levi-
nas on Otherness is analysed keeping in mind the role of the comparatist towards the 
laws compared. While reading, I had to select what I thought could be issues relevant 
to this kind of relation, as indeed neither Levinas himself nor the secondary literature 
mention legal comparison. And, as he sketches an understanding based on dialogue, 
I deemed his philosophy to contain persuasive arguments toward a certain kind of 
comparison. In particular for the purposes of this introductory synthesis it is relevant 
to underline how the Levinasian critique of knowledge as appropriation, if applied to 
legal comparison, leaves us with an understanding of legal scholarship that is not accu-
mulative. That is, not an exhaustible kind of knowledge where there is a finite heap of 
stacked notions about the foreign law. Rather, law is suitable for endless interpretations 
and explanations, and each comparatist will choose her argumentative path, what in-
formation to select and what literature to resort to. According to this view, comparative 
legal studies do not produce universally valid knowledge, and the comparatist cannot 
hide behind an alleged neutrality. On the contrary, she is responsible for the images of 
the other law she produces and for her own methodological choices. This introduces 
the issue of the ethics of research in general and more particularly of comparison. 
It has to be emphasized that Levinas did not write his philosophy as a basis for a cer-
tain kind of research method. His thoughts on the conception of otherness and of the 
relation of the self to the other are made to interact with the theory of legal comparison 
in a way that entails a double “reading”: firstly, towards law in general and comparative 
law in particular, and secondly towards methodologically relevant themes. Overall, the 
chapter does not provide a straightforward application of his philosophy, but rather 
Levinasian Alterity (the way I read it) is used to give philosophical standing to the 
epistemological shift from “method as a road to knowledge” to “research responsibility 
and ethics” as introduced above. 
2.4.2.  Theoretical programmes
The article “Legal Pluralism as Theoretical Programme”65 chronicles the trajectory of 
the theory of legal pluralism. Originally introduced by anthropologists as a descriptive 
65 Emma Patrignani, “Legal Pluralism as Theoretical Programme”, Oñati Socio-Legal Series 6, no. 3 (2016), 
707-725.
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label in order to account for normative phenomena observed during fieldwork, now-
adays a less naïve understanding of the term is needed. The article presents how legal 
pluralism, if conceived as a theoretical programme, becomes a normative analytical 
tool. Epistemic reflexivity is applied to the concept by illustrating how this norma-
tivity works, or in other words, how the theoretical programme chosen affects the 
results. This happens as the theoretical programme adopted guides the researcher in 
the selection of the relevant data and in the legitimate forms of explanation. Indeed 
the whole debate between legal monists and pluralists has been turning around on 
what kind of normative phenomena should be considered relevant for the purpose 
of legal scholarship, with the pluralists striving to enlarge the definition of law from 
the strict “stately-enacted rules” idea. Moreover three contemporary theories of legal 
pluralism are studied with the aim of identifying the legitimate forms of explanation 
underlying them, that is, the connections between the facts that are looked for. The 
whole argument is developed without mentioning its applicability to comparative legal 
studies, but obviously the comparatists also face the other law with a certain theory of 
law in mind, and therefore the argument developed in the article is pertinent to legal 
comparison as well66.
 In the article the notion of theoretical programme as adapted by Jean-Michel 
Berthelot to the social sciences is applied to legal pluralism. This paper develops a 
reflection on the epistemological status of legal pluralism as a theory of law; in other 
words, the article purports to investigate the nature of empirical knowledge produced 
by approaching legal phenomena with pluralist lenses. All the attention is therefore 
devoted to the space between the knower and the known, avoiding any simplifying 
claims of objectivism. The conclusion is that the concept of legal pluralism, as any other 
theory adopted, enables research and at the same time limits the space for manoeuvre: 
this awareness shall not discourage the production of knowledge but make it more 
realistic. Taken as a whole, this article examines very closely in what way knowledge 
of legal phenomena (be they foreign or domestic) can never be absolute and therefore 
contributes to the discussion presented in the previous chapter on the inaptitude of 
method to guarantee (a certain kind of ) objectivity. 
2.4.3.  Complexity theory
 The other article about legal pluralism is entitled “Complex Legal Pluralism”67, which 
analyses the challenges that arise at the crossroads between abstraction-oriented juris-
prudence and empirically oriented approaches to law. It considers that legal pluralism 
allows for an understanding of law as a complex phenomenon, and this conception 
66 In fact the whole idea of the article stems from Geoffrey Samuel’s schemes of intelligibility theory, which 
he has been developing in connection to the theory of comparative law in various publications. Q.v. Geof-
frey Samuel, “Epistemology and Comparative Law: Contributions from the Sciences and Social Sciences”, in 
Epistemology and Methodology of Comparative Law, ed. Mark Van Hoecke (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004), 
35-77, pp. 57-74; Geoffrey Samuel, “Taking Methods Seriously (Part One)”, Journal of Comparative Law 2, 
no. 1 (2007), 94-119, pp. 105-110; and more recently Samuel, An Introduction to Comparative Law Theory 
and Method, pp. 81 – 95.
67 Emma Patrignani, “Complex Legal Pluralism”, Retfærd Årgang 38, no. 4/151 (2015), 19-33.
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brings along consequences concerning the theory of knowledge about law. Complexity 
theory as developed by Edgar Morin is combined with theory of law; the result being 
a pluralist understanding of legal pluralism. This article aims to make a similar point to 
the previous article in that it discusses the nature of our understanding of legal plural-
ism and argues that our discernment of it is not abstract or general. 
No abstract and general laws can be formulated about complex systems, and rather 
knowledge about them is characterised by singularity, locality and temporality. This 
means that each rendering of complex systems cannot ignore contingent aspects of 
them, including the contingent perspective of every specific observer. As stated already 
in the previous article, the outlook of the researcher studying legal pluralism matters. 
Here this point is used to argue further the reason for why legal pluralism (if one is 
ready to follow the understanding of it advanced in this article) is better protected than 
other theories of law from the risk of wrongly assuming its own generality or universal 
applicability. Once again, the discussion is about the nature of legal theory and about 
the influence of the outlook of the observer on the knowledge she can have of the law. 
It should be underlined that the focus is neither on the factual legal pluralist situation 
nor on its desirability. The article does not discuss the ontology of legal pluralism but 
its epistemology68. In this sense, it is a reflection that is relevant to the comparatist as 
well, as she will also have to face the complexity of foreign law. Given the particularity 
of her own comparative endeavour, she has to be aware of the possibilities to avoid the 
pitfalls of general theories of law through the tools provided by complexity theory. 
Such a complexification of the concept of law does not make the position of the re-
searcher necessarily easier, but complexity theory does provide some conceptual tools 
to handle it. The article closes with a reference to the ethics of research. This renewed 
understanding of legal pluralism as a complex system (and as such being a theory that 
states its own contingency and perpetual need for re-definition) also states the una-
voidable responsibility involved in making methodological choices. 
2.4.4.  Diversity in society
After taking all of this epistemological awareness into consideration, still the impossi-
ble will be done: laws will be compared. This is the spirit of the fourth article “Over-
coming Essentialisation – A comparative study of ‘Living Together’-conceptions”69, 
which compares two Constitutional Courts’ decisions that judge the constitutionality 
of Statues forbidding Islamic veils. The first judgement is the French Decision n. 2010 
– 613 DC, rendered on 7 October 2010 by the Constitutional Council. The second is 
the German order in the cases 1 BvR 471/10 and 1 BvR 1181/10, rendered on the 27 
January 2015 by the First Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court.
The two decisions are placed within their respective context. They are not taken 
to represent “the” French and “the” German legal answer to the veil or to contain the 
68 See the differentiation by Morin between restricted complexity and general complexity. Edgar Morin, 
”Restricted complexity, general complexity”, (2005).
69 Emma Patrignani, “Overcoming essentialisation: A comparative study of ‘living-together’ conceptions”, 
International Journal of Law in Context (2017), 1-22. doi:10.1017/S1744552317000210.
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ultimate definitions of the courts of “what it means to live together” in each society. 
The two decisions are considered as documents in which the deciding organs at least 
implicitly state something about the French and German ways of living together: they 
are steps in the processes in which meanings are negotiated within the French and Ger-
man legal evolution. Being cultural products of their respective society, they constitute 
possible starting points for analysis. The essentialisation to be overcome (to which the 
title refers) is not the essentialisation of the “other” veil-wearing woman but in this case 
of the French and German attitudes towards diversity in society. This article purports 
to show how both cultural contexts are complex, multi-stranded and shifting over 
time, and thus the study of the context is used as a means to overcome simplifying and 
stereotyping explanations. Therefore, already at the outset the article states that legal 
cultures are understood as mixed, non-pure compounds and that the aim in re-present-
ing the French and German conceptions of living together is to defend a law-in-context 
approach that overcomes essentialisation.
While reading and looking for the appropriate way to formulate the argument I had 
to realise how, in practice, the choice of scheme of intelligibility determines what is 
conceived of as relevant70. The methodological tool constitutes the “object” of compar-
ison and vice versa: the process and the object of comparison mutually construct one 
another. So, while the article is an interpretation of French and German law, it does not 
focus on the substantive law or on the legal reasoning carried out by the courts. Rather, 
given the “object” of comparison – the conceptions of living together- the focus is on 
the vision of society entailed in the judgements. While the beginning of the research 
defined the main claim of this article, the line of argument (for example the choice 
to divide the analysis of the living together into three parts) and then the single steps 
within it (for example the choice to rely mainly on Rogers Brubacker’s reconstruction 
of the history of German nationality law, or on Jean Baubérot’s version of the history 
of laicity in France) were progressively shaped.
Overall, the “method” followed in the comparison carried out in this last article 
has very much been one of trial and error; in other words heuristic research of what 
could be an appropriate way of developing the argument and supporting it. By reading 
commentaries of the decisions and literature about both countries on the topic, the 
yardsticks of the conception of individual, of belonging to the national community 
and of secularism were identified as elements about which something relevant could 
emerge from both decisions. In this way, the procedure that led to the comparison 
70 As the texts are dissected with the aim of understanding the social and cultural ideas underlying them, the 
methodological tool chosen is probably fairly close to what Samuel defines as the hermeneutical intelligibility 
scheme, see Samuel, An Introduction to Comparative Law Theory and Method, pp. 86–87, and pp. 108–120. 
It has to be underlined though that the hermeneutical method as presented by Samuel (who relies heavily on 
Legrand’s approach) does not stress the complexity and variability within each context as vehemently as this 
article does. In this sense, the approach taken in the article is also similar to what Van Hoecke names “deep 
level comparative law”, in Mark Van Hoecke, “Deep Level Comparative Law”, in Epistemology and Methodol-
ogy of Comparative Law, ed. Mark Van Hoecke (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004), 165-195, in particular with 
reference to the conclusion he reaches concerning the existence of competing theories in each legal culture, 
pp. 189-191.
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carried out in this article cannot be said to have been one of setting the principles at the 
beginning (object of comparison, research question, method) and then just executing 
the programme. Rather, mutual co-shaping took place. 
I chose a middle line in regard to translation related issues71. The article is written 
as much as possible by pretending to ignore the fact that the sources are in different 
languages (so for example the names of the institutions, i.e. “Constitutional Council”, 
“Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court” and “Council of State” are used only 
in the English version), but the most salient passages of the compared decisions are 
reproduced in their original version in the text and have a translation in the footnotes. 
This approach was chosen for various reasons. To begin with, concerns over readabil-
ity and word count restrictions meant that the text had to be concise. Moreover, the 
overall focus of the article did not lay on the aspects of the legal cultures that could be 
read from the literal linguistic expressions contained in the texts, but rather it lay on 
what could be read between the lines in regard to the ideas underlying the texts. For ex-
ample the translated words “individual”, “citizen”, “national community”, “secularism” 
as well as the untranslated ones “laïcité” or “bekenntnisoffen” are contextualised and 
their meaning (with its variations over time) is discussed. That is to say, the sensitivity 
for the foreign language is manifested through the awareness for the foreign culture. 
Nevertheless, since the contextualisation is carried out in English and addressing an 
international audience, a certain level of semantic infidelity is unavoidable72.
To conclude, the first three publications (the book chapter and the two articles on legal 
pluralism) are more theoretical in nature and affirm similar points to the ones made 
in the previous sections on method. In contrast, the last article tries to implement the 
recommendations developed in the first three publications. As stated, the comparative 
work carried out there is not the result of a linear process but of continuous moves 
between methodological texts and substantial law and its history, as well as moves be-
tween French and German literature. This non-linearity has to be attested concerning 
the setting of the research question, as will be put forth next. 
2.5.  Research questions
Many of the questions tackled in the articles, such as the instability of the line to be 
drawn between what counts as legal culture and what as non-legally-relevant culture 
(culture-not-pertaining-to-the-legal), the significance of the concept of otherness for 
71 Comparative law methodology and legal translation are intrinsically connected, as argued for example 
by Jennifer Hendry, “Legal comparison and the (im)possibility of legal translation”, in Comparative Law - 
Engaging Translation, ed. Simone Glanert (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2014), 87-103. The issue is not 
addressed directly in this dissertation as it consists mainly of theoretical essays on other topics, but since this 
last article carries out a comparison and therefore multiple translations from French and German to English, 
the issue has to be at least mentioned.
72 Simone Glanert, “Comparaison et traduction des droits: à l’impossible tous sont tenus”, in Comparer les 
droits, résolument, ed. Pierre Legrand (Paris: PUF, 2009), 279-311, pp. 305-309.
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legal comparison or the non-universality of the theory of legal pluralism have gone 
unanswered. In other words, it would be incoherent with the nature of the academic 
work undertaken here to formulate a research question in the form of a hypothesis 
that is then proven to be right or wrong in the course of the analysis or in the form of 
a question expressing a desire to know something previously unknown. Rather, these 
texts merge together in a discussion that is never ending. Nevertheless, it is worth con-
tinuing this discussion, and with these texts I have added my own contribution. 
More precisely, the overarching aim of this dissertation is to argue in favour of a 
conception of legal comparative knowledge that is aware of the risks connected to 
reductionism and simplification73. Knowledge, and also juridical knowledge, is con-
structed as structured representations which necessarily are simpler and contain less 
information than the world they refer to74. This simplification can be very useful for 
pedagogic purposes. Think for example the taxonomies of the legal systems of the 
world, or the civil law – common law distinction: they help the novice to orientate in 
the jungle of theorical legal constructs. Indeed reducing the amount of information to 
be dealt with in structured representations is useful and human knowledge is based on 
cognitive structures. The schematization of the world, so as to render it in an ordered 
(almost geometrical) way is how the scientific spirit works75. Still, the overarching con-
cern of this dissertation is to argue that this also has limits, and that at least we should 
be aware of how these representations structure (and therefore also restrict) the way 
we think. In other words, what is being asserted and defended is the importance of the 
local, the particular, the troubling exception that forces us to re-think the structure, or 
maybe even the paradigm we are in. The general, the universal, the reduction to (stereo)
type are criticised – in particular in connection to the nature of legal knowledge. That 
is, instead of a search for an ever perfectible simple structure, the unknowability of 
the other and complexity should be embraced as starting point for an epistemological 
appreciation of legal knowledge.
The inquiry of the epistemological status of legal knowledge is indeed very broad to 
be dealt with in a journal article. Therefore for the individual papers a more precise way 
to approach the issue had to be found. Most significantly, I had to find a way of grasping 
such issues and to hack from the inchoate mass of possible conceptions something to 
hold on to. This then had to be carved into one thin handle, a line of thought, that 
would manage to stay afloat on its own. Therefore, the single questions tackled in the 
papers can be formulated as follows: “How can Levinasian Alterity help comparatists 
to overcome the conception of knowledge as apprehension?”; “How do the analytical 
tools influence the knowledge produced?”; and “How is legal pluralism, as a theory 
of law, better equipped against universalising tendencies?”. One cannot help noticing 
how questions formulated in this way have been formulated after the essays have been 
73 I am grateful to both the pre-examiners for making me realize how this point had to be stated explicitly in 
order to give a clearer sense of direction to the whole thesis and also to make it more intelligible.
74 Marie-Laure Mathieu, Les représentations dans la pensée des juristes (Paris: IRJS Éditions, 2014), pp. 237 
– 265.
75 Id., pp. 306 – 307.
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written. They are not research questions that were formulated before the research was 
undertaken but deliberately drafted afterwards. 
The fourth article focuses on practice and performs comparison. It does this by 
having a methodological concern and tries to answer the following question: “How 
can legal comparison be carried out in a way that is context-sensitive and at the same 
time not stereotyping or essentialising the compared laws?”. The answer is looked 
for by performing the comparison itself. Notwithstanding the fact that the object of 
comparison is the content of two constitutional courts’ decisions, the article’s most 
compelling concern is how comparison is performed. This is in line with the overall 
methodological focus of the dissertation. 
As stated above, because of the theoretical nature of the research undertaken, no un-
equivocal research question can be formulated. This is because we are led to assume that 
for every question there must be an answer, which may be right or wrong, or somehow 
contain a certain degree of truth. But this does not apply in the realm of interpretation, 
where the aim is rather to persuade the reader of the solidity of a certain way of looking 
at something.
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3.  History of the discipline and state of the art
As mentioned at the outset, the history of legal comparison is particularly interesting as 
different methodologies have been following one another; at times in consonance with 
certain philosophical currents and at times in open disagreement with ideas developed 
both outside and inside legal doctrine. It is therefore interesting to observe how differ-
ent thought structures underlie the different approaches to comparative legal studies 
that have succeeded each other in history, such as encyclopaedic aspirations, evolu-
tionist theories, scientific positivism and universalism. Similarly, also post-modern 
philosophy has influenced the methodology of comparative law. Broadly speaking, the 
history of methodology can be described as a history of the evolution of paradigms76. 
They are windows through which one can watch the world; windows that define the 
borders of the visible.
The aim here is not to provide a detailed historical reconstruction but rather to 
stress the high variability of actual research practices that have been striving to become 
accepted methodological attitudes within the academic field. That is to say, it will be 
highlighted how comparative legal studies have been very diverse, disparate even. Fur-
thermore, this chapter is built in a way that should highlight the historicity of the arti-
cles presented in the second part of the dissertation or clarify their historical context. 
3.1.  Illustrious precursors 
According to some historians of the discipline, legal comparison boasts illustrious pre-
cursors such as Aristotle’s Politics77, Plato’s Laws and Theophrastus’ On Laws78. Accord-
ing to others, those references to foreign rules and institutions are carried out in such 
an unsystematic and unreflected way that they cannot be considered to be properly 
 
76 Alessandro Somma, Temi e problemi di diritto comparato - vol II Techniche e valori nella ricerca comparat-
istica (Torino: Giappichelli Editore, 2005); Léontin-Jean Constantinesco, Traité de Droit Comparé - Tome I 
Introduction au Droit Comparé (Paris: L.G.D.J., R. Pichon et R. Durand-Auzias, 1972), pp. 8-9; This has also 
been claimed by Balázs Fekete in his doctoral dissertation: Paradigms of modern comparative law – toward 
a new interpretation of the history of comparative law, supervised by professor Zoltán Péteri (Pázmány Péter 
Catholic University, Budapest) in 2009.
77 Amari, Critica di una scienza delle legislazioni comparate, p. 164; Charles Donahue, “Comparative Law 
before the Code Napoléon”, in Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, eds. Mathias Reimann and Reinhard 
Zimmermann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 3-33, p. 20.
78 Zweigert and Kötz, Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung auf dem Gebiete des Privatrechts, p. 48.
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comparative79. Discordance can be traced also concerning the interest of roman legal 
scholars for alien legal rules. Some describe them as self-centred and convinced of the 
superiority of their own law80; they downplay the Greek influence on the redaction of 
the XII Tables81 and depicting the role of the praetor peregrinus in the formation of the 
jus gentium as not having comparative nature but rather being a prudent crystallisation 
of customs based on the necessities of Mediterranean merchants82. Others have tried 
to show the vastness of the actual influence of Egyptian and Middle Eastern ideas on 
Roman law83. Be that as it may, interest in foreign law alone is necessary but not suffi-
cient for comparison. 
A more systematic analysis of foreign law has been carried out by Charles de Sec-
ondat, Baron de Montesquieu who, in his De l’Esprit des Lois, studies the variability 
and the relation between social and natural conditions and the law84. Because he had 
an overall coherent approach, and declared that rules of law cannot be treated as ab-
stractions but must be regarded against their background and in the environment in 
which they are called upon to function, he is considered to be one of the founders of 
comparative law as a discipline85. Nevertheless, in the nineteenth century he received 
criticism by comparatists for lacking the necessary historical sensitivity that would 
have allowed him to recognise the right stage of development of the laws he studied86. 
More recently his work has been assessed in comparative legal literature as partisan; 
defending the status quo of the French monarchy as opposed to despotic others far away 
in time or space87.
As noble precursors, Heidelberg jurists Paul Johann Anselm von Feuerbach and 
Eduard Gans still have to be mentioned: in opposition to the historical school, they 
looked beyond the German experience by displaying rather universalistic aspirations. 
79 Frédéric Pollock, “Le Droit comparé: Prolégomènes de son histoire”, in Procès-verbaux des séances et doc-
uments du Congrès International de Droit Comparé tenu à Paris du 31 juillet au 4 août 1900 (Paris: L.G.D.J. 
Pichon et Durand-Auzias, 1905), 248-261, p. 249; Walther Hug, “The History of Comparative Law”, Har-
vard Law Review 45, no. 6 (1932), 1027-1070, p. 1029.
80 Mario Rotondi, “diritto comparato”, in Novissimo Digesto Italiano, eds. Mariano D’Amelio and Ernesto 
Eula, Vol. V (Turin: UTET, 1957), 823-826, p. 823; Pollock, Le Droit comparé: Prolégomènes de son histoire, 
248-261, p. 250.
81 but see Henri Sumner Maine, Ancient Law (London and New York: Everyman’s Library, 1965 [1861]), 
p. 15.
82 Pollock, Le Droit comparé: Prolégomènes de son histoire, 248-261, p. 253; Hug, The History of Comparative 
Law, 1027-1070, p. 1030; Donahue, Comparative Law before the Code Napoléon, 3-33, p. 22.
83 Pier Giuseppe Monateri, “Black Gaius: A Quest for the Multicultural Origins of the “Western Legal Tra-
dition””, Hastings Law Journal 51, no. 3 (2000), 481-555.
84 Charles Montesquieu, Esprit des lois (Paris: Typographie de Firmin Didot Frères, 1849), p. 8.
85 Harold C. Gutteridge, Comparative Law, An introduction to the comparative method of legal study and 
research, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1949), p. 12.
86 Amari, Critica di una scienza delle legislazioni comparate, pp. 226–227; Pollock, Le Droit comparé: Pro-
légomènes de son histoire, 248-261; Eugen Ehrlich, “Montesquieu and Sociological Jurisprudence”, Harvard 
Law Review 29 (1916), 582-600, p. 582. As it is often the case, this criticism actually reveals quite a lot about 
those who formulated it, maybe even more than about the target of the criticism.
87 Robert Launay, “Montesquieu: the Specter of Despotism and the Origins of Comparative Law”, in Re-
thinking the Masters of Comparative Law, ed. Annelise Riles (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 
2001), 22-39.
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Famously, Feuerbach called for a Universal-Jurisprudenz and studied both the simi-
larities and differences of laws and customs in near as well as faraway countries. He 
thus showed an interest in all kinds of manifestations of law without bias in favour of 
legislated rules. In addition, he aimed to improve knowledge (with a certain encyclo-
paedic vocation) rather than improve national law88. And so the way for the subsequent 
comparative legal research opened up. In the meantime, France had promulgated its 
Code Civil, and this indeed aroused the interest of private legal scholars abroad89. Over-
all, by the first half of the nineteenth century law had come to be considered a human 
construct and one that displays notable local variabilities. As these variabilities became 
more apparent because the territories of applicability were clearly defined, also legal 
comparison started to be conceivable. As a result, comparative law started to affirm 
itself as an independent academic discipline in modern sense during the second half 
of the nineteenth century, as is proved by the flourishing of scholarly societies and 
academic publications90.
3.2.  Legal ethnology
As legal ethnology is here meant the legal comparative school of thought which devel-
oped mostly in Germany (where it was called Rechtsethnologie), but saw representatives 
also elsewhere, for example in England and Italy. It manifested interest for normative 
apparitions of all sorts, particularly in very different and often colonised societies, and 
it was strongly influenced by recent discoveries in biology and in natural sciences as it 
considered Darwin’s evolution theory to be applicable to the evolution of regulatory 
regimes91. This was explained as being the result of some universal natural features of 
88 Von Feuerbach, Blick auf die deutsche Rechtswissenschaft, 152-177.
89 Already in 1808 the first German version was published of the Handbuch des französischen Zivilrechts by 
Karl Salomo Zacharie. Interestingly, the book was then translated into French by Charles Aubry and Frédéric 
Charles Rau and became extremely successful in France. French jurists read this study of their private law not 
in the form of an exegesis of positive law but as a systematised exposition that looks for the historical and 
philosophical foundation of the institutions. In a way, they could experience a de-placement of perspective, 
seeing the familiar as foreign, which is also a typical experience in comparativism. Constantinesco, Traité de 
Droit Comparé - Tome I Introduction au Droit Comparé, pp. 83 -85.
90 The first journal, the Kritische Zeitschrift für Rechtswissenschaft und Gesetzgebung des Auslandes, appea-
red in Germany in 1823, which was followed in 1834 by the French journal Revue étrangère de législation. 
The first scholarly society was founded in Paris in 1869. It was named Société française de législation com-
parée and published the Annuaire de législation étrangère (a mere French translation of foreign statutes from 
the previous year) and the Annuaire de législation française. The Revue de droit international et de législation 
comparée was printed in Belgium in the same year. The Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft was 
founded in 1878 in Stuttgart. In Spain the Revista de derecho internacional, legislación y jurisprudencia 
comparadas appeared in 1884. In Germany various associations were constituted: the Gesellschaft für verg-
leichende Rechts- und Staatswissenschaft in 1896, the Internationale Vereinugung für vergleichende Recht-
swissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre in 1894, each publishing their own periodicals. In London in 1869 
the Society of comparative legislation was founded and in 1895 followed the Society of Comparative Law, 
which issues the Journal of the Society of Comparative Law. In Italy the Rivista di diritto internazionale e di 
legislazione comparata and the Rassegna di diritto commerciale e straniero were printed for the first time.
91 Constantinesco, Traité de Droit Comparé - Tome I Introduction au Droit Comparé, pp. 114–120.
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human beings, as similar forms of life would produce similar institutions according to 
the same cause-effect relation. The whole of humanity would be thus guided by the 
same civilising impulses, and there would be “laws on the development of laws”92 to 
be discovered through the comparative study of legal systems “at different stages of 
development”.
Hence, according to Sir Henry Sumner Maine, for example: “As societies do not ad-
vance concurrently, but at different rates of progress, there have been epochs at which 
men trained to habits of methodical observation have really been in a position to watch 
and describe the infancy of mankind.”93 He believed the evolution of humankind to be 
uniform and developed his well-known theory according to which in more primitive 
societies the position of the individual is determined by his social status (mainly given 
by the family), while in more advanced ones by freely stipulated contracts94. On the 
basis of this understanding of the evolution of laws he establishes his research agenda 
as follows: 
We shall examine a number of parallel phenomena with the view of establishing, 
if possible, that some of them are related to one another in the order of historical 
succession.[..] We take a number of contemporary facts, ideas, and customs and 
we infer the past form of those facts, ideas, and customs not only from historical 
records of that past form, but from examples of it which have not yet died out of 
the world, and are still to be found in it95. 
Unilineal theories of evolution are spread through the Zeitschrift für vergleichende 
Rechtswissenschaft, founded in Stuttgart in 1878 by Franz Bernhöft and Georg Cohn, 
whose opening article states the following: “so comparative legal studies will teach us 
[…] how in the end, even without actual connection, the legal systems of different na-
tions evolve according to the same laws of development”96. Similar ideas are propagated 
also through the Jahrbuch der internationalen Vereinigung für vergleichende Rechtswis-
senschaft, first published in 1895. This approach is defended even when it leads to 
forcing the material into a Procustean bed in order to attain a positive result in proving 
the original hypothesis. For example Albert Hermann Post wrote: 
the comparative-ethnological research will reach […] a knowledge of the causes 
of the circumstances of the life of populations through the assemblage of similar 
92 For example the Italian comparatist Emerico Amari would write explicitly about the construction of a 
“biology of laws”. Amari, Critica di una scienza delle legislazioni comparate, p. 216.
93 Maine, Ancient Law, p. 71.
94 Id., pp. 99–100.
95 Henri Sumner Maine, Village-Communities in the East and West (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 
1880), pp. 6-7.
96 “So will also die vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft lehren, […] wie endlich auch ohne jede thatsächliche 
[sic] Verbindung die Rechtssysteme verschiedener Nationen sich nach gemeinsamen Entwicklungsgesetzen 
fortbilden”. Franz Bernhöft, “Über Zweck und Mittel der vergleichenden Rechtswissenschaft”, Zeitschrift Für 
Vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft 1, no. 1 (1878), pp. 36–37.
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or kindred ethnic manifestations, wherever and whenever in the world they 
may have appeared, and through the drawing of inferences about their causes, 
which will also be similar and kindred. In this sense it is an a-historical [kind of 
research]97. 
These ideas were still represented at the Paris Congress in 1900 where Joseph Kohler 
expressly advocates the study of the “identical civilizing forces” pushing humanity98. 
Even though intrinsically flawed due to being founded on such ideas, which more-
over implied that the western systems were at the very top of the evolution line, this 
current manifested interest in very different conceptions of the legal and necessarily 
had to have a broader understanding of the definition of law. This puts it in opposition 
to the paradigm established later, which focused only on legislated private law, thus 
drastically reducing the scope of the discipline. It has to be acknowledged though that 
the broadness of the interests of legal ethnologists, expanding in space and time, was 
actually due to their encyclopaedic aspirations and universalist tendencies rather than 
to a sensibility for the cultural context and respect for diversity.
3.3.  Paris Congress 
At the 1900 Paris Congress there had been discussions about the ethnological ap-
proach, and in particular Edouard Lambert, one of the organisers, who advanced 
strong criticisms in regard to its circularity between premises and conclusions and 
denounced as simply erroneous its fundamental presupposition, namely the unilineal 
theory of evolution. He states that there is no singular “natural” evolutionary path, but 
that rather the social life of populations may follow very different trajectories99. With 
a certain dose of “intellectual dirigisme”100 Raymond Saleilles, another prominent 
organiser, posed the scientific and positivist framework for the new paradigm of com-
parative law to be pursued starting from then on. “[T]out est à faire”101 he proclaimed 
in his report to the organisers. He continued establishing the goals of the congress as 
follows: 1) the definitions of the methods to realise the three functions of comparative 
97 “die vergleichend-ethnologische Forschung will […] zu einer Erkenntnis der Ursachen der Thatsachen des 
Völkerlebens gelangen, indem sie gleichartige oder ähnliche ethnische Erscheinungen, sie mögen wo und 
wann immer auf der Erde auftreten, zusammenstellt und aus ihnen auf gleichartige oder ähnliche Ursachen 
Rückschlüsse macht. Sie ist also durchaus unhistorisch”. Albert Hermann Post, Bausteine für eine allgemeine 
Rechtswissenschaft auf vergleichend-ethnologischer Basis (Oldenburg: Schulze, 1880), p. 13.
98 Josef Kohler, “De la methode du droit comparé “, in Procès-verbaux des séances et documents du Congrès 
International de Droit Comparé tenu à Paris du 31 juillet au 4 août 1900 (Paris: L.G.D.J. Pichon et Du-
rand-Auzias, 1905), 227-237, p. 228.
99 Lambert, Séance Du 1er Aout , 26-60, pp. 33–35.
100 Attitude defined as such by Roderick Munday, “Accounting for an encounter”, in Comparative Legal Stud-
ies: Traditions and Transitions, eds. Pierre Legrand and Roderick Munday (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2003), 3-30, p. 3.
101 Saleilles, Rapport présenté à la commission d’organisation sur l’utilité, le but et le programme du congrès, 
9-17, p. 14.
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law; namely the documentation of foreign laws, the comparison and the adaptation in 
view of transplant; 2) the identification of the role of comparative law as a method of 
teaching; 3) the research of the right way of using in practice the knowledge produced 
through legal comparison, respectively by legislators, judiciaries and in the drafting 
of international treaties; and 4) the organisations of the means to obtain information 
about foreign law102. Also Lambert had been convinced of the fact that one of the main 
aims of comparison is legal unification through the identification of what in modern 
terms would be called common core103. Moreover, he asserted the necessity of focusing 
mainly on the legislation of Latin and Germanic countries, considering even common 
law not to be comparable with civil law and thus taking into consideration only private 
law104. 
The focus on positivised private law in the view of unification indeed became the 
standard for the new century and one that required a lot of ink to be spilled in order 
to be overcome. This cannot be understood without connecting it to the conditions in 
Europe at the opening of the twentieth century, which were characterised by optimism 
and belief in progress. Legislated private law designated a manageable amount of in-
formation so that also the comparative discipline could consider itself as partaking the 
science-ness that guaranteed credibility for the kind of knowledge considered valuable 
and reliable at the time. 
3.4.  Complexification of the idea of law for the purposes of comparison
The theoretical discourse between comparatists became more articulated after the 
Second World War. Among the scholars who fled the Nazi-regime to the United 
States and were confronted with a new legal environment105 the figure of Ernst Rabel 
deserves to be mentioned. He decided to study conflict of laws and therefore his atten-
tion focused on the fact to which private international law applies. There is a factual 
situation to which substantial dispositions of at least two legal orders are applicable, 
and comparative law can be useful to explain how different systems may give different 
legal qualifications of the same fact106. His way of doing comparison moved away from 
abstract legal categories as positivised by legislators and focused rather on concrete 
legal solutions to particular problems107. The 1960-61 Cornell Seminars, directed by 
102 Ibid.
103 Lambert, Séance du 1er aout , 26-60, pp. 49–50.
104 Id., pp. 36 – 39.
105 Vivian Grosswald Curran, “Cultural Immersion, Difference and Categories in U.S. Comparative Law”, 
American Journal of Comparative Law 46, no. 1 (1998), 43-92, pp. 66–78.
106 David J. Gerber, “Sculpting the Agenda of Comparative Law: Ernst Rabel and the Façade of Language”, 
in Rethinking the Masters of Comparative Law, ed. Annelise Riles (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Pub-
lishing, 2001), 190-211, p. 202.
107 Michele Graziadei, “The Functionalist Heritage”, in Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and Transi-
tions, eds. Pierre Legrand and Roderick Munday (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 100-130, 
p. 105.
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Rudolf Schlesinger, also used a factual approach: various cases (factual situations) were 
to be solved by jurists according to their respective legal systems in order to identify if 
the operational rules were actually similar regardless of their systematic qualification. 
This constituted the first encompassing study of the common core on the formation of 
contracts108.
Some of these ideas are then to be found also in the much discussed functionalist 
method. As there are as many definitions of functionalism as there are functionalists 
(if not more)109, here I will limit myself to reproducing the definition of functionality 
formulated in the prominent textbook by Zweigert and Kötz: 
The basic methodological principle of all comparative law is that of functionali-
ty. From this basic principle stem all the other rules which determine the choice 
of laws to compare, the scope of the undertaking, the creation of a system of 
comparative law, and so on. Incomparables cannot usefully be compared, and 
in law the only things which are comparable are those which fulfil the same 
function. […] The proposition rests on what every comparatist learns, namely 
that the legal system of every society faces essentially the same problems, and 
solves these problems by quite different means though very often with similar 
results110. 
This last fundamental assumption has been also called praesumptio similitudinis111. 
Brutally leaving aside the –however compelling- debate or cacophony of criticism 
and defences of (various versions of ) functionalism, only one aspect of this definition 
will be spotlighted here. The approach proposed can be understood as a further step 
in the complexification of the concept of law because, firstly, it focuses on remedies 
and on the effects of rules rather than on the rules themselves. Secondly, it rests on a 
conception of law as related to society even though still separated from it and as an 
instrument to reach certain social objectives. In this way at least the word “society” 
and the idea that the kind of interaction that law has with it is relevant for the com-
108 Rudolf Schlesinger, ed., Formation of Contracts, a Study of the Common Core of Legal Systems (Dobbs 
Ferry, New York; London: Oceana Publications; Stevens & Sons, 1968).
109 For an attempt of systematisation see Ralf Michaels, “The Functional Method of Comparative Law”, in 
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, eds. Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 339-382. 
110 Zweigert and Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, p. 34 [“Das methodische Grundprinzip der ge-
samten Rechtsvergleichung, aus dem sich alle anderen Methodenlehrsätze – Auswahl der zu vergleichenden 
Rechte, Spannweite der Untersuchung, Systembildung etc. - ergeben, ist das der Funktionalität. Unvergleich-
bares kann man nicht sinnvoll vergleichen, und vergleichbar ist im Recht nur, was dieselbe Aufgabe, dieselbe 
Funktion erfüllt. [...] Rechtsvergleichende Grunderfahrung [ist], dass zwar jede Gesellschaft ihrem Recht im 
wesentlichen die gleichen Probleme aufgibt, dass aber die verschiedenen Rechtsordnungen diese Probleme, 
selbst wenn am Ende die Ergebnisse gleich sind, auf sehr unterschiedliche Weise lösen”. Zweigert and Kötz, 
Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung auf dem Gebiete des Privatrechts, p. 33]
111 Konrad Zweigert, “Die “Praesumptio Similitudinis” als Grundsatzvermutung rechtsvergleichender 
Methode”, in Inchieste di diritto comparato 2 -- Scopi e metodi del diritto comparato, ed. Mario Rotondi (Padua: 
Cedam, 1973), 734-760, p. 737.
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paratist are re-introduced in comparison after the strict positivist paradigm imposed 
at the Paris Congress. 
More and more the focus is broadened; not only is legislation taken into account but 
also empirical aspects of law are considered in their social contingencies112. This shift 
cannot be said to make things easier. On the contrary, in the introduction to the second 
volume of the International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law (a titanic collection 
that aims to compare the private law of the systems of the world), René David admits 
the difficulties in finding a common definition of law that would allow comparison113. 
He recognises that comparing the rules which are in fact enforced might lead to con-
sidering elements which in very different experiences are not considered to be law. The 
functions of law are so diverse that “the task of comparison is likely to be made difficult, 
or even falsified to some degree”114. 
In order to make sense of the variability of the very concept of law some comparatists, 
relying on developments in linguistics and anthropology, try to set as their object of 
interest the structure underlying the legal system by considering all of its various com-
ponents beyond the official pyramid of sources of law115. For example, in 1979 Sacco 
elaborated on his theory of formants: those are various types of rules and propositions 
coexisting in the same legal order. They are legal and normative elements stemming 
from different sources that are susceptible to having different influence on the resulting 
system in action. It is exactly this comparatively different role played by the various 
formants that differentiate legal systems from one another. So for example, legislation, 
judicial decisions, scholarship, customs and cryptotypes116 are all formants. Those can 
be further dissected into principle declarations and operational rules, rationes decidendi 
and obiter dicta and so on. Each of these has a different impact on the living law, and the 
comparatist has to take them all into account. In this way, she will be able to qualify the 
system as being more or less compact; that is to say to assess how much inconsistency 
exists among different formants117. 
Further complexifications of the object of comparison, that is to say of all the el-
ements that the comparatist has to take into account, are brought about by various 
authors who argue in favour of a deepening of the focus on jurisprudential concepts. 
This comparative jurisprudence turns towards the intellectual and philosophical 
 
112 René David, Les avatars d’un comparatiste (Paris: Economica, 1982), p. 47. See also Jorge L. Esquirol, 
“René David: At the Head of the Legal Family”, in Rethinking the Masters of Comparative Law (Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2001), 212-237.
113 René David, “The different conceptions of the law”, in International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law 
- The legal systems of the world - their comparison and unification, Vol. II (Tübingen and The Hague: Mohr 
Siebeck Verlag and Mouton, 1975), p. 3.
114 Id., p. 10.
115 Constantinesco, Traité de Droit Comparé - Tome I Introduction au Droit Comparé, pp. 213–221.
116 Defined as rules that exist and that are relevant but which the participant in the legal system does not 
formulate explicitly; and even if attempted cannot be put easily into words. Rodolfo Sacco, “Crittotipo”, in 
Digesto delle discipline privatistiche - sezione civile (Turin: Utet, 1990), p. 39.
117 Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law (Installment I of II), 1-34, pp. 23–25.
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foundations and cognitive structures which underpin rules and institutions118. Others 
have argued for the importance of the cultural context119. Overall, the elements to be 
taken into account have broadened to such an extent that the amount of information 
is unmanageable for one single researcher, and many have recognised the necessity of 
interdisciplinary team work120.
3.5.  Complexification of the position of the comparatist
It was not until 1985 that also the position of the comparatist herself was put under 
scrutiny. Frankenberg’s “Critical Comparison” article led the path121, allowing for an 
encounter between theory of comparison and politicized jurisprudential theories such 
as those advanced by the Critical Legal Studies122. The 1996 Utah Symposium “New 
Approaches to Comparative Law” thematised the political dimension and the non-neu-
trality of the comparative act: comparatists themselves were described as “people with 
projects, not texts written by methods”123 and comparative law as “invasive political 
enterprise with considerable practical impact”124. The symposium openly criticised, for 
example, the contribution to hegemonic practices such as (more or less) forced trans-
plants in exchange for financial support or other forms of economic partnerships. The 
role of the comparatist legal scholar is condemned in the reproduction of structures 
of domination. Alongside with the systematic inclusion of the dimensions of power 
within comparativism, CLS has also denounced its traditionally (at least since the Paris 
Congress) West-centred perspective. 
Since then various voices have been raised against the ethnocentrism intrinsic in 
mainstream comparative approaches that invariably prove the superiority of the do-
mestic system and its values in comparison to foreign ones. This might also be the result 
of the unacknowledged influence of the cultural background and more specifically of 
the legal pre-understanding of western scholars. This has been thematised extensively 
118 William Ewald, “Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What was it like to try a rat?”, University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 143, no. 6 (1995), 1889-2149; William Ewald, “The Jurisprudential Approach to Compara-
tive Law: A Field Guide to “Rats””, The American Journal of Comparative Law 46, no. 4 (1998), 701-707; 
Catherine Valcke, “Comparative Law as Comparative Jurisprudence: The Comparability of Legal Systems”, 
The American Journal of Comparative Law 52, no. 3 (2004), 713-740; Jaakko Husa, “Nicht nur Juristische 
Auslandsforschung: Rechtsvergleichung als Rechtsphilosophie “, Rechtstheorie 40 (2009), 1-20.
119 Discussed below in apposite sub chapter 4.3. 
120 Jaakko Husa, “Interdisciplinary Comparative Law - Between Scylla and Charybdis?”, Journal of Compar-
ative Law 9, no. 2 (2014), 12-26.
121 Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-Thinking Comparative Law, 411-455.
122 For a sympathetic criticism of the encounter see Ugo Mattei, “Comparative Law and Critical Legal Stud-
ies”, in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, eds. Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 815-836.
123 Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and International Governance, 545-638, 
p. 548.
124 Günter Frankenberg, “Stranger than Paradise: Identity & Politics in Comparative Law”, Utah Law Re-
view (1997), 269-274.
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also by Teemu Ruskola in his publications on legal orientalism125. By applying Edwards 
Saïd’s literary and postcolonial theory to legal scholarship, he illustrates that western 
discourses about the orient have contributed to the creation of the identity of the West 
as opposed to an invented East through the “projection onto the Oriental Other of var-
ious sorts of things that ‘we’ are not”126. The other is thus described as static, irrational 
and exotic in order to qualify the self as a dynamic, rational, master of one’s destiny. 
Once such discursive domination has been unmasked, what different approach can 
be adopted? Some, optimistically, have declared comparative law to be the cure of its 
own ethnocentric disease127. The mission of the comparatist is reset, and her inquiries 
“should pursue the ultimate goal of overcoming prejudice and stereotyped notions 
of other cultures and legal systems”128. Ruskola, realistically, recognises that precon-
ceptions, understood in the Gadamerian sense, have to be managed but cannot be 
eliminated. The idea that one can free oneself from them is a prejudice of the Enlight-
enment’s, and on the contrary preconceptions are necessary for understanding: “there 
is no innocent knowledge to be had, and we have little choice but to Orientalize”129. 
He advances the idea of an ethics of orientalism, which is an awareness of the fact that 
the categories we employ always impose limits of what we can discover in the world. 
Along similar lines, also Legrand has repeatedly stressed how the comparatist cannot 
claim objectivity, which is itself a culturally constituted concept. To be dismissed are 
also all aspirations of truth, as all one can do is defend an ever perfectible and contest-
able interpretation and assume responsibility for such invention130 of the foreign law 
compared. Finally, also the idea of understanding has to be reshaped, as the compara-
tist will never be able to fully dismiss her preconception or fully grasp the other in its 
otherness131.
Overall, while the complexification of the concept of law has now reached a very high 
level of acceptance, the same cannot be said for the complexification of the position 
of the comparatist. Indeed the more easily spottable political implications of legal 
comparison have been unveiled, as have the parochialism and ethnocentrism of cer-
tain scholarship. Still, not many are willing to stop pondering on the epistemological 
position of the comparatist as a knower132. In Morin’s words, while the “restricted com-
plexity” of legal comparison is nowadays an accepted standard, its “general complexity” 
125 Teemu Ruskola, “Legal Orientalism”, Michigan Law Review 101 (2002), 179. Ruskola’s theorisations are 
based on the way Chinese law has been studied- and misrepresented- in American legal scholarship. 
126 Id., p. 209.
127 For example Nora Demleitner, “Combating Legal Ethnocentrism: Comparative Law Sets Boundaries “, 
Arizona State Law Journal 31 (1999), 737-762.
128 Id., p. 739.
129 Ruskola, Legal Orientalism, 179, p. 222.
130 Invention is intended both as creation and as finding.
131 Lastly in Legrand, Negative Comparative Law, 405-454, pp. 432-437.
132 Indeed exceptions exist; see for example the attention devoted by Samuel to the relationship between 
intellectus and res Geoffrey Samuel, “Taking Methods Seriously (Part Two)”, Journal of Comparative Law 2, 
no. 2 (2007), 210-237, p. 211.
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is a bit less thematised. Hence, while the former refers “to [legal] systems which can 
be considered complex because empirically they are presented in a multiplicity of in-
terrelated processes, interdependent and retroactively associated”133, the latter actually 
requires “an epistemological rethinking, that is to say, bearing on the organization of 
knowledge itself ”134. And the methodological debate within comparison seems to have 
digested only the first one. But the two actually travel together: and this is the point 
that I have tried to make with the articles “Legal Pluralism as a Theoretical Programme” 
and “Complex Legal Pluralism”. Legal pluralism is taken to represent a complexified 
understanding of law beyond black letter, monist pyramids. Both articles argue that 
such a broadened understanding of law necessarily requires a rethinking of the role 
of the comparatist: the field of study gets so broadened that the comparatist herself is 
included in it. This is the historical conjuncture where my writings take place. 
133 Morin, Restricted Complexity, General Complexity, p. 6.
134 Ibid.
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4.  Cohesive side themes
This chapter introduces the three underground issues in comparative legal studies that 
traverse the articles. Assuredly, only the first book chapter relies extensively on compar-
ative legal literature, while the three articles build mostly on other kinds of sources. Still, 
their arguments are very much topical for the theory of comparative law as well, and 
the aim of this chapter is to highlight the connection. Otherness, pluralism and context 
are here presented in order to clarify the meaning they are given in this dissertation, as 
each of them is so abstract that they could be understood and used in different ways. 
This chapter discusses those terms and advances one possible connotation for each of 
them. Altogether, the way they are used and understood here brings them very close to 
each other: the conception of otherness that is put forth is a prerequisite for the idea of 
pluralism, which in turn displays certain key features which are important for the study 
of law in context. Given the meaning they acquire, these three terms could almost be 
considered to be three faces of the same phenomenon or more specifically the aspects 
of the same sensitivity towards legal comparative research. As already stated above, this 
dissertation is a reflection on theoretical and methodological issues in comparative 
legal studies, with the focus set on fundamental matters of concern. No particular tech-
nique of comparison is here proposed as being better that others, but undeniably there 
is a certain normativity instilled at the underground level of the three issues presented. 
That is to say, while each article aims at making one little disparate contribution, the 
dissertation as a whole can be understood as advancing a certain primal attitude. This 
attitude, almost an ethic of research, is grounded on a special awareness of the other law 
and of one’s own scholarly work; an awareness which builds on a certain understanding 
of the three core themes. 
4.1.  Otherness
“Do we really want to wade into the swamp of the philosophy of ‘otherness’?”135 
ironically asks James Whitman. I am afraid so. Otherness is the first underground 
issue which influences legal comparison. Vivian Curran states it clearly: “Comparison 
involves understanding one entity or domain in terms of another entity or domain. 
The comparative enterprise is thus permeated by the other, the inevitably different”136. 
135 James Q. Whitman, “The neo-Romantic turn”, in Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions, 
eds. Pierre Legrand and Roderick Munday (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 312-344, p. 314.
136 Grosswald Curran, Cultural Immersion, Difference and Categories in U.S. Comparative Law, 43-92, p. 45. 
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Further, otherness lies at the very core of the comparative enterprise, as it is something 
which differentiates it intrinsically from the rest of legal scholarship, and in a way it 
is the proprium of comparative law. It is not by chance that the first journal of com-
parative law was published in Heidelberg, Germany, 25 years after the introduction 
of the French civil code137. For the first time, the otherness of the other law became 
remarkable. Despite the fact that during the period of ius commune there have been 
local customs which were developed, rooted and most of all different, the frontiers 
were not so clear; the borders of the territory affected by the application were not 
so pronounced as they would later become with the promulgation by Napoleon of 
a unified private law for France. The recognition of otherness became unavoidable, 
and comparison became possible. Some conception of otherness is necessarily mobi-
lised when undertaking a comparison, and according to the kind of idea of otherness 
adopted – in a more or less conscious manner-, the jurist will conceptualise the other 
laws differently. A subtle consciousness of otherness could consider comparing two 
customary laws of eighteenth century Europe, but at that time all the symbolic force 
of the French civil code was necessary in order to let the other law be perceived as 
other and therefore comparable. 
4.1.1.  Otherness as inferiority
The issue of the Other, Otherness or Alterity is one of the central themes of post-mod-
ern philosophy due to the particular attention it devotes to the experience of plurality 
and of differences138. For a long time, European thought has been trapped in an under-
standing of the concept that can be explained in a simplified way by starting with the 
etymology of the word. This etymology limits alterity to a semantic field and to an im-
aginary realm which are purely negative, where the other is thought only in opposition 
to the one139. The word “other” namely stems from the Old English adjective oþer “the 
second”, which is also used as a noun and pronoun meaning “one of the two, other”140. 
The original Latin word alter is composed of the root *al- meaning “beyond” and by 
the Indo-European suffix *-(t)ero-, which is an adjectival comparative suffix carrying a 
meaning of contrast and of specification141. Otherness conveys thus the idea of an op-
position between two elements thought of as alternatives. Moreover, “other” refers to 
the second component, the less evident and common one, which can be understood as 
a copy of the first, its shadow, its replacement, whose primary function is to contribute 
to the definition of the first142.
137 Heinrich Albert Zachariä, “Über den Zweck dieser Zeitschrift: Statt einer Vorrede”, Kritische Zeitschrift 
für Rechtswissenschaft und Gesetzgebung des Auslandes 1 (1829), 1-43.
138 Jeffrey Koski, “Alterity”, in Encyclopedia of Postmodernism, eds. Victor Taylor and Charles Winquist (Lon-
don: Routledge, 2001), 8-9.
139 Francesco Paolo Ciglia, “Alterità”, in Enciclopedia Filosofica, ed. Virgilio Melchiorre, Vol. I (Milan: Bom-
piani, 2006), p. 306.
140 See entry “other” in Klein, A Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of the English Language, p. 1102.
141 Andrew L. Sihler, New Comparative Grammar of Greek and Latin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1995), p. 364.
142 Ciglia, Alterità, p. 306.
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In such a manner for example the conceptual categories available to Europeans at the 
moment of their confrontation with the “radical foreignness”143 of the Amerindians 
were thus limited: the recognition of otherness implied the necessity of the establish-
ment of a hierarchy, the differentiation between a one-first and an other-second, while 
only Christian universalism opened the way to equality and avoided discrimination144. 
In European minds, only similarity seemed to imply recognition. A relationship could 
be established by only starting with common elements. Conversely, alterity and differ-
ence were indissolubly bound to a ranking as if they manifested themselves in a situation 
where there is already a classificatory rationality at work. The conceptual categories 
for thinking otherness were organised around the parallelism between universalism/
respect versus otherness/discrimination. Interestingly, Curran advances the hypothesis 
that also the generation of comparative lawyers that fled Nazi persecution held the view 
that perceived difference, otherness, would be inextricably linked to exclusion, discrim-
ination and even annihilation145. In contrast, common cores between (legal) cultures 
would facilitate communication, further justice and prevent future holocausts146. 
Traumatised by their personal experience, they conceived this parallelism as universal, 
and while focused on furthering the indeed laudable goal of peaceful coexistence, they 
considered a structure of thought that actually needs rethinking as immutable.
The parallelism universalism/respect versus otherness/discrimination, based on an 
understanding of otherness that includes in the concept a sort of depreciation and be-
littlement, is familiar to jurists as in its shortcomings it is analogous to the principle of 
formal equality. General and abstract rules do not let the singularity of each case emerge 
and can on an individual basis cause injustice if not set aside, adjusted or at least creatively 
interpreted. As Adorno wrote: “In law the formal principle of equivalence becomes the 
norm; everyone is treated alike. An equality in which differences perish secretly serves 
to promote inequality”147. Hence the need for the correctives of substantial equality. 
Come to think of it, the otherness of each single case (or for that matter each single cat) 
cannot be held within the concept (of “Cat”) as reality is made of individual exceptions 
and not of universal concepts. Those are but a framework situated in the thinking mind. 
This can be extended also to the concept of law in general. The article “Complex Legal 
Pluralism” shows the limitations of general theories of law, that is, those theories about 
law that claim to be ultimate: they simplify socially variable phenomena and forget their 
own situatedness148. As argued also in “Legal Pluralism as a Theoretical Programme”, the 
impossibility of a universally valid definition of law is due both to the extreme variability 
143 Tzvetan Todorov, La conquête de L’Amérique - La question de l’autre (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1982), pp. 
193-204.
144 for more examples of the monist model see Pierre Legrand, “The same and the different”, in Comparative 
Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions, eds. Pierre Legrand and Roderick Munday (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2003), pp. 257–58.
145 Vivian Grosswald Curran, “Dealing in Difference: Comparative Law’s Potential for Broadening Legal 
Perspectives”, American Journal of Comparative Law 46, no. 4 (1998), 657-668, p. 666.
146 Id., p. 667.
147 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), p. 309.
148 Patrignani, Complex Legal Pluralism, 19-33, pp. 22–24.
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of the legal phenomena worldwide and to the limitation of labelling concepts149. Em-
pirical phenomena do not fit into analytical categories in a one-to-one manner, and the 
multiplicity of the real cannot be forced into one forever imperfect definition. Concepts 
are necessarily imprecise and incomplete: and this applies also to any definition of law. 
As a consequence, the criticism to the shortcomings of formal equality and to the uni-
versality-leads-to-respect-while-otherness-to-discrimination thought construction can 
be extended to conceptual thought overall, which instead attributes identity and over-
looks (when not repressing) otherness, differences and particularities150. A rethinking of 
Otherness seems to require a reconsideration of the whole way of thinking. 
4.1.2.  Otherness as primordial
And yet a rethinking of Otherness is needed, possible and has happened already with-
in the possibilities allowed by conceptual thought and human language. A chiasm 
within the parallelism mentioned above can be drawn. Alterity can be thought of as 
preliminary to all hierarchical ordering and universalism criticized for its monopolistic 
tendencies. For the sake of clarity, in the following I will be using the word “alterity” 
to refer to this renewed understanding of otherness, which has been introduced by 
the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. He proposes the grounding of respect in the 
recognition of alterity (and not in the commonalities) and denounces the uniformity 
imposed by universalism. In order to understand how he came to such ideas, those have 
to be put into historical and intellectual context.
Levinas developed the extension of the possible ways of thinking about the Other 
as a critique of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger151. For Husserl, the meeting of 
the other is firstly a perception of his corporeality and secondly an acknowledgment of 
his being analogous to the self. Husserlian intersubjectivity does not trigger a privileged 
relation to the other, and the self remains basically isolated152. Phenomenology, being 
a philosophy which raises the question concerning the other uniquely in relation with 
the issue of the constitution of the world, remains necessarily stuck in a conception of 
the other as Fremdich, analogous of the self and as a foreign me153. This impasse is not 
overcome by Heidegger either, even though the Dasein is not considered as separate, 
and on the contrary he is never fully separated from the others. Because he is thrown 
into the world as the others, the Self belongs to the Others154. But in this way the Oth-
149 Patrignani, Legal Pluralism as Theoretical Programme, 707-725, p. 713.
150 Vincenzo Costa, Alteritá (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2011), p. 40.
151 Rudolf Bernet, “Levinas’ s critique of Husserl”, in The Cambridge Companion to Levinas, eds. Simon 
Critchley and Robert Bernasconi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 87.
152 Emmanuel Levinas, Trancendance et Intelligibilité - suivi d’un entretien (Geneva: Éditions Labor et Fi-
des, 1984), p. 40. See also Emmanuel Levinas, Totalité et Infini - Essai sur l’Éxteriorité (The Hague: Nijhoff, 
1961), p. 185.
153 Michael Theunissen, Der Andere - Studien zur Sozialontologie der Gegenwart (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1965), 
p. 257.
154 “„Die Anderen“ besagt nicht soviel wie der ganze Rest der Übringen außer mir, aus dem sich das Ich 
heraushebt, die Anderen sind vielmehr die, von denen man selbst sich zumeist nicht unterscheidet, unter 
denen man auch ist”. Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 3rd ed. (Halle: Max Niemer Verlag, 1931), p. 118.
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ers only end up serving in the development of the argument leading to das Man155. This 
is the criticism advanced by Levinas to the German philosopher: “the relation to others 
is posed by Heidegger as the ontological structure of the Dasein: it plays virtually no 
role in either the drama of being or in the existential analytic. All the analyses in Sein 
und Zeit proceed either towards the impersonality of everyday life, or for the isolated 
Dasein”156. The Dasein repeats the autarky of a self-constituting ego.
If on the one hand Levinas’ conception of alterity can be understood as a correction 
of the solipsism that phenomenology had not been able to exceed, then on the other 
hand also the influence of the philosophy of dialogue by Martin Buber should not 
be forgotten157. The philosophy of dialogue considers the question of the relation to 
the other as the primary problem whose reach is the broadest158. It is the dialogical 
life that gives a foundation to ontology159. Actually, in a series of lectures presented in 
1946 and 1947 at the Collège Philosophique, Levinas contrasts his conception of the 
I-Thou relation to the one of Buber160. He underlines the fact that, according to Buber, 
it consists of a reciprocal relationship, which implies that it could become a spiritual 
friendship without ethical connotations. For Levinas, inasmuch as Buber suggests that 
we can know the other and form a community with him, he expresses a concept that 
is too similar to the enclosure of the Other into the Same. While Buber holds that the 
I-Thou relation is reciprocal, Levinas underlines its asymmetry. The former theorizes a 
relation which leads to knowledge and therefore gets closer to the relation I-that (from 
a subject to a thing). The latter, on the contrary, considers the relationship to the other 
as pre-original, which means before any knowledge, before the cogito161. Later on, how-
ever, Levinas recognized Buber’s influence on him because of the importance accorded 
to the dialogical relation, its phenomenological irreducibility and its ability to form an 
autonomous order162. 
This is thus the tradition to which Levinas belongs to, the background against which 
he developed his conception of alterity, which is presented in the book chapter “Alteri-
ty according to Emmanuel Levinas and Comparison of Laws”. As illustrated there, it is 
155 Id., p. 126.
156 “La relation avec autrui est certes posée par Heidegger comme structure ontologique du Dasein: pratique-
ment, elle ne joue aucun rôle ni dans le drame de l’être, ni dans l’analytique existentiale. Toutes les analyses 
de Sein und Zeit se poursuivent soit pour l’impersonnalité de la vie quotidienne, soit pour le Dasein esseulé”. 
Emmanuel Levinas, Le temps et l’autre (Paris: P.U.F., 1983), p. 18. See also Theunissen, Der Andere - Studien 
zur Sozialontologie der Gegenwart, p. 172; and also Jean-Luc Marion, “The final appeal of the subject”, in 
Deconstructing Subjectivities, eds. Simon Critchley and Peter Dews (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1996), p. 90.
157 Agata Zielinski, Levinas - La responsabilité est sans pourquoi (Paris: P.U.F., 2004), p. 11.
158 Emmanuel Levinas, “Martin Buber und die Erkenntnistheorie”, in Martin Buber, eds. Paul Arthur Schlipp 
and Maurice Friedman (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1963), pp. 122–23.
159 Theunissen, Der Andere - Studien zur Sozialontologie der Gegenwart, p. 258.
160 Levinas, Le temps et L’autre, p. 89.
161 Stephan Strasser, “Buber and Levinas: Philosophical Reflections”, in Levinas & Buber, Dialogue & Differ-
ence, eds. Peter Atterton, Matthew Valarco and Maurice Friedman (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 
2004), p. 45.
162 Emmanuel Levinas, Hors Sujet (Paris: Fata Morgana, 1987).
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an understanding of alterity that accords pre-eminence and pre-existence to the other, 
which is free and whose independence cannot be reduced by the comprehension of 
the knowing subject. Levinasian alterity is external, that is it does not belong to any 
shared metaphysical ordering and therefore is completely foreign. This is understood 
as a richness, as it is what is foreign, what comes from the exterior, that can teach and 
bring about something new, unexpected or unheard of163. Moreover, another funda-
mental characteristic of alterity is its infinity, its unsuitability to become a content of 
conscience: the infinite remains exterior to the thought which thinks it. Otherness 
conceived in this way remains ultimately incomprehensible and undefinable164. In 
Levinasian philosophy, the encounter with the other counts as primordial experience, 
anterior to any rational grasping. In contrast, it is the encounter with the other that 
shapes all further experiences and ways of thinking.
4.1.3.  Otherness in S.A.S. v France
It is interesting to note that the Levinasian conception of alterity has been mobilized 
in the French Government Submission to the European Courts of Human Rights in 
the case S.A.S. v. France of 1 July 2014. In this well-known case, the Court declared 
the French provision prohibiting full face veils to be compliant with the ECHR, and 
the argument that made the point is the French “living together”-conception, which 
is considered to be a legitimate ground to restrict the rights to respect for private life 
and to manifest one’s beliefs165. Levinas’ discourse about the face of the other as the 
163 Patrignani, Alterity according to Emmanuel Levinas and Comparison of Laws, 437-446, p. 440.
164 Ibid.
165 What then is the exact content of the French “living together” that is recognised by the Court? In the expla-
natory memorandum accompanying Bill no. 2520 (eventually Act no. 2010–1192) as it was discussed in the 
French Parliament, the wearing of a full face veil is defined as a “sectarian manifestation of a rejection of the 
values of the Republic” that brings with it “a symbolic and dehumanizing violence, at odds with the social fabric” 
that is “incompatible with the fundamental requirements of ‘living together’ in French society”. The Muslim 
practice is seen as undermining the “dignity of others who share the same public space and who are thus treated 
as individuals from whom one must be protected”. In a nutshell, the conception of living together entails, as an 
indispensable element, the possibility of open interpersonal relationships, which are considered to be fundamen-
tally jeopardised by the concealment of one’s face. Thus, the self-confinement of any individual who cuts herself 
off from others would be prohibited. Moreover, the “living together” is used here to protect the majority of the 
population, which is assumed to share this conception and to not be familiar with the practice of wearing full 
face veils. In effect, by stating that the refusal of visual exchange undermines the dignity of others who share the 
same public space, the statute is not only stating that in France people do not wear veils but is also preventing 
people in France from being confronted with such an unusual sight. The statute is protecting a certain image 
of the social landscape, which should be preserved somehow as “French” – and of a kind of Frenchness that is 
certainly not Muslim. This understanding of the “French conception of living together” and its use as a means 
to protect the majority is the one shared in the ECtHR judgement. The Court dismissed all other adduced 
justifications for the ban: public safety (§139), gender equality (§119) and protection of human dignity of the 
veil wearers (§120). It only retained the “French conception of living together” as it considered it legitimate and 
having the necessary value for providing sufficient grounds for the limitation of the right to respect for private life 
and of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion as protected by artt. 8 and 9 ECHR respectively. 
Furthermore, the Court accepted it as a measure to protect the others, that is, the non-wearers. The banned 
practice is considered to be “breaching the right of others to live in a space of socialization which makes the living 
together easier” (§122). Maintaining a given appearance in the population or creating a certain superficial image 
of how the people in the street look is considered to be “a choice of society” compatible with human rights law.
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fundamental element of the encounter has been interpreted literally as referring to 
the actual visage of the other person, which would be necessary for social interaction 
(which in turn, as the government’s argument goes, is necessary for community life 
within society)166. In her Final Observations however, the applicant replied that “the 
government is treading on dangerous ground when it attempts to justify a legal meas-
ure by postmodern philosophy, which by its very nature is highly complex and not 
capable of clear-cut interpretations, let alone one ‘correct’” interpretation. Arguably, 
the law prohibiting covering the face in public is not at all in line with the spirit of 
Levinas’ philosophy, and his idea of face-to-face is centred on inherent respect for the 
other – the opposite of what the law in question achieves”167. Similarly, the reading of 
Levinas’ philosophy proposed in my contribution below underlines the recognition of 
alterity as a step towards the guarantee of freedom and equality, which is completely 
at odds with the Government’s submission. This same attitude is manifested also in 
the Constitutional Council decision compared in the fourth article “Overcoming 
Essentialization - A comparative study of ‘Living Together’-conceptions’”: there also 
an uncovered face encounter is preferred to a deeper respect for disturbing difference. 
As argued in the article, the decision introduces an objective reading of freedom and 
equality according to which the meaning of these fundamental principles is determined 
by central authorities for society as a whole. 
Furthermore the applicant in S.A.S. v France disputed the enforceability of Levi-
nasian ethics through law, which were backed by penal sanctions168. Even though it is 
not the only possible reading of Levinasian ethics, some authors have indeed argued 
that his teachings are not transposable into political ethics. Their imposition through 
a programmatic social theory “would necessarily perpetrate, en masse, the very sub-
sumptive violence they denounce”169. This seems to be the present situation, as de-
scribed also in the last article. Not only is a homogenizing majoritarian conception 
of living together politically sustained, it is also enforced by a ban, while other milder 
measures were actually recommended also by the Council of State170. Levinas’ alterity 
has been denied twice: in the rejection of the radical heterogeneity of the other, and 
in the means i.e. the criminalization of alterity or the imposition through criminal 
law of a certain understanding of freedom and equality. Levinas wrote in 1961 that, 
166 French Government Submission in Response to the Third Party Interventions, S.A.S. v. France, App. 
No. 43835/11 (Eur. Ct. H. R. filed Sept. 17, 2012), at ¶104, as quoted in Eva Brems, “Face veil bans in the 
European Court of Human Rights: the importance of empirical findings”, Journal of Law and Policy 22, no. 
2 (2014), 517-551, p. 536.
167 Final Observations, S.A.S. v. France, App. No. 43835/11 (Eur. Ct. H. R. July 4, 2013), at ¶90, as quoted 
in Brems, Face veil bans in the European Court of Human Rights: the importance of empirical findings, 517-551, 
p. 536.
168 Ibid.
169 Nick Smith, “Questions for a Reluctant Jurisprudence of Alterity”, in Essays on Levinas and Law - a 
Mosaic, ed. Desmond Manderson (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 55-75, p. 57.
170 Conseil d’État - Section du rapport et des études, Étude relative aux Possibilités Juridiques d’Interdic-
tion du Port du Voile Intégral, 30 March 2010, available at  : http://www.conseil-etat.fr/content/down-
load/1731/5221/version/1/file/etude_vi_30032010.pdf [17/2/2017].
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“Freedom consists of knowing that freedom is in peril”171. This is quite a different 
understanding of the word.
To conclude, the conception of otherness lies at the very core of many highly topical 
matters for the comparative lawyer. On the one hand, she is confronted with the alteri-
ty of the other laws and needs to find a way to enter into dialogue with it in order to de-
velop at least a partial intelligibility of the foreign, which will indeed remain unknown, 
mostly unexplored, and towards which the comparatist will anyway be indebted and 
held responsible for her rendering: “À l’impossible tous sont tenus”172. But can she fix 
it? Yes she can173, and an awareness of her own understanding of otherness will help 
her at least to “fail better”. On the other hand, otherness is a very important notion 
for the comparatist and for the legal scholar in general given the challenges that social, 
cultural and religious inhomogeneity pose to law. A reflection on otherness helps the 
understanding of difference and inequality as historically and empirically related but 
conceptually separated notions174. Moreover, otherness-awareness is crucial in order to 
fathom the inherent plurality of every law.
4.2.  Pluralism
By definition legal comparison requires a broadening of the horizon beyond the terri-
tory of applicability of one’s legal system at least to the neighbouring one. Therefore, 
the comparatist has to be aware of the plurality of laws. Yet, the plurality goes deeper 
and reaches down inside within the one. One of the methodological arguments of this 
thesis consists of a complexification of the concept of law also (but not only) for the 
purposes of comparison. Luckily enough, the comparatist is not alone in this chal-
lenge, and she can fruitfully draw inspiration from the legal anthropology literature. 
Anthropological studies had to overcome the understanding of law developed around 
dogmatic categories and grounded uniquely on the western state legal experience and 
had to develop complexified analytical tools. The theories of legal pluralism developed 
there are indeed useful for the comparatist; not in order to understand the law in very 
distant colonized societies but most importantly to unthink all laws. In other words 
this thesis argues that pluralism is relevant for comparison in a more foundational sense 
than the simple recognition of the existence of a plurality of legal systems in the world 
and a manifestation of interest for what happens there. Pluralism is relevant in the sense 
that it entails a recognition of the plurality that is inherent in every legal culture. 
4.2.1.  Outward looking pluralism
On account of this there are (at least) two senses in which law can be regarded as 
plural. The first one is the traditional outward looking pluralism, which describes a 
171 Levinas, Totalité Et Infini - Essai Sur L’Éxteriorité, p. 5.
172 Glanert, Comparaison et traduction des droits: à l’impossible tous sont tenus, 279-311.
173 Husa, A New Introduction to Comparative Law, p. 24.
174 Rogers Brubaker, Grounds for Difference (Cambridge, US: Harvard University Press, 2015), p. 11.
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multiplicity of legal and normative phenomena coexisting and overlapping in the 
same territory (which could be delimited as encompassing the whole world). This 
type of pluralism is usually based on empirical observations of the existence of nor-
mative and legal spheres that are not reducible to the state-produced law. Such an 
observing and describing pluralism175 carries with it strong political bearings and con-
sequences for legal philosophy. As criticised by Boaventura de Sousa Santos 20 years 
ago, the symmetry between society and state was a basic tenet of the social as well as 
the legal sciences in the nineteenth century, but “this conception of social transforma-
tion misrepresented the dynamics of capitalist development in fundamental ways”176. 
Generally speaking, he states that “the absorption of modern law in the modern state 
was a contingent historical process which, like any other historical process, had a be-
ginning and will have an end”177. More and more legal scholars are struggling to find 
new vocabularies that go beyond the classical equation of perfect congruence between 
legal unit, political unit and national unit178. Interestingly, we see legal anthropolo-
gists and legal comparatists converge on this ground. Just as an example, the two 2013 
published books Laws and Societies in Global Contexts: Contemporary Approaches by 
the legal anthropologist Eve Darian-Smith and The Cosmopolitan State by the late 
comparatist H. Patrick Glenn can be read together. Darian-Smith dismisses the idea 
that the state represents one legal system and contains within it a single cultural inter-
pretation of law as a “myth”179: 
In re-examining the production of domestic national legalities in a heightened 
era of globalization, it is essential to acknowledge that monocultural societies 
no longer exist (if in fact they ever did). […] Today we are witnessing a rising 
presence of multicultural communities around the world, particularly in Europe 
and North America. These culturally rich subnational and transnational com-
munities with distinctly different norms and values – and often with considera-
ble social networks and economic links to peoples and places in Latin America, 
Africa, Asia, and the Middle East – present possibilities of new legal knowledge 
emerging within Western national boundaries180.
My point is that whether the accommodation of alternative, perhaps non-West-
ern, legal norms and cultural values is embraced or resisted, the taken-for-granted 
 
175 On the descriptiveness of this approach and for bibliographical references see my article ”Legal Pluralism 
as a Theoretical Programme”.
176 Boaventura De Sousa Santos, Toward a New Common Sense: Law, Science and Politics in the Paradigmatic 
Transition (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 94. 
177 Id., pp. 94–95.
178 That is, the basic tenet of nationalism according to Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 1–7.
179 Eve Darian-Smith, Laws and Societies in Global Contexts: Contemporary Approaches (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2013), p. 9.
180 Ibid.
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assumption in much sociolegal research that a national legal system maps onto a 
homogenous ‘society’ is no longer acceptable181.
 Along similar lines, the purpose of Glenn’s book is to relinquish the nation-state as 
empirically impossible and to set forth the notion of a cosmopolitan state that corre-
sponds better with social reality. The coincidence of a population, homogeneous in 
terms of language, religion and ethnicity, with a closed legal and political state-like 
structure has never occurred: all states are, and since the Greek poleis in antiquity have 
been, cosmopolitan. He purports to demonstrate this assertion and at the same time 
sketches a pioneering general theory of the cosmopolitan state, thus being descriptive 
and normative at the same time: 
while the idea of a cosmopolitan state correspond with social reality, its asser-
tion is not a descriptive exercise. […] there are normative consequences, notably 
as to whether populations should continue to be inculcated with ideas of social 
uniformity as underlying norm, and whether measures of social ‘uniformization’ 
have some institutional justification182.
To sum up, they both argue for the basic idea that law, nation (referring to a homoge-
neous population) and state (as political entity) do not coincide. Moreover, they share 
the postulate (more or less assertively formulated) that law, nation and state may only 
have ever been congruent in official state rhetoric and mainstream academic discourse. 
In any case, both authors recommend that we leave behind such a paradigm of thinking 
of contemporary law. Lastly, both manifest a strong commitment towards the political 
desirability of pluralism. This first version of outward looking pluralism is thus both 
politically and jurisprudentially engaged and has prompted very lively and passionate 
debates183. When the diversity of the social (beginning with gendered and racialized 
difference) enters the field of law and forces into its very core the recognition of ir-
reconcilably conflicting interests due to radically divergent social understandings, the 
resulting philosophy of law is obviously affected. The conceptual inquiries of normative 
legal theory are shown to be coloured by their assumptions about the social, and state 
law can no longer be viewed as objective or neutral184. Nevertheless, at a conceptual 
level, the recognition of such pluralism “does not necessarily displace the conception 
181 Id., p. 10. 
182 Patrick Glenn, The Cosmopolitan State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. vii – viii.
183 Whether post-national thought has become an established dominant political theory or not is not 
a matter of discussion here, where the focus is rather on systematising legal doctrines on pluralism. For a 
partial but interesting insight, see https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/04/the-canada-experi-
ment-is-this-the-worlds-first-postnational-country, where it is declared that the nation-state model has been 
overcome in Canada but that it is still “sacrosanct” in Europe. See also the book by Constantin Languille, 
La possibilité du cosmopolitisme (Paris: Gallimard, 2015), which discusses about the topic from a political 
perspective in connection with the burqa ban.
184 Roger Cotterrell, The Politics of Jurisprudence - A Critical Introduction to Legal Philosophy, 2nd ed. (Lon-
don: LexisNexis UK, 2003), pp. 209–236.
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of state law as a unified and coherent system. It may merely situate state law as one 
form of law within a context of normative multiplicity”185. The analytical purposes of 
traditional normative legal theory are scaled down, their narrowness emphasised, but 
their project is not yet inherently shattered186. It is at this point that a second more deep 
rooted understanding of pluralism is worthwhile considering. 
4.2.2.  Pluralism within
The second version of pluralism presented here involves a pluralisation of all laws and 
aims at highlighting the incoherencies and variations within any legal culture, even the 
state-produced-law one. Any and every law, including mainstream state-based law is 
plural “in that it is derived from plural sources, relies upon plural modes of reasoning 
and interacts in complex and contradictory ways with a plurality of social, ideological 
and political systems of significance”187. This pluralism as “incoherence within” brings 
legal philosophy a step further than the first version of outward looking pluralism in 
that it requires to “re-conceptualize the Western concept of positive law as essentially 
complex and heterogeneous”188.
This version of pluralism can be understood in connection with the philosophical 
reflection that extends Otherness beyond the other, as it resides not only among differ-
ent unities, but also within each unity. There is no pure and simple “one”189, writes Jean-
Luc Nancy, and “there has never been, nor will there ever be, any [real] philosophical 
solipsism. In a certain way, there never has been, and never will be, a philosophy ‘of the 
subject’ in the sense of the final [infinie] closure in itself of a for-itself ”190. Following this 
way of thinking, there is no essence that is not co-essence, singular plural and plurally 
singular, and “there is no ‘self ’ except by virtue of a ‘with’, which, in fact structures it”191. 
“From the very start, the structure of the ‘Self ’, even considered as a kind of unique and 
solitary ‘self ’, is the structure of the ‘with’. Solipsism, if one wants to use this category, 
is singular plural”192. No matter where we, for our research purposes, draw the borders 
of the unit, there will always be differences and possible fragmentations within. There 
is no uniform identity as such, be it at the level of an individual human being, of a local 
community or of a “national” community.
185 Margaret Davies, “The Ethos of Pluralism”, Sydney Law Review 27 (2005), 86-112 p. 96. See also Annelise 
Riles, “Comparative Law and Socio-Legal Studies”, in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, eds. Mathi-
as Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 775-813, pp. 794–795.
186 Cotterrell, The Politics of Jurisprudence - A Critical Introduction to Legal Philosophy, p. 229.
187 Davies, The Ethos of Pluralism, 86-112, p. 108.
188 Id., p. 108.
189 Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), pp. 7-8: “The typical 
traits (ethnic, cultural, social, generational, and so forth), whose particular patterns constitute another level 
of singularity, do not abolish singular differences; instead, they bring them into relief. As for singular diffe-
rences, they are not only ‘individual’ but infraindividual. It is never the case that I have met Pierre or Marie 
per se, but I have met him or her in such and such a ‘form’, in such and such a ‘state’, in such and such a ‘mood’, 
and so on.”
190 Id., p. 29.
191 Id., p. 94.
192 Id., p. 96.
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In her study on the status of foreigners in different European civilizations, written 
in the context of the wider debate on the reform of the French Nationality Code, Julia 
Kristeva concludes also with the need for recognising the otherness, biological and 
symbolical, that is present in each self: “Unsettling, the stranger is part of us: we are 
our own strangers - we are divided”193. She argues that the acknowledgment of this 
internal fracture could lead to a better coexistence in a inhomogeneous society194. It is 
not necessary to follow her in an optimistic view of the future to appreciate the central 
move, which parallels Nancy: the recasting of plurality at the core195. It has to be under-
lined how this plurality has actually been there for a long time but not acknowledged. 
The shift is thus a shift in the way we perceive things: not as separate boxes, which are 
uniform inside and diversified outside, but as transversally diversified.
From this perspective, any legal philosophy that has its foundations on the idea of 
singularity, claiming that there is “One law in a particular geo-political space and that 
the One law is itself One system, defined by clear limits, governed by certain principles 
and unified by a distinct foundation”196, clearly loses ground. In contrast to this, an 
understanding of law as plural in this second sense of “pluralism within” sees law as 
diverse and fragmented and not as systematic and cohesive197. This is different from 
the liberal model of cosmopolitan state law, which provides a minimum common basis 
and from then on promotes social diversity: such a perspective would still not abandon 
the idea of autonomy and separateness of law or its nature of neutral system of norms. 
Something similar to the “pluralism within” approach has been advanced with vigour 
by the Critical Legal Studies, which is a school of thought that focuses on the power 
structures embedded in any legal and political system. According to this view, each 
contingent plural legal culture contains within itself opposed forces in a continuous 
struggle – and the task of any engaged scholar is to reveal them. 
As a consequence, any black letter legal text - which could be seen as posing a black-
on-white stable norm, be it written by a legislator or a judge (to take two example 
familiar to the western legal scholar) - is situated as follows:
not on a single developmental path, but on multiple trajectories of possibili-
ty, the path actually chosen being chosen not because it had to be, but (where 
relevant) because the people pushing for alternatives were weaker and lost out 
in their struggle, and also (in part) because both winners and losers shared a 
 
193 Julia Kristeva, Étrangers à nous-mêmes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 268. See also the understanding of 
identity as “never unified and, in late modern times, increasingly fragmented and fractured; never singular 
but multiple, constructed across different, often intersecting and antagonistic, discourses, practices and posi-
tions”, by Stuart Hall, “Introduction: Who Needs Identity?”, in Questions of Cultural Identity, eds. Stuart Hall 
and Paul Du Gay (London: SAGE Publications, 1996), 1-36, p. 4,
194 Kristeva, Étrangers à nous-mêmes, p. 290. 
195 Julia Kristeva, “The Meaning of Equality”, in Crisis of the European Subject, trans. Susan Fairfield (New 
York: Other Press, 2000), 95-110.
196 Davies, The Ethos of Pluralism, 86-112, p. 92.
197 Id., 86-112, p. 93.
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common consciousness that set the agenda for all of them, highlighting some 
possibilities and suppressing others completely198. 
In a similar fashion the judge has been described as the one who has to suppress the 
plurality of law by choosing one interpretation and kill all the others199. The good news 
(not for the losing party of the one particular trial, but for the comparatist indeed) is 
that, as argued in the “Complex Legal Pluralism” article, there is an ongoing unresolv-
able debate about what law is200. So the judgment that defines what is the correct view 
of the law today and kills or suppresses the other options may be overruled tomorrow, 
and in any case it remains contestable by other judges (who would have decided differ-
ently), lawyers, legislators, academics and so on.
The formants theory presented by Sacco can be understood as a first step towards 
the recognition of this plurality within, as it already acknowledged that, given the mul-
tiplicity of legal formants, “there is no guarantee that they will be in harmony rather 
than in conflict”201. And while every interpreter obviously claims all other previous 
interpretations to be wrong, the comparatists shall not “get mixed up in these gen-
erational polemics”202 and focus her attention exactly on this internal inconsistency 
among formants by going beyond the idea that there is one single right rule. As has 
been argued above (in the chapter on method), the problem with the approach pro-
posed by Sacco is that by opening the sphere of interest of the comparatist to all the 
possible formants she considers her position as detached and neutral. Correctives have 
been brought about by the crits, who saw the comparatist’s role as a militant one, not 
only unmasking the inconsistency among formants but also showing how the various 
options of the plurality within also implicate different value choices. The task of the 
comparatist is, above all, to “refuse the homogenizing and essentializing gestures of the 
tradition” and show instead “how all cultural formations are split, hybrid, and embed-
ded in contexts of power”203. 
To summarize, this chapter presented two versions of pluralism, one outward look-
ing and the other existing within each unit. The two are not incompatible with one an-
other, as the second version can be seen as a further pluralization of the first one. Both 
versions are endorsed in the articles. The first one is settled as a preliminary issue on the 
two articles on legal pluralism, as they both develop a reflection based on the assump-
tion that the meaning of the word “law” is much broader than the singular instantiation 
of it that is the law produced by the modern nation state. The “complex legal pluralism” 
article goes further and adopts an understanding of pluralism that resonates with the 
second version by stating that a cultural understanding of law implies the recognition 
198 Robert W. Gordon, “Critical Legal Histories”, Stanford Law Review 36 (1984), 57-125, p. 109.
199 Robert M. Cover, “Nomos and Narrative”, Harvard Law Review 97 (1983), 4-68, p. 54. 
200 Patrignani, Complex Legal Pluralism, 19-33, p. 29.
201 Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law (Installment I of II), 1-34, p. 23.
202 Id., p. 25.
203 Nathaniel Berman, “Aftershocks: Exoticization, Normalization, and the Hermeneutic Compulsion”, 
Utah Law Review (1997), 281-286, p. 281.
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of the internal inconsistencies of law, which is constituted of countless fragments not 
necessarily related in a formal rational manner204. This characteristic is important as 
it is one of the features that make law a complex system in the sense described in the 
article. Lastly, pluralism in the form of “inconsistencies within” is fundamental for 
the methodological argument developed in the last article, as the purpose of the com-
parison carried out there is to underline how both French and German legal cultures 
are compounds of mixed elements. Even in regard to foundational and characterizing 
elements such as the conception of the individual, the conditions of belonging to the 
national community and the meaning of state neutrality, the legal cultures are not 
monolithic but split and dispersed. As argued there, the aim of studying law in context 
is to disassemble it in the various contradicting elements and to analyse the winning or 
majoritarian ones as well as to give voice to the loosing and silenced options.
4.3.  Context
Admittedly, one could compare some black letter rule from the Italian Codice Civile 
with some black letter rule from the French Code Civile and not expand one’s research 
to any extra-textual element by pretending that the codes’ texts exist in a vacuum 
and adjust to the legal systems’ rhetoric of unity and coherence. That would still be 
a comparison, even if an uninteresting and possibly misleading one. On the contrary, 
throughout the articles the importance of studying and comparing the law in its context 
has been stressed. This indeed lies on a certain understanding of the nature of law; so in 
a way this is a point that brings comparative law close to legal philosophy. Devoting at-
tention to context has been considered for example as a means to overcome the lack of 
foundation once all grand narratives about the nature of law have been set aside205. The 
idea of law as a theoretical unit that is neutral and uniformly valid for everyone within 
its territorial boundaries of application has been attacked on the one hand by various 
jurisprudences of difference (that is, approaches to the legal from the perspective of the 
excluded and suppressed). On the other hand it has been attacked by the growth of 
transnational regulatory regimes that have an uncertain legal status but which have un-
deniable coercive force. As such, in order to make sense of it, Roger Cotterrell suggests 
that law needs to be studied in context and that “normative legal theory and empirical 
legal theory need to become a single enterprise”206.
204 Patrignani, Complex Legal Pluralism, 19-33, p. 25.
205 Cotterrell, The Politics of Jurisprudence - A Critical Introduction to Legal Philosophy, pp. 254–263.
206 Id., 263. Interestingly Cotterrell seems to be extending the need to consider the context also of legal 
scholarship itself, and this is presented as a corrective for the circularity, aridity and scholasticism of norma-
tive legal theory: “conceptual analysis of law always presupposes social conditions that must be examined 
empirically”, thus carrying out a sort of “sociological reconstruction of legal theory”, pp. 246-247.
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4.3.1.  Relevance of context for comparison
As for the comparatist’s endeavour, contextualization is crucial in order to avoid mis-
understanding due to the high level of variability of law across different societies. René 
David noted that “[l]aw is but one of the possible methods of organizing a society. 
Its position in this context must be clarified, and its relations with other factors of 
social organization must be stated, if it is desired to have an accurate idea of the real 
scope of rules of law”207. So the comparatist might find herself studying phenomena 
which are considered to be “law” by legal scholars in some parts of the western world, 
while for example Islamic jurists and Hindu thinkers would not consider them “legal”. 
More recently Werner Menski considered the “central challenge for the comparative 
law teacher and legal theorist in the field of globalised legal education” to be the fact 
that there is no “worldwide agreement, in theory as well as in practice, about the central 
object of globalised legal studies, namely ‘the law’ itself ”208. He continues by saying 
that, “As in religious studies, it seems that, unless we agree to disagree about the basic 
ingredients of law itself and allow others the space to explain (and live) their culturally 
conditioned understandings of life and law, no real progress will be made in global legal 
debate”. 
Beside the centrality of having an understanding of the general role of law in society, 
in the comparative legal literature the importance of context has been stressed also in 
relation to more specific research aims. It has been asserted as useful in avoiding ethno-
centric bias209, in recognizing the integrity of the other and accepting the legitimacy of 
diversity210. Some consider the study of law in context to be the proprium of compar-
ative legal research: “the juxtaposition and interpretation of foreign material calls for 
making explicit and trying to understand the institutional and socio-cultural context 
of the law”211. Indeed, there are elements of the legal environment, such as the so-called 
cryptotypes entailed in the legal mentality of jurists working within a system, which 
remain unformulated and that therefore are discernible only through comparison. 
Still, what is meant by studying law in context? As already the case for otherness and 
pluralism, there are many competing definitions for the word “context”212. Moreover, 
this section has so far deliberately avoided the term “culture”, as it is probably one of 
the trickiest ever introduced into the vocabulary of the comparative legal scholar, but 
indeed contextualization as intended in this dissertation and the study of legal cultures 
lie very near to each other in the sense that contextualization entails a certain under-
standing of law as a product of culture. In the following, I will try to clarify the choice 
of the term and the connotation attached to it. 
207 David, The Different Conceptions of the Law, p. 3.
208 Werner Menski, Comparative Law in a Global Context: the Legal Systems of Asia and Africa, 2nd ed. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 32.
209 Demleitner, Combating Legal Ethnocentrism: Comparative Law Sets Boundaries, 737-762.
210 Cotterrell, Comparative Law and Legal Culture, 710-737, p. 736.
211 Adams, Doing what doesn’t come naturally. On the distinctiveness of comparative law, 229-240, p. 234. 
212 Crf. for example the various contribution to the issue Antoine Bailleux and François Ost, “Dossier Le 
Droit en Contexte”, Revue Interdisciplinaire D’Études Juridiques 70 (2013).
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4.3.2. Culture(?)
Among the founders of cultural studies, Raymond Williams attests the wide meaning 
of the word “culture”: beginning from cultivation (as in agriculture) of crops and by 
extension meaning cultivation of the mind, the term’s significance articulates in two 
possible directions, i.e. as signifying a system of a whole way of life involved in all forms 
of social activities (practices) or alternatively as a product of artistic and intellectual 
activities (ideas)213. There is an indissoluble inter-relationship between ideas and prac-
tices: the resultant culture is threaded through all social practices, which may manifest 
unexpected correspondences but also discontinuities. Indeed, such a complex object 
of study puzzles the square-minded legal scholars, and if “legal culture” is considered 
as a subset of the broader “culture” it ends up being puzzling in the same way214. As for 
legal culture, Lawrence Friedman who coined the term differentiates between internal 
and external legal culture, where the first refers to convictions and practices of the legal 
professionals and the second to the perceptions of law shared by the lay members of the 
society215. The sum of the two perspectives leads to a definition approximately encom-
passing patterns of social behaviour and attitudes concerning law and judicature216. But 
the ideas of context and culture used in this thesis are not used in this sense. Rather, my 
approach (in particular in the last article) is more interested in uncovering basic ideas 
about who we are and how we want to live together that are hidden under the surface 
of black-letter law. In order to better clarify such an approach its relation to the existing 
comparative literature should be spelled out.
In the comparative legal literature, explicit concern with law’s relation to culture 
has become prominent since the 1990s217. The issue has been raised in particular in 
connection with debates on the feasibility and desirability of legal transplants: famous-
ly, Alan Watson argued that legal evolution has happened mostly though the moving 
of rules or systems of law from one people to another218; and in opposition to this 
view Legrand fiercely claimed that legal transplants are impossible219. The disagreement 
213 Raymond Williams, The Sociology of Culture (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995 [1981]), 
pp. 10–14. Where he observes the non-incompatibly, but rather the convergence, of these two senses.
214 Roger Cotterrell, “The Concept of Legal Culture”, in Comparing Legal Cultures (Aldershot: Dartmouth 
Publishing Company, 1997), 13-31, p. 13.
215 Lawrence Friedman, The Legal System: A Social Science Perspective (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 
1975), p. 223.
216 Id., p. 193.
217 Cotterrell, Comparative Law and Legal Culture, 710-737, p. 710.
218 Alan Watson, Legal Transplants: An approach to comparative law, 2nd ed. (Athens, Georgia: University of 
Georgia Press, 1993 [1974]), p. 21. He then declares the moving as successful when the moved rule “grow[s] in 
its new body, and become[s] part of that body just as the rule or institution would have continued to develop in 
its parent system. Subsequent development in the host system should not be confused with rejection”, id., p. 27.
219 Pierre Legrand, “The Impossibility of “Legal Transplants””, Maastricht Journal of European and Com-
parative Law 4 (1997), 111-124 re-defines rule as incorporating much more than a sequence of words: “[t]
he meaning of the rule is an essential component of the rule; it partakes in the ruleness of the rule”, p. 114. 
Further on, he expands the definition of rule as “necessarily an incorporative cultural form. As an accretion 
of cultural elements, it is supported by impressive historical and ideological formations. A rule does not have 
any empirical existence that can be significantly detached from the world of meanings that characterizes a 
legal culture; the part is an expression and a synthesis of the whole: it resonates”, id., p. 116.
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lies in the way law is conceived as relating to society, as the degree of transplantability 
is inversely proportional to the embeddedness of law in culture220. If law is rules, i.e. 
propositional statements, then they can be transplanted, but this is not so if law is seen 
as closely intelocked with society. Furthermore, the relevance of law’s cultural context 
has emerged in relation to the so-called “gap” between law and society, which has con-
stituted one of the core issues in legal sociology221, which in turn is thus connected to 
legal comparison222. Both sub-fields have been dealing with the gap question, but argu-
ably nowadays consesus has been reached (and such understanding is also shared here) 
that law and society are not to be considered as two separate subsystems but instead as 
being inextricably intertwined. Law is not conceived as independent or as a by-product 
of social forces but as being actively involved in the constitution of social, political and 
economic phenomena and vice versa223. 
4.3.3.  Risk of stereotyping – and how to avoid it
For the purposes of this synthesis the most relevant aspect to be considered concerning 
the contextualization of law is the objection of producing an essentialised and stereo-
typed image of the studied legal culture by simplifying complex entities by emphasising 
one particular aspect of the whole224. Glenn notoriously disfavoured “legal culture” 
as he saw it as a conceptualising instrument that would be a means of differentiation, 
separating cultures from one another and assuming homogeneity within. Moreover, 
as a descriptive concept culture would reify the present as a given necessity and would 
fail to understand historical influences and circumstances225. Therefore, culture as an 
epistemological instrument is dismissed as it would contribute to an “epistemology 
220 William Ewald, “Comparative Jurisprudence (II): The Logic of Legal Transplant”, The American Journal 
of Comparative Law 43, no. 4 (1995), 489-510 presents a scale of mirror theories of law, arranged according 
to their degree of acceptance of transplantability. On the connection between transplants and understanding 
of legal culture, see also Michele Graziadei, “Comparative Law as the Study of Transplants and Receptions”, 
in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, eds. Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 441-476, pp. 465–474.
221 Reza Banakar, Normativity in Legal Sociology - Methodological Reflections on Law and Regulation in Late 
Modernity (Cham: Springer, 2015), pp. 52–56.
222 Id., p. 145. The core issue is the same as with the legal transplants debate.
223 Riles, Comparative Law and Socio-Legal Studies, 775-813, p. 796. This is in line with the understanding 
of culture advanced already long ago by cultural theorist Stuart Hall, who also underlined how cultural 
identities are always transversal. He conceptualises culture as “interwoven with all social activities” not as 
something separable in distinct poles (“culture” vs. “non-culture”). The core problem of Cultural Studies 
would thus be the thinking together of both the specificity of different contradicting practices and the forms 
of articulated unity they constitute. See Stuart Hall, “Cultural studies: two paradigms”, Media, Culture and 
Society 2 (1980), 57-72, p. 63.
224 Menski, Comparative Law in a Global Context: The Legal Systems of Asia and Africa, p. 32. For the same 
concern related to “contextually oriented” comparative constitutional law see Vicki C. Jackson, “Compara-
tive Constitutional Law: Methodologies”, in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law, eds. 
Michel Rosenfeld and András Sajó (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 54-74, p. 67. She states the need 
to avoid “national stereotypes and group characterizations” and advances as a possible alternative the focus on 
the similarity of singularly taken rules. See also Hyland, Comparative Law, 184-199.
225 Patrick Glenn, “Legal Cultures and Legal Traditions”, in Epistemology and Methodology of Comparative 
Law, ed. Mark Van Hoecke (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004), 7-20.
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of conflict, as opposed to an epistemology of conciliation”226. Furthermore, devoting 
attention to legal culture or somehow adopting a holistic approach to law has been set 
within the romantic tradition. Whitman states that, “When comparatists today talk 
about the problem of ‘understanding’ the ‘other’ or of law as ‘culture’, they are draw-
ing on a tradition that can be traced to late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century 
Germany”227. He historicizes the “cultural turn” as a rediscovery of the Herderian idea 
of Volksgeist, a peculiar national character informing law, but also social manners, art, 
language and whatever else contributes to “make French individuals french, or German 
individuals german”228. Also the Gadamerian concept of Vorverständnis229 is mobilized; 
that is the pre-understanding that influences (allows but also restricts) the possibility 
of further understanding – with reference to the jurists internal to a system (rather 
than to comparatists approaching it, from their own perspective, as the other)230. He 
highlights the limitedness of the internal perspective, as participants are usually poor 
informants231 and warns against a number of “excessive Romantic tendencies”232 that 
are mainly related to the risk of crystallising the other into its Vorverständnis and more 
broadly into its culture by depicting it as an unchangeable block. 
Indeed the idea that there would be a sort of organic connection among different 
manifestations of culture defined in general and totalizing terms is problematic. Such 
a view fails to account for the agency of the individuals and the role they play in gen-
erating meanings233, which may lead to a orientalisation of the other by “emphasizing 
the irreducible of the experience of that culture and the inevitable strangeness and 
‘otherness’ of what lies outside it”234. Most of all it fails to account for conflicting un-
derstandings and views within every culture, which implies both similarity within and 
difference between cultures235. A naïve comparison of French law with German law, for 
example, would have been inadequate according to my understanding of context, which 
actually considers both laws as composed by “many coexisting, fragmented, sometimes 
integrated, sometimes conflicting normative orders with different degrees of access to 
coercive authority and with different kinds of articulations with other cultures and 
with the global legal arena”236. Thus, the main argument of this last subchapter is as 
follows: a contextualizing approach according to which the interpretation of black 
letter law needs to refer to the cultural whole the law belongs to does not necessarily 
 
226 Id., p. 17.
227 Whitman, The Neo-Romantic Turn, 312-344, p. 315.
228 Ibid.
229 This time not in relation to the position of the comparatist – as was the case above within the legal orien-
talism theory, but instead it refers to the jurist internal to the system.
230 Whitman, The Neo-Romantic Turn, 312-344, pp. 325–329.
231 As is argued also by the fifth Trento thesis, see the above section ”method as path”.
232 Whitman, The Neo-Romantic Turn, 312-344, p. 336.
233 Riles, Comparative Law and Socio-Legal Studies, 775-813, pp. 796-802.
234 Cotterrell, Comparative Law and Legal Culture, 710-737, p. 716.
235 Id., p. 718.
236 Riles, Comparative Law and Socio-Legal Studies, 775-813, p. 794. 
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go hand in hand with the myth of the integrity of legal culture237. The soundness of a 
law-in-context approach is not reduced by the heterogeneity of the cultural context. 
On the contrary, the law-in-context approach is used to highlight the heterogeneity of 
the cultural context.
To recap, the understanding of law in context adopted here considers law to be part 
of a worldview which is not necessarily coherent or fully instantiated and is shaped by 
dynamic processes among individual and communities. The last article aims at showing 
the incoherence of the worldviews (more specifically, the views of the individual, of 
the national community bond and of state neutrality towards religions) manifested in 
the compared legal texts. Admittedly, various problems are posed when studying the 
relation of legal texts with their cultural context, emphasizing law’s relation to beliefs 
and ultimate values. To begin with, the exact meaning of these values cannot be set, but 
only its oscillations can be studied. Moreover, their interpretation varies significantly 
among participants in a culture and also among participants of the legal culture depend-
ing on their structural position within the system238. In addition, one needs to be aware 
that those values and beliefs are also partly rhetorical claims, which are manipulated by 
certain members of the culture in order to project uniformity, coherence or stability 
on a given cultural unit239. As a consequence, these underlying values and beliefs are 
rarely defined in a straightforward way in legal texts: “Often they will not be directly 
expressed at all, merely taken for granted as part of the ‘self-understood’, the unstated 
237 Cfr. Michele Graziadei, “Comparative Law, Legal History, and the Holistic Approach to Legal Cultures”, 
Zeitschrift Für Europäisches Privatrecht 7 (1999), 531-543. Still, as the author states the importance of his-
torical research in contrast to mythology, i.e. the study of the past in all its complexity, including facts that 
are disturbing or unsettling because they do not fit into the mythological image of the self, I understand his 
statement to be concurring with the argument made in this chapter.
238 David Nelken, “Thinking About Legal Culture”, Asian Journal of Law and Society 1, no. 2 (2014), 255-
274 p. 269.
239 Id., p. 269. Even Legrand’s account of the French statute on religious dress at school, which is otherwise 
very focused on highlighting the “frenchness” of the statute, admits the persistence of anthropological di-
versity under the fictional and utopic unitary myth – which is, after all, at least partly a product of official 
state rhetoric. Pierre Legrand, “Tracing the French Statute on Religious Dress at School”, p. 8, http://www.
pierre-legrand.com/tracing-detail-2.pdf [28/2/2017]. To be sure, Legrand’s understanding of culture has 
been variating over time. In 1997 he drastically stated that “in enacting a particular rule (and not others), 
the French, for example, are not just doing that: they are also doing something typically French and are thus 
alluding to a modality of legal experience that is intrinsically theirs. In this sense, because it communicates 
the French sensibility to law, the rule can serve as a focus of inquiry into legal Frenchness and into Frenchness 
tout court”, in Legrand, The Impossibility of “Legal Transplants”, 111-124, p. 115. This somehow reifies and 
essentialises “frenchness”. More recently he has also argued for the non-uniformity of culture, being contested 
by individuals as a function of the way in which power manifests itself. The experience of cultural difference 
would thus be internal to any culture. Furthermore, he has stressed how meanings are neither fixed nor static 
and presented a much complexified view on diffusion and mutation of culture by concluding as follows: “[r]
eferring to ‘culture’ in this way does not automatically privilege coherence, does not imply stultification, does 
not entail essentialism, does not exaggerate distinctness, does not preclude temporal variation, does not efface 
individual variations or contestations that can take the form of participation in a range of sub-cultures, does 
not fetishise identity such that it would lay beyond critique, and certainly does not cast its advocates as some 
reactionary minority”. Pierre Legrand, “Comparative Legal Studies and the Matter of Authenticity”, Journal 
of Comparative Law 1, no. 2 (2006), 365-460, p. 390.
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intellectual context in which legal rules are given meaning and purpose”240. For this 
reason, any interpretation such as the one proposed in the last article is necessarily 
personal, not-final and not right. 
Interpretive comparison that aims at discovering unexpressed assumptions and at 
studying society through law is indeed fraught with risks of misunderstanding, mis-
reading and misrepresenting. Those cannot be set aside by the understanding of context 
presented here. What can be set aside is the risk of simplifying, stereotyping and essen-
tialising foreign legal cultures by reducing them to a coherent block to be accepted as a 
whole. This understanding of cultural difference requires a recognition of the existence 
of the many within the one and a rejection of clear cut binary oppositions. Similarly, 
legal anthropologist Sally Engle Merry states culture to be “the product of historical 
influences rather than evolutionary change. It is marked by hybridity and creolization 
rather than uniformity and consistency”241. To conclude, the notion of context when 
paired with the one of plurality within presented in the previous sub-chapter is able to 
bypass the risk of essentialisation. 
4.3.4.  Corollary 
One closing remark has to be added. The shift in focus towards the understanding of 
state-based and non-state-based normative orders in their context entails an interesting 
corollary where there is a fading away also of the distinction between the perspectives 
of insiders and those of outsiders242. The comparative legal scholar who has adopted an 
otherness-awareness, sharing concern for plurality within and is prepared to contextu-
alize is at the same time an insider and outsider, participant and critic and normative 
and descriptive243. She is not fully an insider in the sense that she is not uniquely playing 
by the rules of the system as a lawyer by pleading in front of a national court. She is not 
completely an outsider either, as she is never simply observing. Instead, by creating im-
ages of the studied law she is necessarily engaging with it and taking a stance. The con-
textualized law studied is not a definite object with clear conceptual boundaries which 
scholars can be inside or outside of, and therefore the dichotomy internal=normative 
vs. external=descriptive is complexified244. This bears consequences also on the ques-
tion related to the cognoscibility of the radical otherness, as the difference-approach 
points to the incommensurability and finally incomprehensibility of the foreign law. 
Agreeing with this admission, I would even extend it further: there is no outsider for 
whom the foreign law would be absolutely incomprehensible, and there is no insider 
240 Cotterrell, Comparative Law and Legal Culture, 710-737, p. 735.
241 Sally E. Merry, “What is Legal Culture? An Anthropological Perspective”, in Using Legal Culture, ed. 
David Nelken (London: Wildly, Simmonds and Hill, 2012), 52-76, p. 55. A similar formulation can already 
be found in Sally E. Merry, “Human Rights Law and the Demonization of Culture (and Anthropology Along 
the Way)”, Political and Legal Anthropology Review 26, no. 1 (2003), 55-77.
242 Margaret Davies, “Legal Pluralism”, in Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research, eds. Peter Cane and 
Herbert Kritzer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 805-827, p. 825.
243 Riles, Comparative Law and Socio-Legal Studies, 775-813, pp. 800–802.
244 I also arrive at this conclusion in the article Patrignani, Legal Pluralism as Theoretical Programme, 707-
725, p. 720.
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for whom the domestic law would be simple and well known. Vice versa, there is no 
blinded insider and all-perceiving outsider. Rather, complete understanding is always 
unachievable245. Michele Graziadei puts it amiably: “the question whether cross-border 
communication can ever be ‘complete’ assumes that there can be ‘complete’ communi-
cation within any single linguistic system. But this assumption is questionable to begin 
with because it sets an impossible ideal standard. Our everyday life is a monument to 
misunderstanding, no matter what language we speak”246. Without downplaying the 
difficulties of studying in foreign languages and rendering the law studied in some 
other, again foreign, languages, the corollary brought up here stresses how foreign and 
domestic are relative concepts. There is no total foreignness or complete domesticity. 
Once more the position of the comparatist needs to be complexified.
The complexified understanding of the compared laws entails perceiving them as 
radically other (and therefore not fully comprehensible), analysed without assuming 
their internal coherence but rather giving voice to the silenced disagreements and 
placing them within their context (without thereby crystallising it in an unmovable 
monolith). Furthermore, the complexified position of the comparatist that has been 
advanced in the second chapter on method acknowledges her responsibility in choos-
ing the appropriate analytical tools for her cognitive interests and stresses the ethical 
dimension connected to comparative legal research. These two complexifications when 
combined create the methodological basis against which the following articles have to 
be read. Or in other words, they can be read and listened to as variations on the theme 
set by this synthesis. 
245 Glanert, Comparaison et traduction des droits: à l’impossible tous sont tenus, 279-311, at p. 290, acknowled-
ges how, even within one same language, it is impossible to fix the meaning of words. 
246 Graziadei, Comparative Law as the Study of Transplants and Receptions, 441-476, p. 468. There the move 
is to precisely show how the allegedly “external” approach of the legal pluralist is actually also normative, 
while here the blurring of the distinction is a bit more general, as it originates from the broader approach to 
comparativism which takes into account the three issues presented in this chapter. 
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ALTERITY ACCORDING TO EMMANUEL LEVINAS  





I. Opening: the quid pluris of comparison 
 
Characters: an array of comparative law scholars with 
statuses ranging from “distinguished professor” to 
“inexperienced PhD student”. 
Act 1, Scene 1: A classroom in summertime. A 
discussion following a panel on the emphasis that 
should be placed on the cultural context so as to 
understand both foreign and one’s own law.  
Professor in the audience: “What you say is certainly 
relevant and interesting, but we don’t need to be 
comparatists in order to do that. Comparison does not 
add anything to a context-sensitive approach, it is not 
special in any way”. 
 
To be sure, the professor in the audience is right. Disparate conceptions of 
law may merrily coexist with comparative research. It is often the case that, at the 
level of personal experience, the encounter with different conceptions of the legal 
provokes and stimulates the researcher, and the resultant understanding of law and 
legal research is strongly influenced thereafter. Still, it is not necessary to be a 
comparatist in order to be aware of the embeddedness of law in culture. Therefore, it 
can be said that many of the theoretical issues that arise due to comparison are 
actually shared concerns of domestic legal theory.1 Comparison may help those 
issues emerge, or may make them blatant, but they are there anyway. In this sense, 
the professor’s remark is not a peregrine one. 
Nevertheless, there is a theoretical quid pluris involved in comparison: the 
concept of otherness. As trivial as it may seem, “comparison involves understanding 
one entity or domain in terms of an other entity or domain. The comparative 
enterprise is in thus permeated by the other, the inevitably different”.2 In order for 
comparison to be even conceivable, there has to be some kind of “otherness” 
mobilised – be it explicitly stated or implicitly at work in the mind of the 
comparatist.3 The definition of law adopted is surely a methodologically relevant 
choice; yet we have comparison also among the wording of legislations (clearly, the 
                                                          
 PhD Candidate, Legal Cultures in Transnational World (LeCTra) Doctoral Programme, Faculty of Law, 
University of Lapland, Finland. 
1 Cf. M. Siems, Comparative Law, Cambridge: CUP, 2014, p.106. Cf. also S. A. Smith, “Comparative 
Legal Scholarship as Ordinary Legal Scholarship”, 5 Journal of Comparative Law 331 (2011). 
2 V. Curran, “Cultural Immersion, Difference and Categories in U.S. Comparative Law”, 46 American 
Journal of Comparative Law 43 (1998), p.45. 
3 Cf. G. Samuel, An Introduction to Comparative Law Theory and Method, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014, 
p.11. 
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interest and the relevance of such research will have to be proved, but indeed it will 
be a comparison). Things being so, what intrinsically differentiates comparative legal 
research from the rest of legal scholarship is the deployment of the idea of otherness. 
Exploring and making use of the possible link between comparative law and 
philosophy, this paper in particular examines the conception of otherness developed 
by Emmanuel Levinas (for which the term “alterity” will be used) and attempts to 
draw forth some recommendations for the comparison of laws. 
Otherness, its definition and our relation to it, is among the central themes of 
contemporary philosophy, given the particular attention it devotes to the experience 
of plurality and of differences.4 Here the focus is on Levinas because he conceives 
alterity in a way that overturns a conceptual structure that is firmly rooted in 
European thought. The idea of the “other” has often been conceptually related to 
“one” to which the other is somehow second.5 The Latin word alter contains the 
Indo-European suffix *– (t)ero –, which carries a meaning of contrast and of precise 
identification. 6  Alter conveys the idea of an opposition between two elements, 
thought of as alternatives, and refers to the second, the less evident and common 
component.7 It implies a sort of pre-existing hierarchy, and the recognition of the 
other intervenes in a moment when there is already an ordering rationality in place.  
The conceptual categories used to think about otherness have usually been 
organised around the parallelism between universalism, the idea that there is 
something in common among all human beings, that goes hand in hand with the 
recognition of equality, versus otherness, that is manifested through differences and 
that leads to submission and discrimination.8 Sameness is synonymous with inclusion 
and difference with exclusion.9 Levinas’ conception of alterity, on the contrary, 
subverts the parallelism and draws a chiasm by decoupling it: universalistic claims 
are seen as totalising and imposing uniformity, while the appraisal of differences is 
seen as the key to proper ethical living. Alterity is conceived outside negativity, in a 
truly positive sense. 
Before entering into a more detailed analysis of the concept of alterity and its 
influence on the theory of comparative law, one more preliminary issue has to be 
dealt with that concerns the interest of legal scholars in Levinas’ ethics. The 
philosophy of Levinas has already attracted the attention of jurists, who elaborated 
                                                          
4 Cf. J. Koski, “Alterity”, in V. E. Taylor and C. E. Winquist (eds.), Encyclopedia of Postmodernism, 
London: Routledge, 2001, pp.8-9. 
5 Cf. B. Waldenfels, “Andere/Andersheit/Anderssein”, in H. J. Sandkühler (ed.), Enzyklopädie Philosophie, 
vol. I, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2010, p.88. Cf. also P.-J. Labarrière, “L’alterité de l’autre”, in 
A. Jacob, L’Univers Philosophique, vol. I, Encyclopédie Philosophique Universelle, Paris: PUF, 1990, p.80. 
6 Cf. A. L. Sihler, New Comparative Grammar of Greek and Latin, Oxford: OUP, 1995, p.364. 
7 Cf. F. P. Ciglia, “Alterità”, in: V. Melchiorre (ed.), Enciclopedia Filosofica, vol. I, Milan: Bompiani, 
2006, pp.305-6. 
8 Cf. for example the account of the 1550 Valladolid debate concerning the treatment of the American 
natives by the Spanish colonisers given by T. Todorov, La conquête de l’Amérique – La question de 
l’autre, Paris: Le Seuil, 1982, pp.193-212. On the connections between universalism and Christian 
thought and their influences on legal anthropology see É. Leroy, “Pluralisme et Universalisme juridiques. 
Propos d’étape d’un anthropologue du droit”, in L’étranger en France face au droit de la famille, Paris: 
La documentation française, 2000, p.6. A quick overview of the various manifestations of the “monist 
model” (understood as the preference accorded to oneness and similarity) in Western thought can be 
found in P. Legrand, “The same and the different”, in P. Legrand and R. Munday (eds.), Comparative 
Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions, Cambridge: CUP, 2003, pp.256-58.  
9 According to Vivian Curran, this was also the mind-set of the generation of eminent comparative 
lawyers that fled from Nazi Germany to the United States, cf. V. Curran, op. cit., note 2, pp.66-78. 
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on it in order to apply his ethics to interpersonal relationships, which are susceptible 
to be disciplined by law. According to some authors, his teachings are not 
transposable into a political ethics.10 According to others, on the other hand, some 
important arguments are to be derived from his reflections that can justify the 
existence of the State and institutions, and which may progressively orient them 
towards the horizon of Justice.11 This paper differs from other legal approaches to 
Levinas because it aims to apply the author’s thinking on alterity to the 
epistemological position of the comparatist facing other laws. 
The main theoretical assertion of this paper is that the conception of alterity 
and relationship to the other developed by Levinas can help the comparatist to 
position herself in regard to the foreign laws under consideration. The aspects of the 
author’s thinking that are particularly meaningful and that will be developed in the 
text are the radical heterogeneity of the other, the critical assessment of knowledge 
conceived as appropriation and the establishment of an ethical relation to the other. 
Each of these aspects and their possible contribution to the theory of comparison 
will be focussed on in different sections of the paper. 
 
II. Radical Heterogeneity 
 
“The metaphysical other is other with an alterity that is 
not formal, is not the simple reverse of identity, and is 
not formed out of resistance to the same, but is prior to 
every initiative, to all imperialism of the same.  
It is other with an alterity constitutive of the very 
content of the other.  
Other with an alterity that does not limit the same, for 
in limiting the same the other would not be rigorously 
other: by virtue of the common frontier the other, 
within the system, would yet be the same”12. 
 
The first aspect where the implications of Levinas’ thinking are interesting 
for the comparison of laws is the very definition of alterity and its characteristics. 
Levinas writes about “something else entirely”;13 something that is characterised by 
a deeply different nature that is denominated “radical heterogeneity”.14 The other is 
not produced through a negation that is instrumental to define the same i.e. it is not 
                                                          
10  The imposition of levinasian thoughts on ethics through a programmatic social theory “would 
necessarily perpetrate, en masse, the very subsumptive violence they denounce”. N. Smith, “Questions for 
a Reluctant Jurisprudence of Alterity”, in D. Manderson (ed.), Essays on Levinas and Law: A Mosaic, 
Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p.57. 
11 This interpretation would be viable thanks to the arrival on the scene of the third party, who limits the 
(otherwise infinite) responsibility towards the Other and opens up to institutions and even to the universe 
of logic. The third allows the relation of proximity and of affection towards the other to attain an ethical 
status, enables reciprocity and leads to the emergence of the necessity of State and of statutes. Cf. 
V. Marzocco, “L’ostaggio o il lupo. Un’ipotesi su soggettività e origine delle istituzioni in Emmanuel 
Levinas”, in M. Durante (ed.), Responsabilità di fronte alla storia. La filosofia di Emmanuel Levinas tra 
alterità e terzietà, Genoa: il melangolo, 2008, p.201; cf. also M. Ruol, “Entre politique et sainteté: 
l’exigence de justice”, in M. Dupuis (ed.), Levinas en contrastes, Bruxelles: De Boeck Université, 1994, 
p.143. 
12 E. Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, transl. by A. Lingis, Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press, 2012, pp.38-39 (1969, first French edition 1961). 
13 Id., p.33.  
14 Id., p.36. 
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other in relation to the same. The concept of exteriority is introduced in order to 
describe the condition of not belonging to any shared general metaphysical ordering. 
Exteriority is not a simple spatial distance, it expresses another “way of existing”.15 
Moreover, it allows the other to be able to increase knowledge, since it is that which 
is foreign that can teach. The teaching that the other generates is not reducible to 
maieutic: coming from the exterior it brings to the same more than what is already 
latent within it.16 
The second main fundamental concept is the idea of infinity.17 In contrast to 
totality, which does not leave anything outside and ties together all the differences of 
the real under one single concept, the infinite remains exterior to the thought which 
thinks it. It is an idea whose ideatum overflows the capacity of thought. Infinity 
brings about the insufficiency of our “knowledge” of the other, which remains 
ultimately incomprehensible and undefinable. Alterity cannot be conceived of as 
content of conscience; on the contrary it forces us to acknowledge the limits of 
penetration of our intellect. There is always something of the other which 
necessarily slips through unperceived. To sum up, alterity connotes an other that is 
wholly different (exteriority) and that therefore cannot be comprehended and 
included in an overarching contemplation (infinity). 
Clearly, there are examples of comparative legal approaches that do not 
conceive the otherness of the other law as Levinasian alterity; the most patent 
example being the “praesumptio similitudinis”,18 which refers to an other that is 
assumed to be similar, fully comprehensible and that can be led back to unity with 
the same.19 Another example is the conception of the legal other as “that which is 
not the same”, entailing a sort of praesumptio diversitatis. As Cliffort Geertz 
denounces, the other law is described as “law without lawyers, law without 
sanctions, law without courts, or law without precedent”,20 and the list could well be 
concluded by a “law without law”:21 clearly the idea of such scheme is to remark 
that, in our own law, we do have lawyers, sanctions, courts and precedents.22 There 
is no real encounter with the alterity of the other that can introduce elements hitherto 
unheard of. Both approaches – presupposing the similarity of the other law, and 
defining it by contrast – do not bring anything new to the comparatist. 
                                                          
15 Id., p.35. 
16 Id., p.51. 
17 For an historical reconstruction and an extensive explanation of the world, see also the chapter “Infini” 
in E. Levinas, Altérité et transcendance, Saint-Clément-la-Rivière: Fata Morgana, 1995, pp.69-89.  
18 K. Zweigert and H. Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, 3rd ed., transl. by T. Weir, Oxford: 
OUP, 1998, p.40. 
19 To be precise, it is not a question as to whether and to what extent actual differences or similarities 
exist between various laws, as some conceptions of the legal are indeed more similar to each other than 
others. The aim here is to detect what kind of concept of otherness is at work in different methodological 
approaches. 
20 C. Geertz, Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology, New York: Basic Books, 
1983, p.168. 
21 Ibid., cf. also T. Ruskola, “Law without Law, or is ‘Chinese Law’ an Oxymoron?”, 11 William & Mary 
Bill of Rights Journal 665 (2003), pp.666-69.  
22 Cf. T. Ruskola, “Legal Orientalism”, Michigan Law Review 101, 1 (2002), pp.179-234 and by the same 
author Legal Orientalism: China, the Unites States and Modern Law, Cambridge, Mass. and London: 
Harvard University Press, 2013. 
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To conceive of the other law in a way that entails a conception of otherness 
compatible with the features of Levinasian alterity implies thinking of the law 
“object” of comparison as something completely different from the domestic law; 
that is, something that is constructed on presuppositions that do not have anything to 
do with the foundations of the already-known worldview.23 To be sure, no universal 
definition of law is possible.24 Any attempt to draw a “general” jurisprudence or a 
“grand” theory of law is doomed to reveal its situatedness – which does not make it 
less valid in quality, clarity of insight or less effective in letting certain aspects of a 
given conception of law emerge; rather, situatedness makes a general theory less 
valid in quantity, or better said it restricts the geographical area and the time span in 
which the theory is applicable or valid.25 Therefore, if the exteriority of the other law 
is to be preserved, it shall not be included in a community (like a certain general 
theory of law) that anticipates similarities. Nowadays, no serious comparatist would 
dare to deny the importance of going deeper than black letter law; the difference 
lying rather in what kind of further data are deemed to be pertinent and what 
relevance is accorded to them. 26  Different perceptions of normativity can be 
understood as part of wider intangible intelligibility frames, or paradigms.27 This 
open conceptualisation allows the emergence of fundamental differences such as, for 
example, the place granted to reason,28 the juridical qualification of reality29 or the 
differentiation between fact and norm.30 Within comparative law literature, law has 
been for example conceived of as the following: a cognitive phenomenon,31 the 
expression of singular mentalities 32  and a framework. 33  And various other 
                                                          
23 Cf. R. David, “The different conceptions of the law”, in: International Encyclopedia of Comparative 
Law, vol. II, The Legal Systems of the World: Their Comparison and Unification, Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 
1975, p.10. If René David was admitting with vexation that law does not have the same reach and role in 
different world societies, Werner Menski some 30 years later states the same with more ease, cf. 
W. Menski, Comparative Law in a Global Context: The Legal Systems of Asia and Africa, 2nd ed., 
Cambridge: CUP, 2006, p.32. 
24 Cf. B. Z. Tamanaha, “Law”, in: S. N. Katz, (ed.), Oxford International Encyclopaedia of Legal History, 
Oxford: OUP, 2009, pp.18-22 and by the same author “What is ‘General’ Jurisprudence? A Critique of 
Universalistic Claims by Philosophical Concepts of Law”, Washington University in St. Louis Legal 
Studies Research Paper, No. 12-03-02, 2012. 
25 Cf. J. D. Galligan, “Legal Theory and Empirical Research”, in P. Cane and H. Krytzer (eds.), Oxford 
Handbook of Empirical Legal Studies, Oxford: OUP, 2010, pp.976-995. 
26 The problem of defining the external boundaries of what constitutes relevant material for a legal scholar 
is a poorly formulated one: it is simply not possible to define those boundaries once and for all, not only 
because of their variability in time and space but also because of their entrenchment with the 
surroundings. Law is not a separate subset of the culture to which it belongs, but it is interconnected with 
it. Cf. P. Legrand, “On the singularity of law”, 47, Harvard International Law Journal, 2006, p.527. Cf. 
also C. Geertz, op. cit., note 20, pp.173-74. Along similar lines C. Eberhard, “L’anthropologie du droit: 
Un itinéraire entre altérité, complexité et interculturalité”, Conférence donnée à l’Université Jules Verne 
de Picardie, Amiens, 24 mai 2002, p.4. 
27 Cf. D. De Béchillon, Qu’est-ce qu’une règle de Droit?, Paris: Éditions Odile Jacob, 1997, pp.108-113. 
28 Cf. P. Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World: Sustainable Diversity in Law, 4th ed., Oxford: OUP, 2010, 
p.4. Cf. also N. Rouland, Anthropologie Juridique, Paris: PUF, 1988, p.396. 
29 Cf. G. Samuel, “Epistemology and Comparative Law: Contributions from the Sciences and the Social 
Sciences”, in M. Van Hoecke (ed.), Epistemology and Methodology of Comparative Law, Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2004, pp.50-53.  
30 Cf. C. Geertz, op. cit., note 20, p.173-74. 
31 Cf. W. Ewald, “Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What Was It like to Try a Rat?”, 143 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 1889 (1995), p.1951. 
32 Cf. G. Samuel, op. cit., note 29, pp.35-77.  
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sophisticated terms have been mobilised. What is relevant here, is to note that the 
definitions that shift the focus of the comparatist to the most basic worldviews of a 
society are those which enable the alterity of the other law to manifest itself. This is 
because they leave the comparatist the most freedom in collecting traces 34  and 
constructing her understanding of the legal other; respecting its alterity. 
Lastly, the ideas of infinity and of incomprehensibility find their place in an 
open conceptualisation of law inasmuch as it admits that the comparatist who does 
not share a particular vision of the world will not be able to understand everything of 
the foreign law she studies. Actually, the knowledge that the foreign jurist can hope 
to reach is not an exhaustible kind of knowledge; a finite heap of stacked notions. 
On the contrary, law is suitable to endless interpretations and explanations. The 
research, she knows from the outset, will remain uncompleted and imperfect 
because of the infinity and incomprehensibility acknowledged to the other law. 
 
III. Critique of Knowledge 
 
“Knowledge is a relation of the Same with the Other 
in which the Other is reduced to the Same and 
divested of its strangeness, in which thinking relates 
itself to the other but the other is no longer other as 
such; the other is already appropriated (le propre), 
already mine”.35  
 
The second aspect of Levins’ thinking which is meaningful for comparison is 
the critique of a kind of knowledge he qualifies as “seizure, appropriation”. 36 
Described as a manifestation of an encompassing and organising conscience, such a 
knowledge reduces the other to an object of study.37 By applying the thinker’s own 
categories to the thought, the object is absorbed into the subject, thus annulling its 
otherness.38 Furthermore, the seizure happens in the thematisation of the known 
object, in its inclusion within a panoramic picture. 39  The idea that to know 
something means having it all systematised in front of oneself, as a whole 
representation ordered according to categories established by reason, is dismissed as 
reduction of the other to the same. 
The critique assuredly targets modern epistemology, with the pretence of 
being neutral, objective and capable of drawing a universal picture: in a way, a 
pretence of having everything “under control”. But such a way of exercising 
intellectual capacities has been at work already “before the technical ascendancy 
over things which the knowledge of the industrial era has made possible”;40 it has 
been lurking in Western thought since its inception. The possibility of possessing, 
                                                                                                                                        
33  Cf. M. Van Hoecke and M. Warrington, “Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms, and Legal Doctrine: 
Towards a New Model for Comparative Law”, 47 The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 495 
(1998), p.524.  
34 Cf. J. Husa, “Research Designs of Comparative Law: Methodology or Heuristics?”, in M. Adams and 
D. Heirbaut (eds.), The Method and Culture of Comparative Law, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014, p.67. 
35 E. Levinas, “Transcendence and Intelligibility”, in A. T. Peperzak, S.Critchley and R. Bernasconi (eds.), 
Emmanuel Levinas: Basic Philosophical Writings, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996, p.151. 
36 Id., p.152. 
37 Id., p.153. 
38 E. Levinas, Le temps et l’autre, Paris: PUF, 1983, p.19. 
39 E. Levinas, op. cit., note 12, p.294. 
40 E. Levinas, op. cit., note 35, p.152. 
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that is, of suspending the alterity of what is only at first other, is not only a 
temptation but is the very “way of the same”.41 This attitude has manifested itself in 
philosophy inasmuch as it has considered the other as being accessible by thought 
and susceptible to becoming an object of knowledge. 
In opposition to that, Levinas advances the notion of intelligibility, which 
accentuates the relational aspect of the interaction between the same and the other 
(the “knower” and the “known”). Since the other is free, “[o]ver him I have no 
power. He escapes my grasp by an essential dimension, even if I have him at my 
disposal. He is not wholly in my site”. 42 So through intelligibility no power is 
exercised, and the other is not dominated as is the case in knowledge. Moreover, 
intelligibility takes place in a relation where elements stay separated and are not 
marked by it: this “unrelating-relation”43 cannot itself be encompassed or thematised. 
Intelligibility is thus a way to get to “know” the other through interaction without 
framing it within the point of view of the one. 
The criticism of knowledge as seizure can be directed at the way comparatists 
have been conceiving their wisdom. Legal comparative studies have been aiming at 
the production of universally valid learning,44 which is, in Levinasian terms, a way 
of exerting a domination of the same, an expression of the will to seize the other and 
subsume it into an overarching order.  
Since its dawn, legal comparison has been driven by the desire to create “the 
ultimate science of laws”45 inductively, through empirical observation of various 
juridical phenomena. Following the auspices of Leibniz, who proposed the redaction 
of a “theatrum legale”46 including laws from all over the world, the project has been 
unable to fully recognise alterity exactly because of those encyclopaedic aspirations: 
by framing the laws into a “theatre”, they are analysed through a classificatory 
rationality that is already in place. Later on, comparatists based their studies on the 
unilinear theory of evolution47 and resolved to study the law of “less evolved” 
societies in order to discover the most ancient phases of the “evolved” laws.48 In this 
way, comparative law became a “biology of laws”.49 The adherents to this school of 
thought not only targeted the elaboration of a universal knowledge but also 
                                                          
41 E. Levinas, op. cit., note 12, p.38. 
42 Id., p.39. 
43 Id., p.295.  
44  Cf. A. Peters and H. Schwenke, “Comparative Law Beyond Post-Modernism”, (2000) 49 The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 800, pp.803-10. The authors do not differentiate between 
universalist tendencies concerning the laws studied (to be unified) and the universalist tendencies 
concerning the epistemological status of the knowledge produced by comparison. This may lead to 
misunderstandings. 
45  A. Von Feuerbach, “Blick auf die deutsche Rechtswissenschaft”, in Kleine Schriften vermischten 
Inhalts, Nuremberg: Verlag von Theodor Otto, 1833, p.163 (translation is mine). 
46 G. W. Leibniz, “Nova methodus discendae docendaeque jurisprudentiae”, in Opera Omnia, Tomus 
Quartus, Genoa: Fratres de Tournes, 1768, p.192 (1667/1748).  
47 Cf. A. H. Post, Bausteine für eine allgemeine Rechtswissenschaft auf vergleichend- ethnologischer 
Basis, Oldenburg: Schulze, 1880, p.13. F. Bernhöft, “Ueber Zweck und Mittel der vergleichenden 
Rechtswissenschaft”, 1 Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenchaft, 1878, p.37. 
48 Cf. H. S. Maine, Ancient Law, London: Everyman’s Library, 1965, p.61 (1861) and by the same author 
Village Communities in the East and West, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1880, pp.6-7. This 
approach was presented at the Paris Congress by J. Kohler, “De la méthode du droit comparé”, in Procès-
verbaux des séances et documents du Congrès International de Droit Comparé tenu à Paris du 31 juillet 
au 4 août 1900, Paris: LGDJ Pichon et Durand-Auzias, 1905, p.228.  
49 E. Amari, Critica di una scienza delle legislazioni comparate, vol. I, Palermo: Edizioni della Regione 
siciliana, 1969, p.216 (1857) (translation is mine).  
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introduced a presumption of similarity of evolutionary lines of juridical systems. 
While this second erroneous thesis was rejected at the Congress of Paris in 1900,50 
the universalistic tendencies still enjoy vigorous support. The organisers conceived 
comparative law as a science aiming at the standardisation of laws.51 Consequently, 
the paradigm of the Congress annuls the other’s alterity not only because of its 
political goal (the unification of legislations) but also because of its scientific 
attitude that aims at methodological exactitude; thus claiming an epistemological 
status for the comparative knowledge produced that is similar to the ones of the 
approaches of the previous century. This constant is maintained in the post-world 
war mainstream. 52  More recently, Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz’s seminal 
textbook describes comparative law as a “school of truth”,53 and also according to 
the Trento theses 54  the status of knowledge acquired through comparison is 
considered to be objective and scientific, and the juridical systems studied are 
viewed as a multiplicity of exemplars displayed in front of the comparatist.  
Contrarily to such conceptions, Levinas writes: “[t]he pluralism of being is 
not produced as a multiplicity of a constellation spread out before a possible gaze, 
for thus it would be already totalized, joined into an entity”.55 There is no view from 
above, no all-encompassing perspective to be gained. Knowledge of other laws 
necessarily unfolds in the relation established between comparatist and comparata, 
and this relation is only meaningful from the inside; it is not susceptible to be 
observed “laterally”. 56  The hegemonic project concealed behind the alleged 
neutrality of “scientific” comparison has been openly denounced within the 
comparative literature:57 such a supposedly universal knowledge probably reveals 
more about the holder of the knowledge than about its own content. 58  Rather, 
Étienne Le Roy has written about a dialogie, which can be described as “a dialogue 
where the discovery of the other and the taking into account of his alterity come 
before any concern for the exchange of information”.59 The relation to the radical 
other is the point from which all meaningful intelligence about the other stems. It is 
                                                          
50 Cf. E. Lambert, “Séance du 1er août”, in Procès-verbaux, cit., note 48, p.33.  
51 Cf. R. Saleilles, “Conception et objet de la science juridique du droit comparé”, in Procès-verbaux, cit., 
note 48, p.173.  
52 Cf. H. E. Yntema, “The American Journal of Comparative Law”, 1 American Journal of Comparative 
Law 1/2 (1952), pp.12-13.  
53 K. Zweigert and H. Kötz, op. cit., note 18, p.14 (translation is mine). Pierre Legrand has shown how 
their conception of knowledge relies heavily on the one by Descartes. P. Legrand, “Paradoxically, 
Derrida”, 27 Cardozo Law Review 631 (2005), pp.645-54. 
54 The Trento theses, developed by Rodolfo Sacco in 1987, have been the cultural manifesto of Italian 
comparison. An explanation thereof can be found in A. Gambaro, P. G. Monateri and R. Sacco, 
“Comparazione giuridica”, in Digesto delle discipline privatistiche – sez. civile, vol. III, Turin: Utet, 1990, 
pp.51-56. For a recent endorsement of this approach cf. A. Gambaro, “The Trento Theses”, 4 Global 
Jurist Frontiers 1 (2004). 
55 E. Levinas, op. cit., note 12, pp.305-306.  
56 Ibid.  
57 Cf. G. Frankenberg, “Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law”, 26 Harvard International 
Law Journal 411 (1985) p.429. For a reflection on the epistemological basis of comparison in cultural 
studies that arrives at a similar conclusion, namely the unifying tendency of the operation and its missing 
out on the alterity of the comparata, cf. J. Matthes, “The Operation Called ‘Vergleichen’”, in J. Matthes 
(ed.), Zwischen den Kulturen? Die Sozialwissenschaften vor dem Problem des Kulturvergleichs, Soziale 
Welt, Sonderband 8, Göttingen: Verlag Otto Schwarz & Co., 1992, pp.88-89.  
58 Cf. W. P. Alford, “On the Limits of “Grand Theory” in Comparative Law”, 61 Washington Law Review 
945 (1986), p.946.  
59 É. Leroy, op. cit., note 8, p.6 (translation is mine). 
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not reducible to comprehension, but rather it is a primordial ethical relation that 
structures our experience as subjects and that is precursory to the construction of 
every system and elaboration of every procedure. 60  In this sense: “[t]he first 
philosophy is an ethics”.61 
 
IV. Epilogue: Comparison as Ethics 
 
Considering the encounter with the radical other as the “pre-original” 
birthplace of all theoretical relations leads to the chiasm mentioned in the introduction. 
The recognition of alterity and the ethical relation to it are now substituted to any 
aspirations of universalist knowledge. For the comparison of laws, the emergence of 
a new way of understanding alterity allows the superseding of the connection 
between difference and exclusion; this is done by following the example of other 
critical approaches to law, such as critical race theory and feminist theory. 62 
Levinasian alterity neither lends itself to discriminatory manipulation, nor to lies 
such as the “separate but equal” one. Comparison which assumes alterity enables legal 
pluralism to express itself, through its remarkable and its imperceptible differences. It 
yields new understanding by discovering these differences: it does not fear complexity 
and does not need to resort to the reductionism of an all-encompassing unity. At the 
same time, it also recognises the political dimension of the comparative enterprise63 
and the responsibility of the comparatist for the knowledge she (re)produces. Thus, 
the position of the legal scholar facing the other law is an ethical one. A comparison 
aware of alterity “provides a model for ethical thinking and practice”.64 
The aim of this chapter is to state that a reflection on alterity is a necessary 
prerequisite for all comparison since it influences the entire comparative experience. 
On this point, the jurist cannot but take advantage of the work that has already been 
done on alterity by other disciplines, such as philosophy. Furthermore, this chapter 
endeavours to show the theoretical pertinence and the conceptual fruitfulness of 
Levinas’ thinking for legal comparison. The acceptance of the infinity of alterity, of 
the limits of knowledge of the other and the abandoning of the illusion of a panoptical 
vision complicates the comparatist’s task, but will help her abstain from deforming 
methodological shortcuts; traps that comparison has not always been able to avoid. 
In many ways, this chapter is nothing but a beginning. Indeed, there is still 
much to investigate in Levinas’ thinking concerning the notion of alterity, and this 
work surely has not explored all the possible implications for comparative law. 
Furthermore, the elaboration of the author is being continued by other philosophers, 
and the conceptualisation of alterity in philosophy continues to attract interest. 
Thematics such as the complexity of the linguistic relation to the other, or the 
alterity internal to the Self have been developed as a continuation of Levinas’s 
                                                          
60 E. Levinas, op. cit., note 35, p.108. See also S. Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and 
Levinas, 2nd ed., Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999, p.3. 
61 E. Levinas, Éthique et Infini. Dialogues avec Philippe Nemo, Paris: Fayard, 1982, p.81 (translation is 
mine). 
62 Cf. V. Curran, op. cit., note 2, pp.44-46. 
63 Cf. D. Kennedy, “The methods and the politics”, in P. Legrand and R. Munday, op. cit., note 8, p.433. 
Cf. also G. Frankenberg, “Stranger than Paradise: Identity & Politics in Comparative Law”, Utah Law 
Review 259 (1997), p.274. 
64 A. Nouss, “Translation as ethics”, in S. Glanert (ed.), Comparative Law: Engaging Translation, New 
York: Routledge, 2014, p.23. 
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oeuvre. This text is but a beginning also because it only contains theoretical reflections 
which are preliminary to the actual comparison. It has not yet been started, but with 
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1. Introduction  
There is an ancient Indian tale about a group of blind men who have never seen an 
elephant and want to discover what they look like; so they touch one. Each man 
grasps a different part of the animal and consequently imagines it differently: The 
one who touches the leg is persuaded that elephants are like trees, and the one 
who feels the ear convinces himself that elephants are like fans. They all end up 
with very different opinions about the appearance of elephants. The American poet 
John Godfrey Saxe popularised this tale in the Western world with a poem that 
concludes:  
[E]ach was partly in the right,/ And all were in the wrong!/ Moral:/ So oft in 
theologic wars,/ The disputants, I ween,/ Rail on in utter ignorance/ Of what each 
other mean,/ And prate about an Elephant/ Not one of them has seen! (Saxe 1873, 
p. 78) 
Some versions of the tale specify that the blind men are not aware of their 
blindness, and this is a relevant detail, because if they were informed about it they 
would also take into account the fact that their own perception of the animal is 
limited, as is that of their fellows. The whole point of the tale is to prompt 
speculations on the conditions and relativity of human perception. In a similar way, 
this paper wants to reflect on the influence of analytical tools on the results of 
empirical legal research. In other words, the elephant of this paper is legal 
pluralism, and the tactile sense of the blind men, the only means at their disposal 
to get to know what an elephant looks like, is the concept of legal pluralism.  
This paper aims to redraw the theoretical trajectory of the concept of legal 
pluralism from being considered a descriptive label to having a more complex 
epistemological status. The starting point is a research question concerning the kind 
of knowledge that is produced by legal scholars who approach the world with the 
legal pluralist mindset and the influence of the concept on the empirical knowledge 
produced. An initial short excursion into the history of the term puts forth the 
theoretical takeover (Berthelot 2012a, p. 229) that was induced by the introduction 
of a descriptive term in the vocabulary of the legal scholar. That is to say, the shift 
towards an empirical approach to law entailed the recognition of an existing 
pluralism and unsettled established theories of law. Yet, it will be argued that an 
unsophisticated understanding of analytical tools as merely descriptive is 
problematic. Any agreement on the exact content of the concept’s definition has 
proven impossible: As a matter of fact, the meanings of words are variable, and are 
even more so if they refer to an evolving societal phenomena such as law. 
Consequently, it is necessary to recognise a different epistemological status of 
analytical tools, and the purpose of this essay is to reflect on the relation between 
the concept legal pluralism, the social reality it refers to and the legal pluralistic 
knowledge produced. Here, Bourdieu’s notion of epistemic reflexivity can be 
invoked: 
The analysis of mental structures is an instrument of liberation: thanks to the 
instruments of sociology, we can realize one of the eternal ambitions of philosophy-
discovering cognitive structures […] and at the same time uncovering some of the 
best-concealed limits of thought. I could give hundreds of examples of social 
dichotomies relayed by the education system which, becoming categories of 
perception, hinder or imprison thought. The sociology of knowledge, in the case of 
the professionals of knowledge, is the instrument of knowledge par excellence, the 
instrument of knowledge of the instruments of knowledge. I can’t see how we can 
do without it. (Bourdieu 1990, p. 16) 
This way of proceeding entails the systematic applicability of the instruments of 
sociology to the subject who practices sociology and the exploration of the 
“unthought categories of thought which limit the thinkable and predetermine what 
is actually thought” (Bourdieu 1990, p. 178). Thinking about limits does not enable 
one to think without limits (Bourdieu 1990, p. 184) but allows a more realistic 
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account of the epistemological status of the knowledge produced, thus buttressing 
the fundaments of the discipline to which epistemic reflexivity is applied (Wacquant 
1992, p. 46). Following the teachings of Bourdieu, in order to support the 
epistemological security of empirical approaches to law1, a theory of the intellectual 
practice itself has to be included as an integral component and necessary condition 
of a critical theory of legal pluralism. Reflexivity is here thus referred to the activity 
of research itself. The ambition is to unearth the “epistemological unconscious of 
[the] discipline” (Wacquant 1992, p. 41), which is not going to happen by magically 
abolishing the distance between knower and known, but by taking into account this 
objectivising distance and analysing it (Bourdieu 1990). The reflexive turn “lead[s] 
to constructing scientific objects differently. It helps produce objects in which the 
relation of the analyst to the object is not unwittingly projected” (Wacquant 1992, 
p. 42). What makes this reflexive exercise particularly interesting is the fact that 
the objectivising distance and the relation of the legal pluralist to legal pluralism 
has changed over time. The present paper purports to show the variations of this 
relationship, or in other words, the evolution of the epistemological status of the 
concept “legal pluralism”. 
Clearly, facts and concepts are different. They influence one another, and any 
knowledge-producing activity based on an empirical approach entails a progressive 
co-shaping of concepts and facts in an ongoing process of understanding and 
revising the explanatory tools. Through a reciprocal interaction the facts mould the 
concepts and vice-versa. Such “prudent” (Santos 1995, p. 22) knowledge requires 
a rethinking of the relation between the subject (with its concepts) and the object 
(with its facts) in a way that entails the possibility of a connection between the two. 
Confusion between observed realities and conceptual instruments used to observe 
them is sometimes being prompted by the fact that we perceive realities through 
the filter of concepts, representations, theories, values and paradigms (Ost and Van 
de Kerchove 2002, p. 21). Consequently, careful consideration of the chosen 
theoretical framework and verification of its effect on the empirical research 
conducted are not only legitimate but also necessary.  
Both anthropology and sociology, which deal with the exceptionally variable and 
receptive “objects of study” that humans inevitably are, had to face epistemological 
issues of this sort, such as the risks of “nostrification” of the Other into the 
categories of the observer's mindset as an outcome of the 
“Aufmerksamkeitsfixierung” (Matthes 1992, p. 84). From the time it emerged as a 
distinct subdiscipline, legal anthropology has been enlivened by analogous debates: 
Max Gluckman and Paul Bohannan pursued ethnographic studies of law and social 
control that led to opposite theoretical positions. The former maintained that the 
legal categories developed by Western legal scholarship could be used in order to 
represent indigenous legal practices and concepts (Gluckman 1955), while the 
latter considered the indigenous legal categories to be irreducible to Western 
vocabulary, and argued for the use of untranslated terms (Bohannan 1957). The 
Gluckman-Bohannan controversy on the appropriateness of the use of concepts 
stemming from the culture of the observer in order to account for a different 
observed culture was, in a way, a discordance of cognitive interests (Moore 1969, 
p. 339): not only a disagreement on the emic or etic way of rendering the results of 
ethnographic fieldwork, but also on the posture of the ethnographer herself. Of the 
two, Bohannan showed more concern for the impossibility of ever arriving at a 
“fact” that is uncoloured by the ethnographic instrument that is represented by the 
perceiver of the fact, and therefore affirmed the importance of learning “more 
about our sensory means of perception, and mechanical and other extrinsic 
extensions of them, and our own cultural prison” (Bohannan 1969, p. 407).  
                                                 
1 Taken in a broad sense. I am not referring here to any specific American school of thought such as the 
Empirical Legal Studies of New Legal Realism. For an overview, see Macaulay and Mertz (2013). 
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Animated by similar concerns, this essay tries to apply epistemic reflexivity to legal 
pluralism by conceptualising and making explicit the way in which an apparently 
descriptive concept is actually also normative, to wit directing the research. This 
will be done by relying on the notion of theoretical programme (Berthelot 2012b, p. 
457). The second section seeks to capture the cognitive operations that have been 
set out by the concept legal pluralism since its inception, focusing on the 
fundamental strategic moves of the empirical turn and of the problematisation of 
classical legal theory. In the third section a way of conceiving legal pluralism that is 
abreast with contemporary reflection on the epistemology of social sciences will be 
advanced. 
2. “Legal pluralism” as a label to account for a fact 
The link between the empirical study of law and the realisation of its plurality 
predates the coinage of the term, thus proving its descriptive origin. It is worth 
mentioning how more than a century ago Eugen Ehrlich (1913), observing the 
“living law” in the Bukowina region, acknowledged the coexistence of nine 
completely different legal bodies of rules applied on a personal basis. Another 
founding father of the sociology of law, Georges Gurvitch, noted that the accuracy 
of the immediate empirical data of the juridical experience, and their particularly 
intense variability, necessarily leads to a pluralist conception of law (Gurvitch 1935, 
p. 66, 1960, p. 185). Moreover, Gurvitch argued that the study of law as a social 
fact should avoid adopting any particular philosophy of law (Gurvitch 1960, p. 188). 
Nevertheless, the introduction of a pluralist understanding of law has since its 
inception been the expression of a certain legal politics in the sense that it implied 
the recognition of the existence of power structures that are maintained by the 
monist tendency of the dominant social group (Rouland 1988, p. 304). This double 
dimension is acknowledged by Jean Carbonnier, who used the term pluralisme 
juridique as an explicative hypothesis for the widest possible number of juridical 
phenomena (Carbonnier 1969, p. 5) mentioning at the same time the connection 
between the choice of a theory of law (monist vs. pluralist) and the preference for a 
given political structure (Carbonnier 1969, pp. 13-16).  
Then the term appeared as the title of a collection of papers published by John 
Gilissen, where the monist theory of law is vehemently shown to be inadequate, in 
particular in its variant developed by Carré de Malberg, who considered the State to 
be the starting point of all legal order, the only creating power of proper law 
(Gilissen 1972, p. 7). In the same book, the well-known definition of legal pluralism 
proposed by Jacques Vanderlinden (1972, p. 19) refers to the existence, within one 
defined society, of various juridical mechanisms that apply to identical situations. 
This statement is interesting for the purposes of this paper because it defines the 
concept as existence. Along these lines, according to other contributors, the aim of 
legal pluralism is the definition of a complex reality in its present state (Van den 
Bergh 1972, p. 93) or the rendering of the historical evolution of law (Ingber 1972, 
p. 82). Here, it is essential to acknowledge that the term is considered to be a 
descriptive one. This employment continues in Barry Hooker's book from 1975 
called “Legal Pluralism”. He also gives an account and analysis of a particular 
phenomenon and likewise uses the term as a descriptive category by referring to 
“the situation in which two or more laws interact” (Hooker 1975, p. 6, emphasis 
added). The same can be said about the seminal article by John Griffith, where he 
imperatively states: “[l]egal pluralism is the fact. Legal centralism is a myth, an 
ideal, a claim, an illusion” (Griffith 1986, p. 4, emphasis added). So legal pluralism 
is perceived to be the best label to describe a fact that is out there. There are 
certain facts in the world which deserve the label of “legal pluralism”, while some 
other facts only deserve the label of “weak legal pluralism”. Clearly, in so doing, the 
author was also defining what he wanted this label to mean, dismissing different 
meanings proposed by other anthropologists. The debate concerning the 
appropriate meaning continued, and the focus shifted from the societal group to the 
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individual (Vanderlinden 1989). The definitional dispute notwithstanding, the lowest 
common denominator is that “legal pluralism” remains part of a conceptual 
apparatus that is suggested directly by observed realities and is treated as a label 
proposed to describe a situation existing in the world, empirically verifiable, for 
which there was no label before (Merry 1988, Von Benda-Beckmann 1988). 
The adoption of an empirical point of view led legal anthropologists to take into 
account normative phenomena which are not defined as law by the state legal 
system. In other words, the boundaries between law and notlaw posed by the rule 
of recognition of the state system itself are not considered to be the only valid way 
to define the relevant data. Legal pluralists, by going to look for law in previously 
unexpected places and recognising more sources of law than the ones usually 
accepted in classical legal theory, questioned the very meaning to be given to the 
word “law” (Le Roy 2003, p. 10). Apart from being one major cause of disarray and 
disparagement, this has also given rise to fruitful discussions and reflections. What 
is at stake is clear: the very possibility of “detect[ing]” and “see[ing]” (Davies 
2010, p. 810) legal pluralism in a society depends upon the concept of law utilised. 
Far from being a sterile debate on nomenclature, this raises important issues for 
the legal scholar. To be sure, it is at this very point that legal pluralism, carrying its 
baggage of knowledge about the interconnected patterns of normativities at work in 
the complex world we happen to live in, enters and upsets the field of 
jurisprudence.  
The dispute unfolds on at least two levels: the first is the level of legal theory, 
where a pluralist conception of law clearly contributes to the denouncement and 
progressive erosion of the ideological rhetoric of state legal monism (Woodman 
1998, p. 48). Alternative conceptions of law challenge more conventional 
understandings of the term; legal theory is summoned inasmuch as it is ultimately 
built on the common sense and intuition about law drawn from the scholar's own 
domestic experience. Furthermore, at times legal theory might even fail to fit the 
facts of the legal system of the theoretician, if empirically tested. Thus, abstract 
and coherent logical constructs are criticised not only because theoretically they are 
ethnocentric, but also because they do not even correspond with domestic social 
reality (Galligan 2010). At the level of jurisprudence, legal pluralism, which is the 
product of an empirical approach to normative phenomena, challenges the validity 
of the pure theories of law. Where they are proven to be ill-founded, their universal 
soundness is reduced to a point of view that is necessarily relative and bearer of 
local interests. Still, it is indisputable that in the Western world there is (or there 
has been, due to reinforcement of local affinities and transnational regulations) a 
state monopoly on law. This fact is surely based on the process of centralisation of 
power that occurred in most European nation states during the nineteenth century, 
but is also a consequence of the elaboration of general theories that defined law in 
such a way that by the twentieth century it was understood to be necessarily 
centred on a State (Davies 2010, p. 808). Through a process of co-shaping, state 
monopoly on law and monist legal theories have been upholding and reinforcing 
each other. The jurisprudential debate triggered by legal pluralist conceptions of 
law is in this way charged with meaning and values: the expression “politics of 
definition” (Santos 1995, p. 115) makes it clear and leads us to the second level of 
the quarrel set off by legal pluralism, the one of politics tout court.  
As Michel Leiris (1992, p. 37) argued, in most of the cases the anthropologist 
becomes the “natural advocate” of the people she studies: in the same way the 
legal pluralist is likely to claim that marginalised normativities deserve to be 
acknowledged by the central legal system, and to contend for more biodiversity in 
law. Clearly, it is important to be aware of what becomes visible through the lenses 
of a concept. Becoming visible means also acquiring a certain credibility, and in the 
best case scenario this might lead to recognition by neighbouring (dominating) 
normative systems. Research on legal pluralism gives voice to submerged social 
processes and fields, and this produces an effect of empowerment. Doing empirical 
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research utilising a legal pluralist framework certainly produces (at least indirectly, 
or in the long run) different political consequences than repeating and developing 
further abstract theories of law. Nevertheless, the elaboration of a theoretical 
framework is analytically not coincident with its desirability. Thus, the concept of 
legal pluralism cannot be blamed or prized for empirical constellations that are 
abhorred or found attractive for political or moral reasons (Von Benda-Beckmann 
2002, pp. 45-46).  
Both at the jurisprudential and the political level, compelling debates arise when 
the descriptive conception of legal pluralism meets classical academic legal science, 
but they will not be followed further here. Rather, the accent is set on another 
aspect of the theoretical matter of contention, namely the impossibility of a 
universally valid definition. The main shortcoming of the extended conception of law 
advocated by anthropological and sociological approaches is the one pointed at by 
the so-called pan-legalist objection: the problem of the distinctiveness of law from 
other social normative orderings has been haunting the theorists of legal pluralism 
until today (see for example the advanced distinction proposed by Croce 2012). The 
various attempts to locate an appropriate threshold of legal relevance 
notwithstanding, a conclusive line could not be drawn (Tamanaha 2008, p. 391). 
Theories and definitions are necessarily situated and cannot be considered universal 
(Tamanaha 2009, pp. 18-22, 2012, pp. 22-23). More recently the attempt to 
identify the essence of law through the use of a general concept that is universally 
valid has been acknowledged as an “illusion”, and any such search defined as vain, 
“for the simple reason that this fundamental existence of the genuine properties of 
law does not exist” (Treiber 2012, p. 37). The very definition of law adopted, the 
very general theory one espouses, is dependent upon the cognitive interests of the 
research (Treiber 2012, p. 1). 
Evidently, the impossibility of a universal definition of “law” for “legal pluralism” 
conceived of as a descriptive label is a quite predictable shortcoming for any term 
that claims to account for reality: empirical phenomena do not fit into analytical 
categories in a neat one-to-one manner, and the multiplicity of the real cannot be 
forced into one forever imperfect definition. In other words, the problem is not the 
law (with its variability in different human societies in time and space), but the 
epistemological status of our concepts. If we consider them to be descriptive labels 
we will necessarily end up having to admit their incompleteness and imprecision, 
and it could not be otherwise. A more complex understanding of the role of 
concepts in the production of knowledge is needed, and this applies to legal 
pluralism too. 
3. Legal Pluralism as a theoretical programme 
Many contemporary theorists explicitly distance themselves from the naïve 
objectivism of the social-scientific, empiricist-positivistic take on legal pluralism that 
is spread among the first proponents of the concept. Fortunately, the speculation 
on the influence of analytical tools on the production of knowledge in the social 
sciences has come to a more sophisticated understanding of the social scientific 
enterprise. These theoretical investigations may help us make sense of the various 
literature on legal pluralism and of the different conceptions of the term that have 
been proposed. Various approaches are indeed possible in order to account for the 
present state of the literature on the topic. For example, one could concentrate 
specifically on the scientific community itself, on its internal ordering and its 
influence on the knowledge produced (Husa 2014). Admittedly, Bourdieu’s notion of 
epistemic reflexivity requires a recognition of the gravitational forces of the 
academic field on the intellectual work. Even so, it also provides the means to 
overcome the relativism this might lead to, namely highlighting the significance of 
the relation between knower and known. Not all aspects of the content of a notion 
can be explained through reference to the academic social field of its production. 
Epistemic reflexivity makes the objectifying relation between knower and known 
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itself the object of analysis; and the resultant objectification of objectification is the 
epistemological basis for social scientific knowledge (Maton 2003, p. 57). The 
impact and validity of a theory are not entirely expounded only by referring to the 
usages made of it by the scholarly community, but can also be evaluated on the 
basis of its internal consistency and its ability to structure empirical data. In this 
paper, the objectifying relation of the legal pluralist to the legal phenomena is 
scrutinised with the help of the notion of theoretical programme as developed by 
Jean-Michel Berthelot (2012b, pp. 469-70). 
In his exploration of the epistemology of social sciences, Berthelot distinguishes, in 
between the broad disciplinary borders and low-rise methodological procedures, the 
middle level of the plurality of possible approaches, theories and schools of 
thought. As had already been noted by Robert K. Merton, this plurality is to be 
found within any discipline, and at the same time the “middle-range theories” share 
common issues, commitments and debates that create bridges among disciplines; 
and within sociology, they can be consonant with a variety of comprehensive 
sociological theories which are themselves discrepant in certain respects (Merton 
1968, pp. 41-69). Those different approaches concern in fact the intellectual 
framework of the researcher. In order to solve a problem, to represent or explain a 
social normative phenomenon, the researcher brings into play schemes of analysis 
and more generally schemes of thought which inscribe the problem into a space of 
plausible solutions and designate certain acceptable operations (Merton 1968, pp. 
39-40). Berthelot (2012b, p. 459) ventures to reconstruct those schemes and their 
workings, by relying mainly on the notion of a programme as developed by Imre 
Lakatos2 and adapting it to the social sciences.  
A programme can consist of an implicit guide of thought or of an explicit struggle 
manifesto and can be transposed into different particular theories. For each theory 
there is a tension between the dominant programme brought into play and the 
complexity of the real world that it aspires to reconstitute and at the same time 
describe (Berthelot 2012b, p. 485). Being a sort of a bet on the fruitfulness of an 
orientation of research, it is evaluated on the basis of its capacity to put aside 
“anomalies” which would falsify it and of its power of rational clarification of new 
occurrences (Berthelot 2012b, pp. 469-70). In other words, a programme is 
appraised according to its capacity to reduce the tension and the incongruencies 
between the “map” and the “territory”. Also the clarity of the coding language is a 
determinant feature. The same phenomenon, within one same discipline, can be cut 
out from the context, studied, thematised and represented in different ways 
according to the indications given by the different programmes (Berthelot 2012b, p. 
461), which therefore can be in competition with each other. As a matter of fact, 
there are conflicts between schools of thought: to conceive the epistemological 
space of social sciences through programmes does not mean to forget their 
situatedness within a certain scientific community. Instead, it involves focusing on 
some aspects inherent to the programmes’ structure and their internal coherence 
rather than on the human background in which they are developed. Such an 
approach thus concentrates on the fundamental propositions which define a certain 
                                                 
2 Lakatos's programmes are formed by a sequence of theories and experimental techniques grounded on 
a central core of assumptions, around which a belt of auxiliary hypotheses is developed. His view of 
science tries to reconcile Popper's falsification and Kuhn's paradigm revolution: conflicts with observation 
cause adjustments in the auxiliary hypothesis before they lead to a shift to a new research programme, 
and the whole process is rational and progressing and avoids the theoretical astray of 
incommensurability. The programme as conceived by Lakatos manages at the same time to convey its 
role as a vector of scientific activity, but it does not imply absoluteness and thus justifies the coexistence 
of different scientific explications of the same phenomenon and accounts for the social and historical 
context of the activity. Programmes have been poetically described as emerging as “excrescences of 
imagination fighting for existence by trying to outgrow each other”, and defined as “flowers of phantasy” 
that display heuristic power (Motterlini 1999, pp. 9-10). Berthelot adjusts this notion for the purposes of 
social science epistemology and focuses on the role played by programmes in the creation of knowledge 
(programmes as heuristic devices) rather than on their ability to account for and explicate the history of 
science. 
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point of view in research in a given domain at a given time. The core of a 
programme is composed of axioms that define the ontological orientations 
concerning the entities and their relevant properties to be retained in the analysis; 
and of axioms that determine the epistemological orientations, outlining the 
legitimate forms of explication (Berthelot 2012b, pp. 474-475). In this sense, the 
programme steers the research through a set of axioms that are considered to be 
applicable to certain domains of reality.  
The basic idea that the concepts steer the analysis is not completely absent from 
the legal anthropological literature. Leopold Pospisil already assigned to the very 
concept of law the role of a heuristic device:  
“Law as a theoretical and analytical device is a concept which embraces a category 
of phenomena (ethnographic facts) selected according to the criteria the concept 
specifies. Although it is composed of a set of individual phenomena, the category 
itself is not a phenomenon - it does not exist in the outer world. The term “law” 
consequently is applied to a construct of the human mind for the sake of 
convenience. The justification of a concept does not reside in its existence outside 
the human mind, but in its value as an analytical, heuristic device” (Pospisil 1971, 
p. 39)3. 
His position might have been partially due to the quixotic aim of developing a cross-
cultural understanding of legal knowledge, and the authority he recognises in the 
social researcher might be considered excessive and outdated since it maintains the 
observer/observed dichotomy instead of depicting the research endeavour as an 
interactive one (Goodale 1998, p. 138). Nevertheless, he has the merit of 
introducing the researcher as one of the elements that, together with the inequality 
of power, determine the relativity of the concept of law. The reflection concerning 
the use of culturally relative concepts and their influence on the constitution of legal 
anthropological knowledge (Arnaud 1998, p. 6) has led to the recognition that the 
role of the concept is not one of a final description or explanation of what has been 
previously observed, but instead it is one that has shifted to the very beginning of 
the analysis. The concept becomes the “starting point for looking at the 
complexities of cognitive and normative orders” (Von Benda-Beckmann 2002, p. 
40), and as such is particularly relevant for the subsequent research, since 
sociological theoretical frameworks are not value-free or non-normative 
(Westerman 2011, p. 109, 2013, pp. 50-63).  
The following sub-paragraphs focus on the structuring force of the ontological and 
epistemological axioms entailed in the programme of legal pluralism, making 
explicit the theoretical programme's guiding power in the data selection process 
and in determining the legitimate forms of explanation. 
3.1. Data selection 
Applying the notion of a social scientific programme to legal pluralism requires a 
rethinking of the conception of relevant data. Berthelot differentiates between the 
background of reality, the events as perceived and organised by the people living 
them, their traces, and the stabilised facts as forged by the researcher. The infinite 
succession of events composing the background of reality is always already 
structured in the mind of the people living them. The difference between “ordinary” 
and “social-scientific” structuring of events is uniquely a difference between “de 
jure” and not “de facto” (Berthelot 2012b, pp. 489-493). The legal pluralist 
proposes one possible reconstruction among others, which will be evaluated 
according to the accurateness of its rendering and its pertinence, even if the 
participants would not have reconstructed the facts that way4. The materials are 
                                                 
3 Emphasis added. 
4 A completely adverse position is held by scholars belonging to the ethnomethodology school, for whom 
the role of the researcher is uniquely the description of the mechanisms and the processes through 
which people organise and orient themselves, without proposing any “scientific” structuring of data 
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gathered by the researcher partly through the traces they leave, which are but 
fragmentary expressions of the events, and partly they are produced by the 
researcher herself by means of questionnaires, interviews, observations and similar 
means. The social scientist then engages in a pertinent structuring of the traces, 
transforming them into facts, steady objects of analysis and explication. Those facts 
are the results of a constructing operation that applies structuring axioms that 
consist of schemata of selecting elements from a continuum of reality and 
regrouping them in pertinent entities and sequences (Berthelot 2012b, pp. 494-95).  
Each programme, or more specifically their ontological axioms, determine the 
application of this sophisticated mechanism of data selection and structuring. This 
point is openly accepted by some theorists of legal pluralism in the form of 
statements such as: “pursuing legal pluralism raises questions of scale and 
projection concerning the range and scope of the investigation, that are in turn 
dependent upon the standpoint from which legal pluralism is being addressed. For 
what you look for defines what you see” (Griffith 2011, p. 176). Yet others are 
more cautious. In his theoretical assessment of legal pluralism for instance, 
Melissaris mentions the issue concerning the selection of facts and discourses that 
are to be taken into consideration, rendering it as a sort of fumus boni juris 
evaluation of the “lawness” of a certain discursive practice. Nevertheless, he rapidly 
moves on to the decision concerning the merits, since it is only at that stage that a 
fully accomplished evaluation of the legal pluralist phenomenon can take place 
(Melissaris 2004, p. 75). What is argued here is that it is necessary to reflect about 
the very primordial moment of the acquisition of knowledge: the interstice between 
the mind of the researcher and her prima facie impression of the discourses she 
listens to and identifies as legally relevant.  
Accepting this renovated theory of data is vital for any contemporary legal 
anthropologist. Clearly, the whole history of legal pluralism can be considered to be 
a debate about the selection of the pertinent data. Since the very beginning, legal 
pluralists have struggled to obtain the acceptance of a more extended definition of 
law, raising to the level of the “legally relevant” information bases that are not 
taken into consideration by traditional legal theory. Here the purpose is a more 
complicated one: the renovated data theory developed by the contemporary 
epistemology of social sciences involves the recognition that traces of events are 
reconstructed into facts by the researcher. In this manner state-enforced rules are 
constructed as “legality” and set within the wider matrix of normative phenomena 
existing beyond the State. Such a way of re-imagining normative and legal 
“hybridity” (Donlan 2012, p. 4) evidently puts into question the validity of a 
different data-organisation, for instance the hierarchical theory of sources of law or 
the classical taxonomical disposition into discrete and closed families or systems. 
Each programme entails certain rules of data selection and organisation, and legal 
pluralism as a programme also has the same guidance power. 
3.2. Legitimate forms of explanation 
The second half of the core of legal pluralism when conceived of as a research 
programme is constituted by its epistemological axioms. In order to account for the 
explanatory structures considered to be acceptable, Berthelot introduces the notion 
of scheme of intelligibility. A scheme of intelligibility is a set of operations and 
prescriptions that determine what kind of correlations between events are deemed 
to be pertinent. A non-exhaustive list of six possible schemes is proposed: (1) the 
causal scheme (if x, then y or y=f(x)) understands social facts as being cause and 
                                                                                                                                               
alternative to the “ordinary” one. Such an approach has been applied to legal pluralism by Badouin 
Dupret, with the conclusion that there is no legal pluralism unless the participants consider themselves 
to be in such a situation (Dupret 2007, pp. 18-19). Those efforts to downplay the role of the researcher 
notwithstanding, it cannot be denied that there would be no social sciences without social scientists, and 
the purpose of this paper is exactly to explore the often overlooked role of the analytical tools in the 
mind of the researcher. 
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consequence of one another, and presents them as connected in an aetiological 
chain; (2) according to the functional scheme (S→X→S), phenomenon X is analysed 
in relation to its role or purpose in a given system, and consequently the 
teleological connections will be stressed; (3) in the structural scheme, elements 
gain their meaning from their respective position within a coherent structure (X 
results from a system founded on disjunctive rules, A or not A); (4) the 
hermeneutical scheme comprehends each fact as a symptom or expression of an 
underlying signification to be discovered through interpretation; (5) in the actional 
scheme the focus is set on the intentional actions of the agents, and events are 
mainly conceived of as the result of those intentions; and finally, (6) the dialectical 
scheme is presented, where a certain fact is explained as being the outcome of the 
development of internal contradictions within a system (Berthelot 2012b, p. 484). 
Those are but examples of different possible ways of selecting certain nexuses 
between elements. The schemes designate the connections that are considered to 
be more relevant or at least specifically worthy of attention in order to gain 
knowledge that deserves academic recognition. They present an array of possible 
relevant interactions to be singled out and studied by the researcher, operating at 
an intermediary level between reasoning techniques (such as induction or analogy) 
and paradigm orientations. These matrices of possible associations between facts 
are at work in different programmes and, silently but effectively, operate in 
contemporary theories of legal pluralism as well. Each different conception of legal 
pluralism applies a different scheme of intelligibility so as to meaningfully 
reconstruct the plurality of laws. In order to discover the scheme of intelligibility at 
work it is necessary to read between the lines about what kind of connections 
between facts are deemed to be telling. For instance, the conceptions of legal 
pluralism proposed by Roderick Macdonald, Emmanuel Melissaris and Margaret 
Davies can be usefully considered from this point of view as differentiating from 
each other exactly on the basis of the scheme of intelligibility they incorporate. 
Similarly, those schemes of intelligibility have also been used as a key to 
understand the methodological disputes between comparative lawyers (Samuel 
2014, p. 14, pp. 81-95). 
Macdonald sets forth a conception of critical legal pluralism that focuses on the 
individuals who are not passive subjects exposed to the control of law, but who are 
agents continuously negotiating their agency with one another (Macdonald and 
Kleinhans 1997, pp. 38-40): “[l]egal subjects are not just law-obeying or law-
abiding. They are law-creating, generating their own legal subjectivity and 
establishing legal order as a knowledge process for symbolizing inter-subjective 
conduct as governed by rules. In such an aretaic conception, every human being in 
interaction with others is both law-maker and law-applier” (Macdonald 2011, p. 
310). Compliance occurs through personal commitments arrived at without coercion 
or inducement, and people define acceptable behaviour in ways that engage their 
fluid, competing and multiple identities and notions of the self (Macdonald 2011, 
pp. 323-24). His position resembles the conception of law as an individual claim 
proposed by the liberal Bruno Leoni, who considers to be legal those demands that, 
following the rule of thumb id quod plerumque accidit, enjoy a good probability of 
being satisfied in a given society at a given time. Legal and illegal demands are 
located at the opposite ends of a spectrum of all possible demands that people may 
make, and each single individual, with his intentional actions (of claiming and of 
satisfying a claim), determines the position of the demand along this spectrum 
(Leoni 1991, pp. 195-205). In this sense, a multiplicity of laws is the outcome of 
the agents' intentional doings: this way of concatenating facts follows the 
epistemological orientation of the actional scheme of intelligibility as presented 
above. Therefore, it can be said that, with his theory of legal pluralism, Macdonad is 
proposing to recognise as most telling the interaction between facts that focuses on 
agents' intentions and actions. 
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The epistemological axioms that underlie Melissaris' theory are less clearly 
identifiable. He proposes to shift the focus away from the strictly defined and 
hermetically closed legal systems and the empirico-positivist approach typical of the 
last century and advances a theory that is a refinement of the contributions of 
Gunther Teuber, Robert Cover and Boaventura de Sousa Santos (Melissaris 2004, 
pp. 73-75). He proposes a conception of legal pluralism that focuses on discourses 
reducible to the basic schema legal/illegal. He adopts Teubner's definition of 
“communicative processes that observe social action under the binary code 
legal/illegal” (Teubner 1998, p. 128). Those discourses, in order to be considered 
relevant, need to fulfil the further condition to be institutionalised, which is to 
create generalised expectations and to be the object of the commitment of their 
participants. The notion of commitment is borrowed from Cover, who has a very 
strong understanding of the term, which includes an intellectual sense of belonging 
as well as bodily participation (Cover 1986, p. 1605). Melissaris thus mixes the 
work of two authors to elaborate his definition of the legal, and to further detail his 
conception he prescribes also the posture that the research should take. He 
requires that voice is given to the participants themselves, to their understanding of 
“what is it that they do when entering the legal discourse and why”: this is what 
Santos calls for, when he argues for letting the South (symbolising the socio-
economically dominated subjectivity) emerge and express itself without the 
distorting interference of a distant observer (Santos 1995, pp. 506-518). Melissaris' 
sophisticated theory of legal pluralism finds a balance between the philosophies of 
three different scholars, and for this reason it mixes elements from different 
schemes of intelligibility. It applies partly the structural scheme of intelligibility to 
legal discourses, since different elements acquire their meaning in relation to the 
position they occupy in the complex interrelation of closed systems. Interdiscursive 
relations are conceptualised by Teubner who mobilises a vocabulary and a 
theoretical apparatus such as “structural coupling” and “linkage institutions” that 
define specific roles for each element in the total economy of the systems relations 
(Teubner 1998, pp. 126-129). Melissaris then calls for a move from structures to 
discourses, which are institutionalised but not in the sense that they become whole 
coherent systems, rather the institutionalisation is due to the participants’ 
commitment (Melissaris 2004, p. 74). It is at this point that the hermeneutical 
scheme of intelligibility enters into play, with the reference to the participation and 
with the emergence of the subjugated subjectivities in their own terms. It is they, 
who, connecting a certain meaning to a certain discourse, make it legal, and it is 
their understanding of the practice that should be given voice to. Therefore, the 
researcher should figure out, by interpretation, the signification underlying the 
(facts of) participation. By so doing, she clarifies the scope of the research and 
produces legal pluralistic knowledge in line with Melissaris' conception. To sum up, 
the relevant connections are those that convey a certain meaning to certain facts 
(hermeneutical scheme), thus setting them within the non-contradictory matrix of 
legal/illegal discourses (structural scheme). 
Finally, Davies aims at developing a new understanding of law, one which is 
appropriate to contemporary conditions of diversity. Her idea of pluralism is 
twofold. On the one hand, there is the outward looking pluralism which sees a 
multiplicity of normative spheres coexisting in the same one space, with state law 
being one among many normative instances. Davies is aware of the fact that this 
approach risks remaining trapped in a theoretically singular view of plural laws, 
focusing on developing a systematic and totalistic understanding of legal plurality. 
To be sure, she contends (Davies 2005, p. 96), this is what happened to much of 
the empirical research on legal pluralism. Instead she pleads for a deeper 
understanding of the conceptual pluralities concerning law. She calls for a re-
evaluation of the relation of law to the social, political and moral spheres of life, and 
for the recognition that all law is a form of cultural practice (Davies 2005, p. 107). 
As a consequence, legal pluralism comes to signify the multiplicity of the legal 
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phenomena, which is expressed in a variety of different forms that are 
incommensurable and cannot be reduced to unity. On the other hand, the second 
understanding of pluralism she advances points to the inherent pluralism of state 
law itself, which, far from being a coherent and complete block, is actually full of 
lacunas, contradictions, unresolved histories and counter-narratives (Davies 2005, 
p. 96). She suggests re-conceptualising the Western concept of positive law as 
complex and heterogeneous and presents Cover's insights on nomos as effectively 
expounding the contradictory and fictional foundations of any singular structure of 
law. This second pluralist attitude also rests on the conviction that law is essentially 
a cultural expression of a radically plural society (Davies 2005, p. 110). These two 
attitudes of pluralism, which convene under the expression “ethos of pluralism” 
both entail a “descriptive” part in which she determines what should be focused on, 
and what she calls a “normative” part, which includes the political and social 
reasons that make pluralism preferable to monism (Davies 2005, pp. 100-105). 
Nevertheless, her approach to pluralism can also be understood as a programme 
with its heuristic guidance power. Because of her aspiration of making sense of the 
dominant legal order through its implications in systems of social power and of 
explicating the alternative concepts of the legal as elaborations on cultural, sexual 
and other forms of difference, the hermeneutical intelligibility scheme can be seen 
at work in her theory. In other words, the concept of law she expounds is 
envisaged as an expression of underlying cultural meanings, which are to be 
assessed through interpretation, and the characterisation of this kind of nexus 
between meanings and practices is considered to be the proprium of the legal 
pluralistic research.  
The divergences in the scholarly production of legal pluralists are in this way 
grasped as being an expression of variance in the epistemological core of the 
programmes. The authors briefly considered here all propose a programme of legal 
pluralism that differs from the other proposals not in the ontological part of the core 
but in its epistemological axioms. They all apply a different intelligibility scheme to 
their data, and thus they isolate as relevant different kinds of interactions between 
their constructed facts. The very same world phenomena would be conceptualised 
and made sense of in partially different ways by each of these theories. Very much 
like the blind men touching the elephant, legal scholars conducting their research 
empirically are being guided by the theoretical programme they adopt, which leads 
them to construct as legally relevant certain facts and to perceive as academically 
worthy of attention certain kinds of interrelations between facts. 
4. General considerations 
The concluding remarks will consider what is the interest in setting the concept of 
legal pluralism within the theoretical programme theory. Before that, it is 
appropriate to acknowledge explicitly the nature of the stance of this essay. Clearly, 
it entails the implicit assumption that the recognition of (not only) normative 
pluralism in society is necessary. It is under the eyes of everyone that different 
Weltanschauungen happen to coexist very closely and intersect with each other, 
and this established social reality does not even need to be upheld. Needless to 
say, the “central” legal system is in need of finding ways to deal with this factual 
situation, and legal pluralism is certainly a very useful analytical tool. Furthermore, 
developing theoretical frameworks that enable getting to grip with the complexity 
of, and to make sense of, the network of interrelated normativities existing in the 
contemporary world is clearly a way of challenging whether generations of law 
students should still be inculcated with the general theories of state law that do not 
take into account other kinds of norms. On the whole, reflecting on the theoretical 
foundations of the anthropology of law is a way of supporting the overall project of 
the discipline. This is the underlying agenda of this paper, which has hopefully been 
visible throughout, the abstractedness of the approach taken notwithstanding. Yet, 
the main focus of this essay is not to prompt any particular policy of legal pluralism, 
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but instead it is to apply epistemic reflexivity to the concept by illustrating the way 
in which the epistemic practice of research, and in particular the theoretical 
programme chosen, affects the results. 
A first corollary of this operation is the reduction of distance between the so-called 
internal and the external approaches to law. As has been discussed above, the legal 
anthropological and sociological enterprise involves a change in the nature of the 
legal research. It introduces, alongside the classical legal doctrine that uses a 
nomologico-deductive way of reasoning, an inductive way of looking at law, one 
where the researcher proceeds in order to establish the facts by empirical 
investigation. This opposition can be presented as the methodological dichotomy 
between paradigms of inquiry and of authority (Samuel 2007a, 2007b). Often, legal 
scholars are trapped into a world of consenting insiders and therefore are unable to 
produce any relevant social scientific knowledge (Samuel 2009). Their intellectual 
work consists of analysing and systematising rules in the pyramid of precepts so as 
to determine their exact prescriptive content within the authority paradigm. 
Conversely, the empirical legal researcher concentrates on the actual behaviour of 
the people in the world; instead of developing alleged universal theories of law she 
reveals features of lived normative phenomena (be they of state origin or not). By 
and large, legal theory and empirical research on law have tended to ignore one 
another, each going in its own direction and following different research agendas. 
Still, since they both aim at comprehending the same phenomenon, cooperation 
could be advisable (Galligan 2010, p. 991). To this end, legal pluralism happens to 
be rather well placed: it is a fruitful area for constructive engagement between 
empirical research on law and legal philosophy, whose concepts are directly put into 
question (Cotterrell 2002, p. 638, Davies 2010, p. 825). 
A second corollary of the complexification of the epistemological status accorded to 
the concept of legal pluralism consists in a further challenging of the dichotomy 
between the internal vs. external approach. The very validity and utility of such a 
sharp opposition are questioned. A search for the archetypal instance of the 
dichotomy leads us back to the beginning of the twentieth century, to the conflict 
between the internal, conceptual and pure theory of law developed by Hans Kelsen 
and the external approach to law, seen as part of a social complex, adopted by 
Eugen Ehrlich (Davies 2010, pp. 809-810). The prominence of the two first 
proponents notwithstanding, this disciplinary division is conventional, unnecessary 
and furthermore contestable since it is based on the assumption that law has clear 
conceptual boundaries which scholars can be inside or outside of (Davies 2010, p. 
825). In order to question this dichotomy, Bourdieu (1991, p. 95) argues that the 
internal approach can be conceived of as a product of the legal scholars’ social field 
and of their legitimation strategies. Far from being the general and abstract output 
of a universal reason, law is actually a space of belief within which the agents are 
players socialised to think that they are playing a game that deserves to be played 
(Bourdieu 1991, p. 99). The “internal” point of view is attacked by showing its 
historicity, its situatedness and contingency. The legal social field yields a 
normative order that reflects its own values, which are therefore not neutral nor 
universal. In this paper the direction of the attack to the dichotomy is specular, and 
the internal/external opposition is challenged by reflections on the inherent 
normativity of frameworks adopted by the “external” approach to law. The outcome 
is influenced by decisions concerning the scale and the projection of the inquiry, the 
purposes of the research, the actors involved in the investigation, the selected 
sources and the methodological approaches used. Those terms of reference 
determine what the scholar sees (Griffith 2013, p. 272). How this happens is the 
question that has been dealt with in this paper, which contributes to the further 
articulation of the dichotomy beyond the simplistic understanding of internal = 
normative vs. external = descriptive approach. 
The overall aim of this paper has been to investigate the nature of empirical 
knowledge produced through legal pluralistic lenses, its presuppositions and 
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foundations, its extent and validity. By showing the heuristic guidance exercised by 
the concept of legal pluralism, it has been highlighted how it enables research and 
at the same time limits the space of manoeuvre. Such an assessment should not be 
understood as undermining the validity of the concept. As Bourdieu puts it: 
“Reflexivity is a tool to produce more science, not less. It is not designed to 
discourage scientific ambition but to help make it more realistic” (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992, p. 194). That is to say, the programme approach offers a realistic 
assessment of the capacity of the term to convey information about the studied 
domain, one that takes into account the normativity inherent to the use of 
concepts. Moreover, this approach provides a way to analyse the coherence and the 
internal structure of the various conceptions of legal pluralism proposed in scholarly 
literature. It has been claimed that the different usages of the concept by various 
contemporary theories of legal pluralism can be explained as being a consequence 
of their derivation from programmes incorporating different intelligibility schemes.  
The basic point of this paper is that the definition of legal pluralism adopted steers 
the research: awareness of this allows for a choice of framework corresponding to 
one's cognitive interest. In this way, the shape of the “obstacle” constituted by the 
empirical method is made clear, and the relation between observed realities and 
the conceptual instruments used to observe them is acknowledged, in that the 
influence of the latter on the former is undisguised. 
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Complex Legal Pluralism 
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BY EMMA PATRIGNANI, PH.D. STUDENT, UNIVERSITY OF LAPLAND1  
Abstract: Legal pluralism as a theory of law lays at the crossroads between theoretically oriented 
jurisprudence and empirically oriented anthropological and sociological research on law and as such 
holds great relevance in contemporary reflection on the nature of law. The term is understood here 
as the recognition of the plurality inherent in every legal culture, which is a quality that allows the 
applicability of insights from complexity theory. Complexity as developed by Edgar Morin is here 
referred to legal pluralism and is used to argue that legal pluralism is not simply another general 
theory of law. Rather, as a theory of law, it is characterised by its focusing on the variability of legal 
phenomena. It is a theory of law that states its own contingency and the perpetual need for re-
definition. While any alleged all-encompassing theory destroys the autonomy of the legal scholar, 
complexity provides her with the appropriate tools to grapple with the intricacies of the contempo-
rary legal world. 
Keywords: Legal pluralism, complexity, law as culture, general theories of law, legal philosophy. 
1 Introduction 
The main claim of this article is that legal pluralism is not just another general theory 
of law. To be precise, the trespasser here is ‘general’. Understanding the plurality of 
law entails accepting its complexity and dismissing all ambitions to create a universal, 
all-encompassing, ever-valid, general theory of law. Legal pluralism is a theory of law 
and one which is characterised by its focusing on the variability of legal phenomena 
and the importance of empirical findings. It is a theory of law that states its own con-
tingency and perpetual need for re-definition. This is not because we have all become 
skeptical post-modern relativists but because of the nature of the complex thing we 
are talking about: contemporary law. 
 The line of argument will go as follows: law as legal pluralism is a complex system, 
and complexity theory can fruitfully be applied to it as a theoretical framework. Com-
plexity theory does not involve the formulation of general theories, therefore legal plu-
ralism is not another general theory of law. 
 
1 Emma Patrignani is a Ph.D. student in the Doctoral Programme Legal Cultures in Transna-
tional World (LeCTra) at the Faculty of Law of the University of Lapland.  
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2 Two preliminary issues 
The first preliminary issue that needs to be made explicit concerns the factual and 
theoretical disconnection between law, nation and state. For a long time in the west-
ern world there has been coexistence, within the same community, between diverse 
legal systems. It started with the differentiation between ecclesiastical and secular 
powers and then continued with the formation of secular legal systems: feudal laws 
were sided by manorial laws, mercantile laws, urban laws and royal laws; their respec-
tive jurisdictions were determined on a case-to-case basis following territorial, personal 
or substantial criteria. This plurality has been a source of legal (as well as economic 
and political) transformations and also of freedom for individuals: a serf might address 
the town court for protection against his master, a vassal might address the king’s 
court for protection against his lord and a cleric might address the ecclesiastical court 
for protection against the king.2 The relation among these different laws was not only 
that of alternative exclusive jurisdiction but also of coexistence in the sense of a rela-
tion between common (ius commune) to particular law (ius proprium). This relation im-
plies the dependence of one level on the other as a definitional counterpart and as 
guidance for legal reasoning in concrete cases.3 The study of the history of European 
law reveals its plurality and complexity.4 The process of absorption of modern law in-
to the modern state is thus a historically contingent one which ‘like any other histori-
cal process, had a beginning and will have an end.’5 Moreover it is disputed to what 
extent this process of centralisation and differentiation of law along national territorial 
borders has been effective; it has been argued that a perfect coincidence of a homoge-
nous group of people with the legal and political structure of a state has never oc-
curred, anywhere.6 Law (as a normative system), nation (referring to a homogeneous 
population) and state (as a political entity) do not coincide, and they may have corre-
sponded to each other only in official state rhetoric and mainstream academic dis-
course, becoming a sort of ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’.7 The ‘myth’ or ‘taken-for-granted 
assumption’8 concerning the overlapping of a national legal system with a homogene-
ous society is here going to be left behind. The disconnection between law, nation and 
state is one of the theoretical bases for this article. 
 
2 Berman 1983, p. 10. 
3 On common laws defining themselves in relation to particular laws and to other common 
laws, in tolerance and interdependence see Glenn 2005, pp. 95-96. 
4 Donlan 2011, 2/1.  
5 De Sousa Santos 1995 p. 95. 
6 Glenn 2013p. vii f.. 
7 Davies 2010, p. 810. 
8 Darian-Smith 2013, p. 9. 
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 The second preliminary issue consists of the placement of this article within the 
broader jurisprudential discussion. We are at the sometimes uncomfortable but highly 
thought provoking crossroads between legal theory and legal sociology, an intersec-
tion that Gunther Teubner, in the pages of this very journal, has described as a ‘para-
doxical hybrid’ and a locus of ‘mutual irritation’.9 It has been lamented that for a long 
time legal theory and empirical legal research10 have tended to ignore one another, 
each going in its own direction and following different research agendas.11 Analytical 
jurisprudence has been more focused on developing and refining theories; that is, ab-
stractions from the law in books.12 Sociological and anthropological studies of legal 
phenomena have challenged this way of proceeding and the way of doing philosophy 
of law is recast. In this discussion, legal pluralism as a theory of law is quite central: it 
is a fruitful area for constructive engagement between empirical research on law and 
legal philosophy, whose concepts are directly put into question.13 The reflections pre-
sented in this article are to be understood in the setting of the upsetting of legal phi-
losophy to which legal pluralism has contributed.14 The focus is not on the shift it 
caused from monistic to pluralistic understandings of law but on the width of applica-
bility of any legal theory. In other words, the legal-cultural epistemological limits in-
volved in doing legal theory that are highlighted by theories such as legal pluralism. 
As Jaakko Husa puts it: ‘grand legal theories are not very well equipped for confront-
ing the new legal pluralistic world.’15 He advances, instead, the heuristic tool of the 
kaleidoscopic view of law, which takes into account the variability (in space and in 
time) of legal theories and also the perspective of the theoretician who points the ka-
leidoscope towards what interests her. Most importantly, ‘the kaleidoscopic view of 
legal theory is not itself a legal theory. Yet, this view underlines the importance of not 
locking any theory within its primary epistemology:16 it is only by understanding dif-
 
9 Zamboni M. (2012) Interview with Gunther Teubner – Frankfurt (Germany), December 
2010. Retfærd Årgang 35 nr. 4/139: 3-21, p. 5.  
10 The term refers here to sociological and anthropological studies of law, and not to contempo-
rary strands of empirical legal scholarship that are gaining momentum in North-American 
academia. For those, see Suchman and Mertz 2010, 555-579. See also Macaulay and Mertz 
2013, 195-210. 
11 Galligan 2010, p. 991. 
12 But, for an extensive and learned presentation of the major Anglo-American normative legal 
theories interpreted contextually ie reflecting and expressing the political and social environ-
ment of their production see Cotterrell 2003. 
13 Cotterrell 2002, p. 825. 
14 That the discussions on the nature of legal pluralism are in fact discussions on the nature of 
law has since been acknowledged. See Le Roy 2003, pp. 7-20. 
15 Husa 2013, p. 209. 
16 By ‘primary epistemology of law’ is meant the ‘inbuilt and subconscious epistemic foundation 
of law and everything that is deemed legal. [...] The effects of this kind [of] primary episte-
mology concern the manner one regards as a proper theorising about law.’ Id., p. 199. 
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ferent viewpoints of law that we can also obtain a better understanding of legal theory 
itself.’17 The kaleidoscope metaphor goes against the meta-ideas of objectivity and of 
universality on which legal theory has been built.18 Here the project is a parallel one; 
namely the proposal of an understanding of law that, by being pluralistic, also chang-
es the theory of knowledge about law. 
3 General Theories of Law 
By ‘general theory of law’ is meant an intellectual contribution that aims to clarify 
theoretically the nature of law or legal institutions in general.19 That is, that aims to 
offer a clarification with universal value, or, to put it in an exaggerated way, to ad-
vance timeless truths about law. Aspirations of this kind were well spread among legal 
theorists in the nineteenth century. 
 Austin’s concentration on the abstraction and exposition of principles derived from 
positive systems is an example of such an attitude. Even while admitting the existence 
of individual peculiarities in different systems, the focus of what he calls General or 
Universal Jurisprudence is on the ‘principles, notions, and distinctions which are 
common to systems of law’.20 And the reader does not have to search far to localise 
the alleged ‘generality’ and ‘universality’ he is referring to, as the text continues as fol-
lows:  
‘And these resemblances [...] are necessarily confined to the resemblances between the systems of a 
few nations; since it is only a few systems with which it is possible to become acquainted, even im-
perfectly. From these, however, the rest may be presumed. And it is only the system of two or three na-
tions which deserve attention: – the writing of the Roman Jurists; the decision of English Judges in 
modern times; the provisions of French and Prussian Codes as to arrangement’.21  
As such, it could not be more explicit where the author and his theory are situated. 
Still, the theory is called general and universal.  
 An interesting parallel can here be drawn with the theory of comparative law, as 
more or less at the same time similar goals were set. The aspiration was to create uni-
versal knowledge inductively through empirical observation of various juridical phe-
nomena. In this context it is worth recalling the words of the German criminalist An-
selm von Feuerbach, who wrote:  
 
17 Id., p. 212. 
18 Id., pp. 197-98. 
19 Cotterrell 2002, p. 3. 
20 Austin 1954, p. 367. 
21 Id., p. 373 (emphasis added). 
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‘Comparison and combination are the two richest sources of all discoveries in the empirical sciences. 
It is only through the process of contrasting that the opposed elements become clear; and in the 
same way it is only through reflection on similarities and differences, and the reasons thereof, that 
the essence of all things can be exhaustively explored. From comparison of languages emerges the 
philosophy of languages, the true science of languages; in the same way, it is from comparison of 
laws and customs of nearby and distant nations, of all times and countries, that a universal juris-
prudence can emerge, the ultimate science of laws, which gives meaning to all particular laws.’22  
The main shortcoming highlighted above seems to have been overcome, as Feuerbach 
does not claim that from the study of a few legal systems the principles of all the rest 
can be presumed, and instead he refers to the laws and customs throughout history. 
Clearly, the question of feasibility could arise, but what has to be stressed for the line 
of argument to be followed here is rather the use of words such as ‘universal’ and ‘ul-
timate’ to describe the kind of knowledge that is to be produced. 
 More recently, the philosopher Joseph Raz has also stated that the central task of 
general jurisprudence is to produce a universally applicable theory of the nature of 
law:  
‘The general theory of law is universal for it consists of claim about the nature of all law, of all legal 
systems, and about the nature of adjudication, legislation, and legal reasoning, wherever they 
might be and whatever they might be. Moreover, its claims, if true, are necessarily true [...], not 
contingent on existing political, social, economic, or cultural conditions, institutions, or practices.’23  
Such assertions are highly problematic, as universalistic truth claims lead to paradoxes 
when derived (and then applied) to time and culture bound phenomena like law.24 
 Assertions of generality are paradoxical not only because they refer to socially con-
structed, variable phenomena, but also because they are multiple. When multiple 
theories claim to be ultimate, either only one of them is rightly claiming this univer-
sality, or none of them are. Legal philosophers do not live in a vacuum and are aware 
of the existence of multiple theories: just to provide one example, the popular text-
book ‘Lloyd´s Introduction to Jurisprudence’ opens with the adage quot homines, tot 
 
22 Von Feuerbach 1833, p. 163 (emphasis added, translation is mine. Orig.: ‘Die reichste Quelle 
aller Entdeckungen in jeder Erfahrungswissenschaft ist Vergleichung und Kombination. Nur durch man-
nigfaltige Gegensätze wird das Entgegengesetzte vollständig klar; nur durch Betrachtung der Ähnlichkei-
ten und Verschiedenheiten und der Gründe von beiden wird die Eigenthümlichkeit und innere Wesenheit 
jeden Dinges erschöpfend ergründet. So wie aus der Vergleichung der Sprachen die Philosophie der Spra-
che, die eigentliche Sprachwissenschaft hervorgeht; so auch aus der Vergleichung der Gesetze und Rechts-
gewohnheiten der verwandtesten, wie der fremdartigsten Nationen aller Zeiten und Länder, die Univer-
sal-Jurisprudenz, die Gesetzwissenschaft ohne Beinamen, welche aber jeder besonders benannten Gesetz-
wissenschaft erst ihr wahres kräftiges Leben verleiht.’) 
23 Raz 2009, pp. 91-92. 
24 Tamanaha 2012, p. 32. 
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sententiae.25 Indeed, any textbook presenting various conceptions of law must recog-
nise their plurality, as each chapter cannot pretend to be the whole book; on the con-
trary the various theories (or rather the theorists) discuss with each other. In this 
manner, the definition of law advanced by natural lawyers, as an expression of some 
higher non-human instances (God, Nature, Universal Reason), is presented in its his-
torical appearances and is also criticised for confusing law with morals by positivists. 
Those, in turn, bring law down to earth as a set of rules posited by humans. However, 
being empirically oriented, they are in turn accused of confusing law with facts by 
normativists. As supporters of the pure theory of law, they argue that law is what has 
been validly enacted according to a higher norm. The list continues with the historical 
school and law as the expression of the Volksgeist, followed by the more recent analyti-
cal jurisprudence, various theories of justice and interpretivism. And then come the 
contemporary approaches: legal realism, critical legal studies, post-colonial and femi-
nist legal theory and socio-legal studies. They all have their own take on law, their 
specific vantage point or perspective on the subject-matter and obviously they all rely 
on some assumptions or basic theorising.26 What is more important, none can claim 
exclusivity.  
 The aspect of general theories of law that is criticised here is not the content of each 
theory, but its attitude towards other alternative theories. An array of restriction and 
exclusion strategies may accompany a given theory so as to provide it with a false 
sense of exclusivity.27 This occurs, for instance, whenever a certain theory is put for-
ward as defining the whole law rather than expressing one possible selection of the 
subject-matter.28 Other strategies consist of passing certain aspects of the theory ad-
vanced as displaying philosophically necessary or scientifically objective empirical character-
istics of law.29 The epistemological attitude of closure towards further theoretical in-
quiry is the problem: the positing of a certain concept of law as the exclusive concept of 
law.30 Such an approach is essentialist or reductionist as it posits a particular model of 
law as a governing paradigm.31 To sum up, a general theory of law is here defined as 
being a theory concerning law that claims to be ultimate. The point of this paper is 
not only to assert that legal theorists (be they legal pluralists or belonging to any oth-
er school) should avoid this epistemological attitude, but also the point is to show that 
legal pluralists are better protected from assuming such an attitude.  
 
25 Freeman 2008, p. 1. 
26 See also Berman 1983, p. 12. 
27 Halpin 2014, p. 185. 
28 Id., p. 184. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Id., p. 187. 
31 Griffiths A. 2002, p. 293. 
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4 Legal Pluralism 
What is meant by legal pluralism in this paper? Indeed, the definitional disputes over 
the term have been both passionate and compelling. Pluralism has been studied in co-
lonial and postcolonial contexts;32 the existence of various normative orders has been 
acknowledged around state or official law and mainstream society in ‘western’ coun-
tries;33 and finally pluralism has been discussed also in relation to processes of globali-
sation and transnationalisation of law.34 Different definitions have been advanced de-
pending on the context. Nonetheless, it lays beyond the scope of this text to recon-
struct them. And besides, definitions set borders of meaning that are inevitably unsat-
isfactory and imprecise: drawing a definitional line between legal pluralism, legal cul-
ture and the rest of social life is an ever-perfectible enterprise. Bearing this general ca-
veat in mind, it remains indispensable that an established convention on the (rough) 
meaning of certain keywords is set.  
 Legal pluralism is understood here as a feature of law-as-culture, which means that 
law is a manifestation of a specific cultural worldview. The concept of law-as-culture 
cannot be used to justify causally a certain legal institution by referring to a cultural 
explanation (and assigning causal priority to competing hypothetical variables35). The 
term entails a more interpretive approach that is concerned with understanding how 
different aspects of legal culture resonate and fit together.36 This is anything but an 
easy exercise, as different aspects of any legal culture rarely resonate and fit together: 
more often than not they are disparaged and incoherent. This brings us back to legal 
pluralism: law, understood as a manifestation of culture, is inherently plural. Plural-
ism is an element that is present in every law-as-culture, and vice versa a cultural un-
derstanding of law implies the recognition of the internal inconsistencies of law, which 
is constituted of countless fragments not necessarily related in a formal rational man-
ner.37 This amounts to nothing more than a modification of the maxim ubi societas ibi 
jus into becoming ubi societas ibi jura. In this sense, in a context of normative plurality, 
legal pluralism is here understood as the idea that state law is just one form of law. It 
is worth underlying that legal pluralism is not taken to be a synonym for cultural dif-
ference as if there were a relation of congruence between legal order and cultural iden-
 
32 See for example Hooker 1975 
33 See for example the literature referred to in Merry 1988. 
34 See for example Twining 2010, 243-262. 
35 Nelken 2004, p. 9. 
36 Ibid.  
37 See the intriguing reference to Steppenwolf, the novel by Herman Hesse, made by Banakar 
2008, p. 57-59.  
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tity.38 As stated in the first preliminary issue above, law and cultural identity are seen 
as disjoined and both transversally differentiated. 
  In addition to that legal pluralism, as defined in this paper, disassociates itself 
from the allegedly strictly descriptive, social-scientific, empiric positivistic conception 
of the earlier legal pluralists.39 In particular, what is challenged is the objectivist epis-
temology of such an approach that produces images of pluralism that are a reification 
of ‘the legal’. Rather, individuals are recognised as agents creating, and at the same 
time moving in between, a complex environment of normative patterns that is vari-
ously interconnected and variously meaningful. Given the high level of complexity 
and dynamicity of these normative patterns, any account of pluralism that crystallizes 
them conceptually as separated parallel normative orders will be inadequate.40 Anne 
Griffiths has written of the ‘highly mobile and contingent nature of law’ and of the 
‘multifaceted dimensions of legal pluralism that are constantly in the making’.41 As 
such, she is referring to a conception of pluralism that is multidimensional, polycentric 
and made of a network or web of relations as opposed to more traditional views of le-
gal pluralism that are linear and mono-causal. In order to better understand the epis-
temological posture of the conception that is defended here, insights from complexity 
theory can profitably be referred to.  
5 Applying complexity theory to legal pluralism 
Complexity theory originated in the 40s and 50s in North America among mathema-
ticians and engineers in transversal fields of interest such as Information Theory, Cy-
bernetics and General Systems Theory. It then spread in the 1980s with the founding 
of the Santa Fe Institute,42 which focus on the study of dynamical systems with a large 
number of variables, interactions and feedbacks so that internal processes cannot be 
easily predicted: in complex systems the paradigms of classical science do not apply.43 
 
38 Greenhouse 1998 
39 Together with others such as Kleinhans and Macdonald 1997 and Davies 2005. 
40 Davies 2010, p. 822. 
41 Griffiths, 2011, p. 174. 
42 http://www.santafe.edu/ 
43 What needs be overcome is the reductionism and scientific determinism as represented by 
Pierre Simon Laplace, who in 1814 famously described scientific knowledge as follows: ‘We 
may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the cause of its future. 
An intellect which at a certain moment would know all forces that set nature in motion, and 
all positions of all items of which nature is composed, if this intellect were also vast enough to 
submit these data to analysis, it would embrace in a single formula the movements of the 
greatest bodies of the universe and those of the tiniest atom; for such an intellect nothing 
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On this side of the ocean Edgar Morin has also written on complex thought in relation 
to reflections on knowledge (how we know, how we organise our knowledge44) and 
interdisciplinarity. 
 Even though it is not a much trafficked theoretical path, this article is not the first 
attempt to use complexity theory to render the intricacies of law. A well-developed 
vision of law and complexity has been offered by Ruhl.45 In contrast to the approach 
that will be taken here, he relies directly on chaos theory and complex adaptive sys-
tem theory as developed in the natural sciences and orients his overall academic pro-
ject as a refined guide to practical decisions about legal design. Another general46 pro-
posal is advanced by Murray,47 who also relies on natural sciences' literature and on 
one contemporary philosopher.48 More recently, another exploration of the concepts of 
complexity and their relevance to law has been published with the aim of raising 
awareness and encouraging engagement.49 The present contribution follows similar 
lines of argumentation, with the difference that it relies on Morin’s notion of complex-
ity. Being grounded in the humanities and social sciences, it appears more suited to an 
understanding of the inherently plural law-as-culture. This fifth chapter thus presents 
some characteristics of complexity that are referable to plural legal cultures: by pre-
senting certain key concepts of complexity theory, the definition of legal pluralism 
contained in the fourth chapter is here continued and refined. 
 Complexus in Latin means ‘that which is woven together’. In Morin’s words, it is the 
‘fabric [...] of heterogeneous constituents that are inseparably associated, [...] the fab-
rics of events, actions, interactions, retroactions, determinations, and chance that con-
stitute our phenomenal world’.50 Already the etymology of the word hints at a first 
feature of complexity: the interactions among the elements are more significant than 
the definition of every single element taken in isolation. Knowing the content of the 
 
would be uncertain and the future just like the past would be present before its eyes.’ Laplace 
1951. 
44 Morin distinguishes between ‘restricted complexity’ and ‘generalized complexity’. The former 
refers to a system that can be considered complex because it empirically exists as a multiplicity 
of interrelated processes, which are interdependent and retroactively associated. The latter re-
quires an epistemological rethinking, as any system can be looked at through complexity 
glasses. See Morin 2006, p. 6. 
45 Ruhl 1996a; Ruhl 1996b; and Ruhl 2008.  
46 General in the sense that it proposes the utilisation of complexity theory as a framework for 
understanding the ‘whole law’, which is in contrast to other authors that have used the theory 
as a framework to understand specific fields of law. 
47 Murray 2008. 
48 Namely Deleuze. On the convergence between complex system theory and postmodern phi-
losophy, see Heylighen Cilliers, Gershenson 2007. 
49 Webb 2014. 
50 Morin 2008, p. 5. 
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various formants51 of law does not by far correspond to a knowledge of law. It is their 
respective weight and their interrelations that determine the resultant legal culture. In 
addition, in a complex system the interactions among constituents, and between the 
system and its environment, are of such a nature that the system as a whole cannot be 
fully understood simply by analysing its components: there are qualities and proper-
ties that only emerge from the compound.  
 But a complex system is more than quantities of units and interactions that defy 
calculability. It also entails a certain degree of randomness and indetermination. This 
uncertainty partly arises from the limits of our ability to comprehend and partly from 
the uncertainty inscribed in phenomena.52 Phenomena are uncertain as any particular 
development of the system cannot be predicted by examining the constituent parts at 
their starting point.53 As Brian Tamanaha has noted, unpredictability is an inherent 
characteristic of legal pluralism, where, in addition to the usual uncertainty as to the 
outcome of hard cases, there is the added element of jeopardy of not knowing which 
one of the competing legal regimes will find application.54 
 Morin deploys, together with the systemic idea of emergence (new qualities and 
properties that are emergent from the compound in relation to the constitutive quali-
ties and properties of the elements taken in isolation), the cybernetic idea of retroac-
tion or feedback: the return of an effect on the conditions that produced it.55 So, for 
example, society is the result of the interactions among individuals, and at a societal 
level the societal features of culture and language emerge. Those societal features in 
turn retroact on the individuals, who are shaped by the culture and language they 
happen to live in.56 This involves a modification in the understanding of causality. 
Along with linear causality, the feedback loop and recursive causality (effects and results 
are necessary for their own causation) are present at all levels of complex organisa-
tions.57 As has already been noted, a kind of endo-exo causality is assumed to be at 
work in the conception of law-as-culture as defined in the previous chapter: culture is 
not considered to produce certain effects on law nor vice versa, but different elements 
mutually interrelate. Law is both a reflection and a determinant of economic and po-
litical conditions,58 and they need to be studied together. While the paradigm of sim-
plicity isolates objects of knowledge from their environment, in the complexity para-
digm this disjunction is seen as a carrier of falsifications that are deceptive and mis-
 
51 Sacco 1991. 
52 Morin 2008, p. 20. 
53 Morin 2008, p. 56. 
54 Tamanaha 2008 
55 Morin 2008 pp. 112-113. 
56 Morin 2006, p. 10. A similar cycle has been applied to norm creation as well: see for example, 
Kleinhans and Macdonald, 1997, and also Vanderlinden 1989. 
57 Morin 2008, p. 61. 
58 Berman 1983, pp. 44- 45, and 553-556. 
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leading. A contextual approach in law involves, rather than a bare exposition of legal 
rules, treating legal subjects broadly. Insights from other disciplines allow a better 
(more realistic and more stimulating) understanding of legal phenomena.59 
 Additionally, complexity urges to rethink the strict opposition between order and 
disorder. Complex systems can be analysed at different levels; what make sense in 
one, may provoke disorder in another, and ‘local truths can become global errors’.60 
This is a very well-known situation for the legal practitioner: each individual belongs 
at the same time to micro-(local communities), meso-(state) and macro-(global) legal 
realities, and the rules established at one level may be incoherent with those estab-
lished at another level. Over-lapping normative orders often make competing oppo-
site claims.61 Those can be seen in terms of competition or even menace, or in terms of 
conciliation and equilibrium.62 What is more, as the principles of order from noise and 
order from disorder suggest, from agitation and random encounters, organisations may 
emerge.63 The respective meanings of the three words order/disorder/organization are re-
set. Correspondingly, at the logical core of complexity the principle of the excluded 
middle reveals its limits.64 In complex systems, incoherent elements may coexist, and 
concepts may not be closed and clearly distinguishable. In defiance of the Pandectists’ 
efforts towards a refined legal conceptual construction, a pluralist understanding of 
law requires the adoption of a complex form of reasoning including multivalent or 
many-valued logic, and modal logic.65 Inconsistencies are unavoidable for transna-
tional, globalised law, as they are in the traditional loci of legal pluralism (such as 
postcolonial contexts). But they are also unavoidable within ‘classical’ state-law.66 A 
judgment that defines the correct view of the law today may be overruled tomorrow, 
and in any case it remains contestable by other judges (who would have decided dif-
ferently), advocates, clients, academics, legislators, official, journalists etc as there is an 
ongoing and unresolvable debate about what law is.67 
 Finally, while classical science aims at the formulation of abstract and general laws, 
the paradigm of complexity recognises the historicity of knowledge; that is to say its 
 
59 This is the very basic understanding of the law-in-context approach, which nowadays has its 
own Journal at Cambridge University Press [http://journals.cambridge.org/action/display-
Journal?jid=IJC]. Cfr. also the various understanding of the approach in the 2013 dossier Le 
droit en contexte. Revue interdisciplinaire d’études juridiques, 70. 
60 Morin, supra note 43, p. 11. 
61 Glenn 2013, p. vii. 
62 Id., pp. 142-143.  
63 Morin 2006, p. 40-42. 
64 Morin 2008, p. 16. 
65 See the chapter on Cosmopolitan Thought in Glenn 2013, pp. 259-190. 
66 Davies 2005, p. 108. 
67 Webb 2014, pp. 487-89. 
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singularity, locality, temporality.68 Similarly, while it is true that the civil lawyer (ste-
reo)typically considers legislative rules in their general and abstract formulation, the 
inherently plural legal culture lives in the local and in the particular. A pluralistically 
sensitive understanding of law is necessarily aware of the locality and particularity of 
the intersecting lived normativities.69 To this corresponds the reintroduction of the 
observer in the observation,70 which is the last feature of the epistemology of complex-
ity that will be introduced in this article. The impossibility of an overarching theory of 
complexity that would allow to ignore the contingent aspects of complex systems (if 
something is really complex, it cannot be adequately described by means of one theo-
ry), necessarily entails engaging with the contingent aspects of every specific complex 
system and with the contingent perspective of every specific observer.  
 To recapitulate, the features of unpredictability, emergence and endo-exo causality 
together with the relativity of the concepts of order and disorder, the relevance of con-
text and the applicability of paraconsistent logics as well as the ideas related to the 
historicity of knowledge and the observer's perspective are all ascribable to legal plu-
ralism as understood here. But complexity, it has been argued, is not an all-
encompassing theory that can be applied mechanically to the legal world. Instead, 
complexity equips the legal pluralist with a certain number of principles which help 
the autonomous researcher in her pursuit of legal understanding. Whereas a general 
theory of law destroys the autonomy of the legal scholar, the problematic of complexi-
ty stimulates an autonomous strategy. Complexity theory shows that absolute predic-
tions of law’s impact on society (or vice versa) are no longer scientifically rational 
goals. Applying complexity theory to legal pluralism allows a greater appreciation of 
the forces at play in the interaction of law and society and dooms any reductionist, 
prediction-oriented, general theory of law.71 The theoretical and conceptual tools of 
complexity exclude the possibility of one single theory to be adopted ubiquitously. 
They entail the negation of the possibility to have a general theory of law. 
6 Conclusions 
Legal pluralism, understood as legal culture that is inherently plural, entails a change 
in the theory of knowledge that the pluralist adopts. Adopting an understanding of 
legal pluralism as the one suggested in this article means to participate in what Roger 
Cotterrel called ‘an exploratory enterprise aimed at serving an ongoing, ever-changing 
 
68 Morin 1984, p. 51. 
69 Davies 2010, p. 823. 
70 Morin 1984, p. 68. For an application of this idea to the domain of law, and more specifically 
to the definition of law, see Treiber 2012. 
71 Ruhl 1996a, p. 853. 
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juristic practice.’72 As a legal theory, complex legal pluralism is not focused on finding 
ultimate truth about law’s nature or timeless, essential or necessary characteristics of 
the legal. In this sense, it is not ‘general’. Similarly to general theories, complex legal 
pluralism as a legal theory aims to grasp the legal reality. But contrarily to general 
theories, the relationship between theory and practice is not one of map and territory, 
because the map is moving. Complexity theory provides a set of theoretical and con-
ceptual means, not an overall explanation.  
 This opens up supplementary issues for the researcher. Among the set of theoretical 
and conceptual tools provided by complexity theory, the researcher should be explicit 
about ‘which elements are being adopted, how they are received, and what informs 
that choice.’73 Complexity theory does not allow escaping the moment of choice, 
hence the ethical implications of research.74 This is of the highest significance if we 
acknowledge that the complexification of the concept of law (due both to changes in 
the world and to modifications in our instruments to understand it) undermines ac-
countability and the possibility of justice. As has been rightly noted, ‘[c]omplexity, 
fragmentation, pluralism of laws and globalization can perpetuate injustice.’75 These 
conclusions reveal themselves for what they are: a new starting point. As such, ‘recog-
nition of the complexity of the contemporary landscape, and unwillingness to catego-
rize and simplify, is only the starting point for the project of present day legal theo-
ry.’76  
 Legal pluralism as a non-general theory of law, while stating its own contingency 
and perpetual need for re-definition, also states the unavoidable responsibility in-
volved with methodological choices. And it is exactly with the tools provided by com-
plexity theory that a ‘pluralist pluralism’ may make those choices. 
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This paper compares two judgments of constitutional courts (French and German) assessing the
constitutionality of statutes concerning veil-wearing and focuses on the underlying conceptions of
‘living together’. This means that what is actually compared is the self-understanding of the
respective majority in the two societies as stated in the decisions. This is done by disassembling the
concept of ‘living together’ into three elements: the notion of the individual, the meaning of belonging
to the national community and the space accorded to religion in public. Each section of this paper
examines one of these elements as they are entailed in the judgments and positions them critically
within the respective legal cultural and historical contexts. The main aim of this paper is
methodological in nature and is namely to show how comparative legal cultural studies can avoid
essentialisation and rather highlight the complexity of every cultural context.
I. Introduction
The challenges of multiculturalism are becoming more pressing every day: this can be seen both in
the daily news and in the ways law handles the cultural and religious dishomogeneity of society. This
paper compares the judgments of two constitutional courts assessing the constitutionality of statutes
concerning the presence of a fairly new practice in European society, namely veil-wearing, and
focuses on the underlying conceptions of ‘living together’. One of these judgments is the French
Decision n. 2010–613 DC rendered on 7 October 2010 by the Constitutional Council, and the
other is the German order in the cases 1 BvR 471/10 and 1 BvR 1181/10 that was rendered on 27
January 2015 by the First Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court.
Living together is indeed a timely issue. Definable as a modus vivendi (Dupont, 2011, p. 81), the
concept refers to human interactions in a given territory and to basic shared values. In nineteenth-
century Western European nation-states, those basic shared values were determined by a relatively
homogeneous majority in a dominant situation and enforced on everyone else. Conversely,
twenty-first-century states are characterised by diversity. Nowadays, living together needs to be
renegotiated in a situation of plurality of cultural lifestyles. Taken-for-granted social norms,
cultural forms of expression and of social conversance are confronted with alternatives whose
alterity can fascinate, but also perturb. This creates challenges also for law: as it is such a topical
matter, the comparative study of living together is important for understanding the influence of
cultural heritage and for appreciating the novelty of the circumstances.
The study of European living-together conceptions in connection with reactions to Islamic
veiling appears to be full of prejudices. The idea to write about this was sparked by the European
Court of Human Rights’ decision in the case of S.A.S. v. France of 1 July 2014. As a matter of fact,
the Court declared that the French Act no. 2010–1192 prohibiting full-face veils in all public
places is compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights. The only argument that
made this point is the French living-together conception, which is considered to be a legitimate
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ground to restrict the rights to respect for private life and to manifest one’s beliefs, as foreseen by the
second paragraphs of the Articles 8 and 9 ECHR respectively (§142 decision S.A.S. v. France).1 In a
nutshell, the living together recognised by the Court entails, as an indispensable element, the
possibility of open interpersonal relationships, which in turn are considered to be fundamentally
jeopardised by the concealment of one’s face. Moreover, living together is used to protect the
majority of the population (§122). In effect, by stating that the full-face veil undermines the
dignity of others who share the same public space, it is implied that in France people do not wear
veils and also that they have to be protected from being confronted with such an unusual sight.
The Act no. 2010–1192 defends a certain image of the social landscape, which should be preserved
somehow as ‘French’: a kind of Frenchness that is certainly not Muslim.2 This much disputed
judgment aroused my interest in the French legislative procedure, which led to the promulgation
of Act no. 2010–1192; one step of this was the decision of the Constitutional Council assessing the
conformity of the Bill to the Constitution. This decision thus became the comparandum. Only a
few months earlier, the First Senate of the German Federal Constitutional Court had decided that,
due to possible bias, the two constitutional complaints regarding the ban on headscarves in North
Rhine-Westphalian schools had to be decided without the involvement of Vice-President
Ferdinand Kirchhof, as he could be regarded as the author of the legal concept to be considered.3 I
decided to wait for the decision on the merits of the constitutional complaints and that this
would become the comparatum.
Both courts’ decisions will be analysed here against their background, and it will be highlighted
how they fit their context. Nevertheless, this does not need to lead to deterministic understandings of
history nor to simplistic and reductive ‘cultural’ justifications. David Nelken warns that ‘[c]ulture as a
term easily lends itself to misuse both by social actors and scholars. It can be interpreted in a way that
is “essentialist”, over-determined, over-bounded and xenophobic’ (Nelken, 2010, p. 6). Vicki Jackson
has a similar concern in relation to ‘contextually oriented scholarship’ within comparative
constitutional law, which might ‘assume a fixed national identity’ (Jackson, 2012, p. 67). In the
context of this paper, an example of this would be a causal explanation of the content of the
judgments that rhetorically construct the French and the German conceptions of living together
as uniform, immovable and stereotypical. In contrast, understanding law in context can rather be
an occasion to highlight how every cultural context is ‘complex and multi-stranded, and may shift
over time’ (p. 67). This is what this paper purports to do. The presupposition is that law exists in a
social matrix that is actually constituted of a vast diversity of overlapping and potentially
competing elements (Nelken, 2010, p. 17).
The essentialisation to be overcome (to which the title of this paper refers) is not the
essentialisation of the ‘other’ veil-wearing woman,4 but in this case the French and German
1 The Court dismissed all other adduced justifications for the ban: public safety (§139), gender equality (§119)
and protection of the human dignity of the veil wearers (§120). It only retained the protection of the ‘French
conception of living together’ as a legitimate aim (§121), as well as the measure proportionate (§157), so that the
ban would fall within the acceptable limitations of the right to respect for private life and of the right to
freedom of thought, conscience and religion.
2 Ilias Trispiotis (2016) has argued that the conception of living together as recognised in this judgment is
problematic and that an alternative understanding would be advisable.
3 German Federal Constitutional Court’s Press Release No. 22/2014 of 13 March 2014, available at: <http://www.
bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/EN/2014/bvg14-022.html> (accessed 14 March
2017).
4 A discursive practice that indeed exists and is deeply problematic. The fact that this paper does not focus on it
does not mean that it is irrelevant and not worth studying; this has masterfully been done by others
(Frankenberg, 2014, pp. 246–258). Rather, the focus here is on the European ‘self’ in order to unveil that its
identity is also rhetorically constructed (Dietze, 2009, p. 48), and to possibly contribute to a non-
essentialising portrayal of it.
2 emma patrignani
at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744552317000210
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 78.51.143.167, on 14 Sep 2017 at 16:09:47, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
Articles | 121
attitudes towards diversity in society. As will be presented next, the two constitutional controversies
concern different types of religious garments and different places where they are forbidden. In France
the – upheld – statute forbids the wearing of the full-face veil (burqa and niqab) in public places, while
in Germany the – censured through restrictive interpretation – statute targets the headscarf (hijab)
worn by public school teachers. Since the comparison carried out in this paper focuses on the
non-wearers and on the general vision of society entailed in the judgments, this difference is not a
hindrance. In both cases, there is a constitutional court reacting to increasing religious
heterogeneity.5 As with any reaction to otherness, it actually tells much about the self (Amir-
Moazami, 2007, p. 17). The headscarf is taken here as a ‘mirror of identity’ that forces Western
societies ‘to see who they are and to rethink the kind of societies and public institutions they
want to have’ (Joppke, 2009, p. X). Therefore, the two decisions offer a wonderful opportunity to
understand how courts from different historical, political and legal contexts address challenges
posed by diversity in society.
The text will be structured as follows: after a general presentation in Section II of the two
decisions, Sections III–V focus on the conception of living together. The concept is broken down
into three elements: the notion of the individual (Section III), the meaning of belonging to the
national community (Section IV) and the space accorded to religion in public (Section V). Each
section will minutely examine one of these elements as they are entailed in the judgments and
will position them critically within the respective histories. Finally, the conclusion resets the
findings in a more general matrix.
II. Presentation of the two compared decisions
The two compared decisions, if considered as texts, are very different: one is two pages long, the other
thirty-nine. Onewas deliberated on by thewhole Council as a single organ composed of tenmembers;
the other was decided by the First Senate of the Court as a result of the work of six members, two of
which expressed a dissenting opinion.6 This section will focus on the legal reasoning of the courts,
which are also rather different.
The French Decision n. 2010–613 DC rendered on 7 October 2010 by the Constitutional Council
declares the Bill prohibiting the concealment of one’s face in public places to be compliant with the
Constitution. It was taken before it was enacted, according to the second paragraph of Article 61 of the
Constitution, so it is an instance of an a priori abstract constitutionality challenge. The Bill was voted
on in parliament after various preparatory works. The National Assembly created a commission that
had the task of gathering information about Islamic full-face veiling practices (recording 1,900 cases
5 Moreover, in both cases, the constitutional courts are evaluating the constitutionality of statutes dealing with
the presence of veils in public (all public places and public schools), and therefore they are particularly
significant for studying the ideas of the respective societies. It is for this reason they were selected, as
opposed to decisions taken by Supreme Courts in France and Germany that concern Islamic veiling in non-
public sites; for example, the Arrêt n° 612 of 25 June 2014 (13–28.369) rendered by the French Court of
Cassation in its Plenary Assembly, which confirmed the dismissal of a headscarf-wearing worker from the
Baby-Loup childcare centre, or the Urteil of the German Federal Labour Court rendered on 24 September
2014, n. 5 AZR 611/12, which confirmed the possibility to prohibit headscarves for nurses in evangelical
hospitals. As this paper was undergoing review, also the Court of Justice of the European Union has
pronounced for the first time the possibility for firms to prohibit workers from wearing religious symbols
through the judgments in cases C-157/15 Achbita, Centrum voor Gelijkheid van kanses en voor
racismebestrijding v. G4S Secure Solutions, and C-188/15 Bougnaoui and Association de défense des droits de
l’homme (ADDH) v. Micropole Univers.
6 A deeper text-structure, stylistic and linguistic comparison of the judgments will not be carried out, but
indeed they do display interesting features of the respective legal culture they stem from. Notwithstanding
the relevance of those aspects for a judicial style comparison, they cannot be explored further, as the focus
of this paper is on the substantive and implicit content of the texts.
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on French national territory). It submitted its report in January 2010.7 The Council of State produced
a study on the legal feasibility of a ban, presented in March 2010, that actually advised against it.8 In
addition, the National Assembly unanimously voted for a resolution in May 2010 upholding
republican values and condemning integral veiling as being in contrast to them.9 As for the Bill, it
was originally deliberated by the government, then adopted by the National Assembly and the
Senate, and subsequently deferred to the Constitutional Council by the Presidents of both Houses.
In the decision, the Council respectively refers to Articles 4, 5 and 10 of the 1789 Declaration of
the rights of man and of citizen (DDHC) in defining freedom as the possibility to do anything not
explicitly forbidden, limiting the law’s possibility to restrict action only to activities that are
harmful for society and protecting the freedom of opinion. Further, it refers to the third paragraph
of the Preamble of the 1946 Constitution, which guarantees equality of women and men, and it
mentions the protection public order – an objective with constitutional value. It then moves on to
consider the legislator’s intentions and performs a minimum control of not manifest disproportionality
of the conciliation operated by the legislator between the protection of public order and the guarantee
of constitutionally protected rights. It formulates a reserve of interpretation: the public places where
the wearing of the full-face veil is prohibited should not encompass the places of worship open to the
public – which otherwise would have been included in the ‘public spaces’ as referred to in Article 2,
para. 2 of the considered Bill. Besides this interpretative restriction, the Council declares the Bill to be
compliant with the Constitution. The Act no. 2010–1192 was thus promulgated on 11 October 2010
and entered into force on 12 April 2011.
More generally, it has to be added that, in France, the wearing of religious garbs is prohibited at
school. In regard to teachers, the rules concerning public agents apply. The duty of strict neutrality
was first enunciated by the Council of State10 in general and then explicitly applied to the wearing
of religious symbols.11 The legal basis for the same prohibition but in regard to pupils is to be found
in the Act no. 2004–228 of 15 March 2004 on laicity at school. After various ‘affaires du voile’, starting
with the 1989 Opinion of the Council of State, which actually considered the wearing of
headscarves by pupils not to be incompatible with the principle of laicity at school,12 the legislators
concluded the heated debate with a strong positioning (Joppke, 2009, pp. 44–45). Thus, the decision
analysed here can be seen as belonging to an ongoing French discussion on the presence of (mainly
Muslim) religious clothing in public places (Dieu, 2010; Champeil-Desplats, 2012).
The German order in the cases 1 BvR 471/10 and 1 BvR 1181/10, rendered on 27 January 2015 by
the First Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court, is the response to two constitutional complaints
(Article 93, para. 1, sentence 4a, Basic Law, in the following referred to as GG) that were advanced by
7 Assemblée nationale, XIIIe législature, rapport n. 2262. From here on, this report will be referred to as ‘Rapport
d’Information Raoult’ from the name of the reporting deputy, Éric Raoult, available at: <http://www.
assemblee-nationale.fr/13/rap-info/i2262.asp> (accessed 12 March 2017).
8 Study of Possible Legal Grounds for Banning the Full Veil, Conseil d’Etat – Reports and Studies Section, available in
English at: <http://www.conseil-etat.fr/content/download/1910/5758/version/1/file/etude_voile_integral_
anglais.pdf> (accessed 12 March 2017).
9 Assemblée nationale, XIIIe législature, TA n. 459, 11 mai 2010, available at: <http://www.assemblee-nationale.
fr/13/ta/ta0459.asp> (accessed 12 March 2017).
10 CE, 8 December 1948, Demoiselle Pasteau, no. 91.406; and CE, 3 May 1950, Demoiselle Jamet, no. 98.284.
11 CE avis, 3 May 2000, Demoiselle J. X., no. 217017. More recently, the duty of strict neutrality has been restated
also in the government document Charter of Secularity in Public Services, which was distributed with the
Circulaire n° 5209/SG on 13 April 2007, available at: <https://www.dgdr.cnrs.fr/bo/2007/07-07/521-bo0707-
cir5209.htm> (accessed 19 March 2017) and in the Charter of Secularity at School, which was distributed
with the Circulaire n° 2013–144 on 6 September 2013, available at: <http://www.education.gouv.fr/
pid25535/bulletin_officiel.html?cid_bo=73659> (accessed 19 March 2017).
12 CE avis, 27 November 1898, no. 346.893.
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two Muslim women of German nationality. Both had been teaching in public schools and had been
requested to remove their headscarves. One substituted the garment with a woollen hat and a polo-
neck pullover to cover her hair and neck, but she still received a warning from school authorities. Her
lawsuits were unsuccessful at all levels of jurisdiction of the labour courts. The second claimant
refused to remove the headscarf and was dismissed. Similarly, her lawsuits in the labour courts
were unsuccessful. The claimants alleged that their constitutional rights had been violated by the
school authorities’ sanctions, as confirmed by the labour courts, and indirectly they also challenged
the constitutionality of §57, s. 4, and §58, sentence 2 of the Education Act of North Rhine-
Westphalia (NRW SchulG) in the version of 13 June 2006 on which those decisions were based.
The reasoning of the Senate consists in a balancing of constitutionally guaranteed fundamental
rights. On the one side, there is the freedom of faith and conscience (Article 4 GG) of the
complainants, which is considered in connection with the free development of personality
(Article 2, para. 1 GG) and human dignity (Article 1, para. 1 GG), in addition to the right to freely
choose one’s profession (Article 12, para. 1 GG). Moreover, the Senate refers to Article 3, para. 2
GG on the equality between men and women.13 On the other side, weighted against those rights,
the Senate takes into consideration the negative religious freedom of the pupils (Article 4, para. 1
GG), the educational mandate of the state (Article 7, para. 1 GG) that has to be carried out
guaranteeing neutrality of worldview and the parental right to children’s upbringing (Article 6,
para. 2 GG). The result of this reasoning is a relative prevalence of the rights of the complainants,
as opposed to the negative rights of third parties.
The Senate decided that sentences 1 and 2 of §57 s. 4 NRW SchulG have to be interpreted
restrictively: the prohibition of the expression of religious beliefs by outer appearance or conduct
cannot be justified by mere abstract danger. A sufficiently specific danger of disrupting the peace
at school or the state’s duty of neutrality has to exist in order for a ban to be constitutionally
acceptable. This applies both to teachers and to other educational staff, including socio-
educational staff employed by the Land. Moreover, §57 s. 4 sentence 3 of the same statute, which
gave privilege to representing Christian and occidental educational and cultural values or
traditions, has been declared to be discriminatory on grounds of faith and religious beliefs and
hence is unconstitutional and void.
In contrast to France, no full-face veil ban exists in Germany.14 The legal confrontations on
headscarves (‘Kopftuch-Streite’) are mostly in reference to public school teachers. In particular, the
Second Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court had decided the Ludin case15 in 2003. At that
time, there was no state legislation concerning teachers and headscarves, and therefore the
decision of the board of education of the Land Baden Württemberg that prohibited Fereshta Ludin
from taking a post as an English and German teacher because of her insistence on wearing a
headscarf was annulled. The Second Senate declared that the statutory basis at that time was not
13 Interestingly, both courts refer to the principle of equality between men and women, but the French court
does it in order to state that the full-face veil places women in a situation of exclusion and inferiority that
is incompatible with the principle, while the German one in order to verify that the headscarf ban affects
disproportionally (only) women.
14 Even though full-face veil-wearing women do encounter difficulties in everyday life, available at: <http://www.
spiegel.de/international/germany/germany-debates-a-ban-on-burqas-and-other-muslim-veils-a-1108562.html>
(accessed 23 August 2016). Federal Chancellor AngelaMerkel, in a speech on 14 September 2016, declared full
veiling to be ‘a big obstacle to integration. . . .When the face remains covered, the possibilities to get to know
and to appreciate one’s personality are heavily reduced. It hinders communication, which does not consist
only in words’. Concerning the possibility of a ban, she envisages it as consisting of ‘precise provisions for
those sectors where full-face veiling is not appropriate – for example in the public sector or in front of a
Court’. Full text available at: <https://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/Content/DE/Rede/2016/09/2016-09-14-merkel-
parlamentarierkonferenz.html> (accessed 15 March 2017).
15 BVerfG, 24.09.2003–2 BvR 1436/02.
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sufficiently definite for a prohibition on teachers wearing a headscarf, and it expressly advised the
Land legislatures to redefine the admissible degree of religious references permitted at school. In
doing so, it did not give precise guidance as to the content of the legislation. As a result, the
Länder governed by the Christian-Democratic Party (CDU/CSU) passed anti-headscarf legislation
that more or less explicitly exempted ‘Christian-occidentals’ symbols from its reach.16 But the
most evident example of the dependence of the passing of anti-headscarf laws on the colour of
the governing party is provided by the Land North Rhine-Westphalia. As long as it was ruled by
the Social Democratic Party (SPD), no such legislation was passed (Robbers, 2001, p. 648) but, as
soon as a CDU government came into power in 2006, a selectively exclusive headscarf law was
enacted (Joppke, 2009, p. 72). Perhaps it is not a coincidence that exactly this statute ended up
being contested in front of the Constitutional Court. The First Senate decided as expounded above,
which has led to discussion among constitutional law scholars as to whether the case should have
been deferred to the Plenary according to §16 of the Federal Constitutional Court Act, as some
interpreted this decision to deviate from the previous one (Rusteberg, 2015, pp. 638–639;
Sacksofsky, 2015, pp. 806–807; Klein, 2015, pp. 464–466).17
The 2010 French Constitutional Council decision and the 2015 judgment by the First Senate of
the German Federal Constitutional Court illustrate two very different approaches to veiling in public,
to the point that they reach opposite conclusions in their balancing of fundamental rights. However,
the following sections of this paper do not spotlight the legal reasoning, but rather the roots of these
different judicial approaches and specifically the ideas about French and German societies as
depicted in the texts. Indeed, the image of a society inferable from its black-letter law is not
necessarily the same as the one that would emerge from empirical research. In addition, these two
texts are not taken to represent ‘the’ French and ‘the’ German legal answer to the veil, and neither
do they contain the ultimate definitions of the courts of ‘what it means to live together’ in each
society. They are steps in the ‘iterations’ (Benhabib, 2010, p. 466), the processes in which meanings
are negotiated, within the French and German legal evolution. These two texts are cultural
products of their respective society: as such, they are the result of the ‘massaging’ (Glenn, 2010,
p. 16) of the particular legal tradition they belong to and therefore constitute possible starting
points for analysis. The two decisions are here considered as documents in which the deciding
organs at least implicitly state something about the French and German ways of living together.
The next sections will discuss the political and philosophical contexts that inform the decisions
and more specifically the origins of the conception of living together as entailed in the judgments,
which is a result of (at least) three elements. The first of these is the representation of the singular
human being, which will be looked at next. The indented paragraphs contain excerpts of the
decisions in their original version (English translation is provided in the footnotes).
III. Images of the individual
In both decisions, the courts are dealing with a statute that is forbidding something. They have to verify
whether the restriction of the possibilities of action of the individual is legitimate: this implies that some
conception of individual has to be mobilised. Aristotle notably considered the individual to be a zoon
politikón, her existence given by the community, and her nature and telos to be a member of it
(Aristotle, 2009, p. 26). This conception was widespread in Europe in the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries and has influenced the philosophy of both law and the state (Böckenförde, 2001, p. 12). In
16 Only Berlin and Bremen, governed by left-leaning parties, passed laws prohibiting all religious symbols,
Christian and Jewish included.
17 Cf. also the debate among Hans Michael Heinig, Christoph Möllers and Mathias Hong, available at: <www.
verfassungsblog.de> (accessed 21 April 2016).
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opposition to this view, the social contract theorists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
developed a representation of the human as singular and free. Relations and connections are not
given in advance; they can only be created by the free expression of the will of the individual when
she wants to do so in order to satisfy her needs or to develop herself.18 The image of the individual
contained in the French decision, clearly ascribable to thismore recent conception, will be analysed first.
3.1 Individual as an autonomous being, forced to be free
The French Constitutional Council in its decision bears on the DDHC of 1789, which considers the
human to be a carrier of rights inherent to her person, anterior and superior to the state:
‘3. Considérant qu’aux termes de l’article 4 de la Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen de
1789: “la liberté consiste à pouvoir faire tout ce qui ne nuit pas à autrui : ainsi, l’exercice des droits
naturels de chaque homme n’a de bornes que celles qui assurent aux autres membres de la Société
la jouissance de ces mêmes droits. Ces bornes ne peuvent être déterminées que par la loi”.’19
Thus the Council refers to an individual who is primarily free to exercise her natural rights. This
‘French republican theory’ individual exists prior to her choice of lifestyle, values and politics; these
are but external expressions of an inner self (Scott, 2007, p. 127). The Declaration considers the
individual abstractly, not in the particular circumstances of real life. The disregarding of
particularistic cultural determinations corresponds to the disregarding of any substate community
affiliation, or rejection of ‘communalism’. Communautarisme refers to ‘the closing of ethnically
defined communities on themselves, . . . and a refusal of integration. Communalism threatens the
process of direct communication between the state and citizens that underlies French political
philosophy’ (Bowen, 2010, p. 156). The condemnation of communalism can be traced back to
debates held after the 1789 Revolution and, at the time, it was not directed at religious
communities. Intermediate corporate bodies were abolished, as they were accused of separating
citizens, giving them illusions of superiority, constraining them and claiming authority
independently from the state (Bowen, 2010, p. 161). On the contrary, blindness towards
intermediate (between state and citizen) forms of affiliation was melded to the concern to assure
equality of treatment between individuals who are naturally diverse and to create a common
space among very different men and women (Rosanvallon, 2004, pp. 121–124).
The difficulty with this legal fiction is due to the dissension between its apparent descriptive
posture (‘this is how the individual is for the law’) and its strong normativity (‘this is how the
individual has to be by law’). So for example, in point 4 of the decision, the Council considers the
objectives pursued by the legislator as follows:
‘[le législateur] a également estimé que les femmes dissimulant leur visage, volontairement ou
non, se trouvent placées dans une situation d’exclusion et d’infériorité manifestement
incompatible avec les principes constitutionnels de liberté et d’égalité.’20
18 Such is for example the image of the human as described by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in the ‘Discourse on the
Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Mankind’ (Rousseau, 2002).
19 ‘Considering that, according to art.4 of the Declaration of the rights of man and citizen of 1789: “Liberty
consists of doing anything which does not harm others: thus, the exercise of the natural rights of each
man has only those borders which assure other members of the society the enjoyment of these same
rights. These borders can be determined only by the law”’ (all translations are mine).
20 ‘The legislator considers that the women covering their face, voluntarily or not, find themselves placed in a
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One cannot avoid recalling Rousseau’s statement: ‘. . . whoever refuses to obey the general will
shall be constrained to do so by the whole body; which means nothing else than that he shall be
forced to be free’ (Rousseau, 2002, p. 166). So an individual who chooses to cover her face is
making a choice against her own liberty and equality and can be forced not to make that choice.
Liberty and equality are given here an objective meaning. The tension between subjective and
objective understanding has been conceptualised with reference to human dignity: according to
the subjective understanding, dignity is coextensive with freedom of choice and cannot logically
be violated by the individual herself, who instead defines what dignity means to her; the objective
version, in contrast, introduces external standards. Both in France21 and at the European level,22
the subjective understanding of dignity prevails; therefore it is not applicable to this case (Rapport
d’Information Raoult, p. 177; Mathieu, 2010; Dieu, 2010). Nevertheless, with this decision, the
Council introduces an objective conception of other fundamental rights, namely liberty and
equality. Some commentators discuss the ‘rupture’ and maybe even ‘evolution’ (Dieu, 2010) of the
French conception of the principle of equality, as this ‘paternalistic’ (Hunter-Henin, 2012, pp. 624–
628) version leads to a negation of personal autonomy and free will.
To summarise, the free and autonomous individual of the ‘republican theory’ to which the
Council refers is, paradoxically, limited in her freedom of choice. Finally, she finds herself to be
under the influence of the (state) society. The point of departure was the individual conceived as
freed by community fetters but, at the end of the line, we see her actually being restricted by this
very image. As will be shown next, defining the conception of the individual is fraught with risks
for any legal text, and therefore it is understandable that the German decision attempts to leave
such a definition as open as possible.
3.2 Individual as community-determined, whichever community
In the decision under scrutiny here, the First Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court focuses
strongly on the individual. For example the judgment recognises, at §96 and §110, that an
imperative religious precept of covering in the public space is an issue of personal identity as
protected by the right of free development of one’s personality (Article 2, para. 1 GG) in
connection with human dignity (Article 1, para. 1 GG).23 Moreover, the centrality of the
individual can be inferred from the clear distinction that is made between civil servants and
public administration (§104, §107, §112)24 (Theilen, 2015; Schwabe, 2015). In addition to this,
when discussing the freedom of religion (§86), the Court refers explicitly also to the singular
person entitled with fundamental rights instead of only to the religious community as it used to
do25 (Rusteberg, 2015, p. 640; Ladeur, 2015, p. 634; Sacksofsky, 2015, p. 803). As a result, in this
judgment, the individual is important not only as a fundamental rights bearer (as the obvious
21 Cf. for example the Constitutional Council’s decisions in preliminary rulings on constitutionality no. 2010–25
of 16 September 2010, no. 2010–71 of 26 November 2010 and no. 2010–30 of 17 December 2010, which all
interpret dignity as opposable by the individual to the institutions. In contrast, in the (isolated) decision of
the Council of State CE Ass 27 October 1995, Commune de Morsang-sur-Orge, n. 136727, dignity had been
used to strike down consensual arrangements.
22 Cf. for example the ECtHR decision Pretty v. UK, 2346/02 of 29 April 2002.
23 That religious freedom is related to human dignity as protected in Article1 GG had already been
acknowledged in the decision on school prayers BVerfG, 16.10.1979–1 BvR 647/70; 1 BvR 7/74 (§63).
24 This distinction is necessary for argumentative purposes, as the Senate has to distinguish this case from the
one on crucifix on classrooms’ walls, BVerfG, 16.05.1995–1 BvR 1087/9(Klein, 2015, p. 468).
25 For example, in the (Aktion) Rumpelkammer decision BVerfG, 16.10.1968–1 BvR 241/66 at §25 and the previous
headscarf decision BVerfG, 24.9.2003–2 BvR 1436/02 at §40.
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focus for a decision on a constitutional complaint), but also as she is explicitly singled out from her
work and religious community.
The judgment ventures to define the conception of a human being of the liberal constitutional
state and explicitly opts for an open characterisation of the individual: that is to say, one that
leaves its content as undefined as possible:
‘Der freiheitliche Staat des Grundgesetzes ist gekennzeichnet von Offenheit gegenüber der
Vielfalt weltanschaulich-religiöser Überzeugungen und gründet dies auf ein Menschenbild,
das von der Würde des Menschen und der freien Entfaltung der Persönlichkeit in
Selbstbestimmung und Eigenverantwortung geprägt ist (§109).’26
So the question about the subjective or objective understanding of human dignity, which in the
German context has been formulated by Böckenförde (1987, p. 14), is answered in the subjective sense
– that is, the individual is bestowed with the responsibility of choosing for herself how to develop her
personality (Klein, 2015, p. 467). If one decides to avoid social contacts and become isolated, this
choice is protected by the negative freedom of opinion and the general rights of the personality
(Beaucamp & Beaucamp, 2015, p. 182). Such is the conception of the individual as entailed in the
text. But where does it originate from?
Historically, in the German territories, the collectivist representation of the individual has been
more influential (Böckenförde, 2001, p. 8). Later on, in the Basic Law, the image of the individual
developed as a sort of hybrid: in its first draft, Article 1, para. 1 declared the state to be ‘there for
human will, not the human for the State’s will’. Hence, it apparently leaned towards a
Rousseauian conception of individual – but which could also be understood as a reaction to the
just defeated Nazi regime. The final version of Article 1 GG actually refers to human dignity. A
definition of the image of the individual has been formulated by the Federal Constitutional Court
in a 1954 decision27: ‘The image of the human contained in the Basic Law does not refer to an
isolated individual; rather the Basic Law has solved the tension between individual and society in
the sense of the community-relatedness and boundedness of the person, without thereby
encroaching his own intrinsic value’ (§29).
According to the classic comment by renowned constitutionalist Günther Dürig (2003, p. 24), the
Court found a balance between the human being as an autonomous individual and the Aristotelian
conception of collective, political humanity.
Overall, in German law, the legal understanding of the human is very heterogeneous, depending
on the branch of law considered (Häberle, 2008). Space is given for various developments and
concretisations, and this openness is not a fortuity, but a political statement, as the liberal
democratic order of the constitutional state entails the normative negation of any prescribed
integral human image (p. 63). This openness is found in the decision considered here as well. The
Senate puts emphasis on the individual taken singularly, separated from the societal context, and
recognises that, through the exercise of her rights and freedoms, the person inevitably manifests
her choices connected to societal and religious belonging. In this way, the judgment recognises
that the individual is under the ascendancy of the community but does not impose a certain
predominant societal conception.
26 ‘The liberal state of the Constitution is characterised by openness towards the multiplicity of convictions
concerning worldview and religion, and such an attitude is based on an image of the human being that is
shaped by human dignity and the free development of personality in self-determination and
-responsibility.’ This formulation is to be found already in §42 of the 2003 decision of the Ludin case.
27 BVerfG, 20.07.1954–1 BvR 459/52; 1 BvR 484/52; 1 BvR 555/52; 1 BvR 623/52; 1 BvR 651/52; 1 BvR 748/52; 1 BvR
783/52; 1 BvR 801/52; 1 BvR 5/53; 1 BvR 9/53; 1 BvR 96/54; 1 BvR 114/54.
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To sum up, the ‘typically French’ autonomous individual ends up being constrained by the
Constitutional Council more than the ‘(partially) community determined German’ by the Federal
Constitutional Court. Such a statement on the extent of the autonomy of the individual
recognised in the two texts would remain incomplete if the kind of national bond implied was
not put under scrutiny. This leads us to the next chapter: after having pondered on the conception
of the individual in the two texts, the following addresses the meaning of societal belonging.
IV. Societal belonging
The two countries offer good material for comparison, as they have been ‘constructing, elaborating,
and furnishing to other states distinctive, even antagonistic models of nationhood and national self-
understanding‘ (Brubaker, 1992, p. 1). The commonplace representation of the French national
community is that of a political community, while the German national community is first and
foremost a cultural and ethnical one. So belonging in France would be the result of a rational act
of will, while in Germany it would be a pre-political fact (Dumont, 1991, p. 249). These two ‘types’
of different national cohesion ideals are mirrored also in the degree and form of inclusiveness/
exclusiveness in relation to ethnic difference and in the distinction between the French civic
territorial (jus soli) and German ethnocultural (jus sanguinis) basis of criteria for attributing
citizenship. The next section will attempt to problematise this conventional narrative.
4.1 Civic nationalism, moralised
The two decisions compared here do not approach the issue directly, but both make reference to life
in society and to the presence of foreign practices in public spaces. In this sense, they both reveal
something about the conception of ‘belonging’ in the respective societies, and their assertions are
diametrically opposed. Concerning French society, the Constitutional Council acknowledges the
legislator’s concern that:
‘[P]ratiques . . . consistant à dissimuler son visage dans l’espace public . . . méconnaissent les
exigences minimales de la vie en société.’28
In thismanner, it states that the full-face veil is not only against liberty and equality, but also against
fraternity, as it casts off the others and contests head on ‘our conception of living together’ (Rapport
d’Information Raoult, p. 87). Also in the explanatory memorandum accompanying the Bill as it was
discussed in the French parliament, the wearing of a full-face veil is defined as a ‘sectarian
manifestation of a rejection of the values of the Republic’29 that brings with it ‘a symbolic and
dehumanizing violence, at odds with the social fabric’.30 In other words, there is a certain social
fabric whose texture is defined negatively by placing it in opposition to the Islamic practice.
It has to be added that this decision has introduced an innovative notion of public order (Levade,
2010; Verpeaux, 2010). In the third considérant, the Council refers to Articles 5 and 10 DDHC, which
enable the legislator to intervene to protect public order. The ‘tryptic’ of safety, tranquillity and
salubrity constitutes the ‘material public order’ that, according to constitutional jurisprudence,31
28 ‘Practices . . . consisting in covering one’s face in public spaces . . . are oblivious to the minimal exigencies of
life in society.’
29 Projet de loi interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l’espace public, N° 2520, Assemblée Nationale, p. 3,
available at: <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/projets/pl2520.asp> (15 March 2017).
30 Ibid.
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has to be reconciled with the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms. But, by referring, in the fourth
considérant, to the ‘exigencies of life in society’, the Council is actually extending the meaning of
the notion. The simple protection of public order would not be enough to justify a general and
absolute ban. Public order acquires a more substantial and positive content consisting of a certain
number of social values.32 What is problematic with this ‘social’ public order is that it may
change over time, it could be filled with even more precise and restrictive social rules, and more
generally it is an instance of moralisation of the public space (Dieu, 2010; Fatin-Rouge Stéfanini
and Philippe, 2011). Actually, Article 5 DDHC, with its negative phraseology (the legislator is
entitled to edict prohibitions only against acts which are harmful to society), was designed to
restrict the possibilities of state interference. ‘Ironically’, it now becomes ‘a source of justification
for one of the most intrusive pieces of legislation passed in France’ (Hunter-Henin, 2012, p. 631).
The social public order is very close to the objective understanding of fundamental rights
mentioned in the previous section, as in both cases a social norm is identified and imposed on the
individuals, and personal autonomy yields to social heteronomy (Dieu, 2010). In this way, the
political community that constitutes France is not neutral or value-free. On the contrary, it is
becoming filled with normative content in an explicit way.
It has to be acknowledged though that, to a certain extent, this is not a complete novelty in French
history. It is true that Ernest Renan, in his famous speech at the Sorbonne in 1882, spoke of a ‘daily
referendum’ (Renan, 1882, p. 27) to characterise the belonging to the French state. He argued that it is
not race, language, interests, religion or geography that constitute a nation, but the existence of a
common will. However, he also referred to the existence of a common past, of having common
ancestors: so, even in Renan’s speech, which is usually depicted as foundational for civic
nationalism, there are actually elements of ethnicity concealed beneath the surface (Noiriel, 2007,
pp. 19–20). Accordingly, the simplistic ‘Jacobin’ image of France represents only one side of the
coin (Birnbaum, 1998; Daly, 2013, p. 373). In the later part of the nineteenth century, a strong
conservative current emerged that stressed the cultural and historic unity of France both against
internal minorities and Enlightenment ideas and also external pressures (notably the Prussian
annexation of Alsace-Lorraine). This conservative current, a sort of Catholic militant vision of
Herderian culturalism (Birnbaum, 2004, pp. 262–280), has been described as a ‘counter-revolutionary
clerical monarchism and militarism’ and as a ‘populist, anti-semitic and vernacular ethnic
movement, seeking to redefine “France” as an ethnic nation’ (Smith, 1986, p. 149). As a consequence,
French republicanism developed strongly as a reaction to such political opponents (Birnbaum, 2004,
pp. 277–280). Historians of racism today argue that the discourse on the nation during the III
Republic (1870–1940) actually turned on two axes: the civic and the identitarian one (Reynaud-
Paligot, 2015), and indeed the stereotypical representation of France as an instance of pure civic
nationalism is a superficial simplification.
It is against this historical background that the recent refurbishment of ‘national identity’ has to
be read. Starting from the electoral campaign in 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy resorted to arguments about
the majority’s identity as opposed to the presence of Muslims on the national territory (Noiriel, 2007,
p. 112; Daly, 2013, p. 378). Moreover, he established the connection between immigration and
national identity, as ‘immigration politics’ would ‘determine the identity of France in 30 years’
(Noiriel, 2007, pp. 92–99). Such a polarisation of the discourse (French society as opposed to
Muslim alien) is to be read also in the logic underlying the decision considered in this paper
(Ouald Chaib & Brems, 2013, pp. 16–17).
32 Even if very implicitly, this ‘immaterial’ public order had already been useful in the reasoning of the
Constitutional Council decisions no. 94–343/344 of 27 July 1994, no. 99–419 of 9 November 1999 and no.
93-325 of 13 August 1993 that forbid certain biomedical practices, incest and polygamy, respectively.
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Overall, the kind of ‘life in society’ envisaged in the Council’s decision and the moralised version
of public order it advances seem to be rather at odds with the civic conception of belonging. Rather,
they are inscribable into a rhetoric of national identity, which, as argued, is not totally absent in the
French legal tradition.
4.2 Ethnocultural belonging and openness to difference
In the meantime, on the other side of the Rhine, the German society depicted in the judgment text
studied here appears to be much less homogeneous. In particular, the Federal Constitutional Court
reiterates:
‘DieEinzelnenhaben ineinerGesellschaft, dieunterschiedlichenGlaubensüberzeugungenRaumgibt,
allerdings kein Recht darauf, von der Konfrontation mit ihnen fremden Glaubensbekundungen,
kultischen Handlungen und religiösen Symbolen verschont zu bleiben (§104).’33
So, in the German society as it is represented in this text, there is no right to be sheltered from the
confrontation with foreign manifestations of faith, ritual deeds and religious symbols (§116). More
broadly, the decision records the high diffusion of the Islamic veil in German society (§100, §116),
which is described as religiously pluralistic (§105). This is reaffirmed also by the dissenting judges
(§11, §17), even though they differentiate between societal everyday encounters and repeated
influential confrontation at school.
Besides these general statements, in the decision, the Senate searches for practical concordance
(balancing among constitutionally protected rights) among freedom of religion and the
fundamental rights of third parties and societal values with a constitutional status (Sachs, 2015,
p. 572). Without going into the details, the outcome of the court’s reasoning is that the rights of
the third parties yield to the rights of the one. Hence, fundamentally, the evaluation leads to
antithetical results as in the French decision, which considers the rights of third parties to be
successfully opposable to the religious freedom of the individual. In other words, the German
state–societal bond seems to be less constraining.
This could be justified by referring to the historical disconnection between ethnocultural nation-
membership and formal state-membership (Brubaker, 1992, p. 51). The various pre-unitary German
principalities were religiously and culturally heterogeneous, and the overarching Empire provided a
mythical rather than realistic conception of the German nation (Benz, 2008, p. 32). Also, the
Constitution of 1871 was not the achievement of popular sovereignty, but of ‘state’ sovereignty,
where the state – functioning as a negotiation system among executives under the hegemony of
Prussia – was conceptually separated from the citizens (p. 48). It is only during the Wilhelmine
era (1890–1918) that a more ethnonational politics emerged, and the 1913 German Imperial and
State Citizenship Law nationalised and ethnicised citizenship regulation (Brubaker, 1992, p. 114).
This was then distorted and radicalised with the ethnoracial restructuring of citizenship
undertaken by the Nazis (p. 166).
The catastrophes of WorldWar II mark an important discontinuity in the history of the German
national self-understanding (Gerdes & Faist, 2006, p. 319). Still, the citizenship law maintained a
certain ethnonational inflection, which was characterised by expansiveness towards ethnic
Germans expulsed from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and restrictiveness towards
33 ‘In a society that gives space to different religious beliefs the individuals don’t dispose of the right to be spared
from confrontationwith foreign expressions of faith, cultual practices and religious symbols’. The statement is
to be found also in the Ludin decision (BVerfG, 24.09.2003–2 BvR 1436/02) at §46, in the crucifix decision
(BverfG, 16.5.1995–1 BvR 1087/91) at §34, and more recently it has been reaffirmed by the Federal
Administrative Court (BVerwG, 30.11.2011–6 C 20.10) at §30.
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non-German immigrants (Brubaker, 1992, p. 170). This is manifested particularly clearly with the
Gastarbeiter politic34: cultural diversity was necessary, their integration by definition excluded and
naturalisation an exception. Germany has for a long time refused to consider itself as a country of
immigration, which has led to the lack of a viable assimilationist tradition (p. 176). Rather, it has
followed a policy of ‘benign differentialism’ (p. 178): even though access to citizenship is
restricted, everyday encounters with differences are not excluded. This is restated by the Senate in
the decision considered here as well.
Albeit, it has to be remembered that the Senate declares unconstitutional the provision that
establishes a preference for Christian-occidental values: with the exception of the Berlin and the
Bremen Laws, all other Länder statutes favoured the Christian-occidental majority (Baer & Wrase,
2005). Party political discourses in the legislative processes made use of the notion of German
national identity in opposition to an invented Islamic threat. Through the headscarf debates, both
poles have been constructed around a confrontational dichotomy in order to avoid difficulties in
actually defining German national identity and to address inherent inconsistencies and
contradictions within approaches to immigration and citizenship law (Sinclair, 2012, p. 29).
To conclude, the founding idea(l)s concerning the population of the state rooted in nineteenth-
century history display big differences between France and Germany. Those have to be contrasted
with the more recent political developments and the contemporary stress-factor that is immigration:
populistic instrumentalisation of immigration is, somewhat ironically, a transnational phenomenon
(Gerdes & Faist, 2006, p. 327). This section aims to highlight how, in both countries, belonging to
national communities contains both civic and ethnic components. Indeed, these components are
present in varying proportions at particular moments in history, which mark the specificity of each
national experience (Smith, 1986, p. 149). The cultural and historical contextualisations attempted
here expose how the two decisions fit respectively in their tradition, or more precisely, how they fit
respectively in a certain crease of their tradition. Both traditions contain contradicting elements, and
the same principle has received different concretisations at different times, as it is particularly
manifest in the case of secularism as well.
V. Religion in the public sphere
After having taken into consideration the conceptions of the individual and of societal belonging,
this section focuses on the place accorded to religion in the public space insofar as this is relevant
for the living together. Different settings are possible, and each presupposes a certain
accommodation of the public and private spheres. The settlement between these two conceptual
spaces bounds the living together, as the significance of different religious garments allowed in
the public sphere is indeed a determinant of the conditions of coexistence.
5.1 Many laicities
During the legislative procedure in France the principle of laïcité had been left aside: prohibiting the
burqa could not be justified in the name of laïcité, as it was for the 2004 Statute on religious symbols at
school (Rapport d’Information Raoult, p. 90). First, this is because the setting in that the integral veil
was to be prohibited does not only involve state institutions, but also the entirety of the public places
of the French territory. Second, it is because the burqa was declared not to be a religious symbol, but
rather a political one and prohibiting it would be based on concerns of public order. Third, the
34 Migrant workers who were recruited mainly from southern Europe from the 1950s onwards were considered
to be temporary sojourners, and their presence in Germany was seasonal according to business cycles. But, by
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principle was dismissed as ineffective, as it would weigh only on the state and not on private persons
(pp. 90–94).
Nonetheless, the Constitutional Council referred to Article 10 DDHC, which protects religious
freedom, thus confirming the religious significance of the banned practice (Dieu, 2010). Moreover,
the Council introduced a reserve of interpretation:
‘[L]’interdiction de dissimuler son visage dans l’espace public ne saurait, sans porter une atteinte
excessive à l’article 10 de la Déclaration de 1789, restreindre l’exercice de la liberté religieuse dans
les lieux de culte ouverts au public; . . . sous cette réserve, les articles 1er à 3 de la loi déférée ne
sont pas contraires à la Constitution.’35
By including this restriction in the ban (it is not applicable in places of worship), the Council
revealed the religious object of the law. If the prohibited attire was not religious, there would be
no need for an exemption on religious grounds (Joppke & Torpey, 2013, p. 47). The Council’s
judgment resets the prohibition into the dichotomy mentioned at the outset of this section – to
what degree are observant practices accepted in the public sphere. In any case, the official rhetoric
had not hindered legal scholars from considering the ban as a (however questionable) application
of the principle of laicity (Champeil-Desplats, 2012).
But what does laicity mean? At least two versions of the principle can be differentiated on the
basis of the meaning associated to the public/private dichotomy. One requires public and private
spheres to be clearly demarcated. Belief (private) and knowledge (public) are rigorously
autonomous to one another: religion is limited to a constructed private space and cannot be
expressed in the public sphere. Another version of the principle postulates it as personal (in this
sense private) belief and religious freedom. This includes the respect of religious practices in
private as well as in public life, but it negates the pre-eminence of one specific religion: in
particular, the possibility of a state (public) religious institution (Baubérot, 2012, pp. 48–49;
Bowen, 2010, pp. 29–31).
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the dominant conception in France was
Gallicanism, an arrangement of close cooperation between the state and the French Catholic
Church, which in turn had autonomy from the Vatican. Thus Catholicism enjoyed a sort of
monopolistic position (Baubérot, 2012, p. 179). According to Ferdinand Buisson, the philosopher
and first theoriser of laïcité, the principle was introduced in France with the Revolution and the
DDHC through the creation of a State that was independent from the Church, detached from any
religion and the recognition of human rights not considered to be given by God (1882, p. 1469).
Then Napoléon Bonaparte instituted a complex system of Concordats with the recognised
religions, but still the whole of the nineteenth century has been characterised by strong hostilities
between two Frances: one deeply Catholic and the other one referring to the values of free
thinking (Baubérot, 2013, p. 37).
The oppositions continued also during the III Republic and, even if the 1882 Statute laicises
primary education, thus reducing drastically the political and social influence of the Church
(Buisson, 1882, pp. 1469–1470), the horizon of an integral laicity is never attained (Baubérot, 2013,
p. 72). During the parliamentary debates that led to the 1905 Statute on the Separation of the
Churches and the State, opinions have been expressed in favour of a public space freed from all
religious symbols and clothing (Baubérot, 2012, pp. 185–188), but the resulting text is actually an
35 ‘The ban on covering one’s face in public spaces shall not limit the exercise of religious freedom in the places
of worship open to the public, otherwise it would cause an excessive infringement of the article 10 of the 1789
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attempt to negotiate the end of the conflicts between clericalists and anti-clericalists (Baubérot, 2013,
p. 83). It establishes a clear institutional separation and privatises the religious institutions in the
sense that those have to now be organised as associations and, as such, they can act in the public
space. The state does not assume any responsibility for private ‘religious needs’, but it guarantees
the freedom of conscience and of belief without distinguishing among creeds (p. 87).36
The Constitutions of 1946 (IV Republic) and 1958 (V Republic) declare France to be laic. Laïcité thus
becomes a shared heritage, and the division among the ‘two Frances’ is overcome. The laic self-
conception of the political representatives and the intellectuals notwithstanding, rituals and symbolic
elements of Christian origin have not disappeared. Moreover, in society, the Catholic Church has a
relevant role and is thus publicly visible (Amir-Moazami, 2007, p. 96). Starting from the late 1970s
and early 1980s, the public space changes also due to the increasing visibility of migrants. The
Muslim population arriving mainly from ex-colonies (Algeria became independent in 1962) begins to
settle down (Baubérot, 2013, p. 113), and political fights that were previously thematised as workers’
fights are now defined as ‘identitarian’ by the political discourse (Noiriel, 2007, pp. 60–65).
The contemporary revival of laïcité is oriented to questioning the compatibility of immigrants’
religion with it. Actually, laïcité is today mainly invoked to ostracise ostensible Muslim practices
from the landscape of public visibility (Daly, 2013, pp. 379–380). This new laicity is structurally
different from the previous one: its historical roots are not the religious wars and the Revolution, but
the French colonial past; its geopolitics is not connected with the conflict of the two Frances, but
with globalisation and the rejection of a Anglo-American liberal societal model; it is not discussed
primarily in parliamentary debates, but it has become extremely mediatised; and from historically
being a progressive principle, it is becoming a conservative one (Baubérot, 2013, pp. 119–121).
Overall, even if the courts sometimes still interpret the principle in favour of the rights of the
individual (Joppke, 2009, p. 38), the decision studied here is rather in line with the new laicity
resulting from the recent shifts in the meaning of the concept (Hunter-Henin, 2012, pp. 617–623).
5.2 Disputed neutrality
Oscillations of meaning are to be recorded also concerning the presence of religion in the public
sphere in Germany. The central principles for this aspect in the judgment are freedom of religion,
state neutrality and equal treatment, which are all basic principles inscribed in the constitutional
structure (Robbers, 2001). As mentioned above, in the balancing between constitutional rights and
values carried out by the First Senate, the positive religious freedom of the teacher headscarf-
wearer prevails over the negative religious freedom of the pupils (reasoning concludes at §122).
This extensive conception of religious freedom is the result of an erstwhile if very slow
(Sacksofsky, 2009, p. 22) historical process: the individual would get an initial beneficium
emigrationis in the 1555 Augsburg peace treaty, and the 1648 Westphalia treaty merely recognised
the right of toleration for the private exercise – in the sense of not publicly visible – of a religion
different from the state one (Dreier, 2011, pp. 76–77). Positive and negative freedom of religion
were established only in 1919 with the Weimar Constitution (WRV). Nowadays, it is recognised as
being of primordial importance and extensively interpreted to the point that it may have led to a
sort of unintentional (not being the result of firm measures on integration policies)
multiculturalism (Gerdes & Faist, 2006, p. 322).
36 Nevertheless, cases exist that show disagreement about the exact content of the principle. For example, the
Council of State intervened in 1909 by annulling the decision of the Sens city mayor to prohibit clerks
from accompanying a funeral procession in their sacerdotal dress, as it was deemed to be a measure not
strictly necessary to the protection of public order, CE, 19 February 1909, Abbé Olivier, n° 27355. This
decision is interestingly analogous to the one taken last summer by the Council of State, which suspended
the decision of the mayor of Villeneuve-Loubet, who wanted to ban clothes that demonstrate an obvious
religious affiliation worn by swimmers on public beaches (burkini), CE, 26 August 2016 n. 402742, 402777.
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State neutrality also is the result of a long and conflict-ridden process. The concordat ofWorm 1122
is the first document setting forth the division between spiritual and temporal authorities, whose posts
and competences become explicitly separated. Nevertheless, in the German territories, one Land’s
religion would still exists until the eighteenth century (Catholic, Evangelical or Reformed). The state
stopped identifying itself with any creed with the Prussian Allgemeines Landrecht in 1794 and, even
then, only the three Christian cults recognised by the law of the Reich enjoyed the exercitium
religionis publicum – that is, open public presence (Dreier, 2011, pp. 74–77). In the Frankfurt
Constitution of 1848/1849, full religious freedom was recognised and all distinctions between
excercitium publicum and privatum disappeared. These central elements were overtaken also in the
Prussian Constitution 1850, which albeit at the same time also codified the Christian impregnation
of the state and the ethical co-ordination of both the Church and the state (pp. 78–80). This asset
was then overcome with theWRV, which established also the main lines of the contemporary setting.
Nowadays, Article 140 GG, with its reference to Article 137, para. 1 WRV, forbids the existence of a
state Church. Besides, the principle of neutrality is not explicitly stated, but is derived from the
combination of the individual freedom of religion and conscience (guaranteed in Article 4 GG and in
Article 140 GG combined with Article 136, paras. 1 and 4, Article 137, para. 1 WRV) with the
principle of equality (as expressed by Article 3, para. 3 and Article 33, para. 3 GG) (Ganz, 2008, p. 41).
This leaves space for different concretisations (Heinig, 2009). Among the two possible models of a
stricter division vs. a more encompassing cooperative stance, Germany has definitely tended towards
the second (Kokott, 2005, p. 346), and a change of direction would require a new interpretation of the
principle (Sacksofsky, 2009, p. 33). This was also the position of the Second Senate’s majority in the
2003 Ludin decision, which, at §43, stated that overall state neutrality has to be understood as open
neutrality, but that, in the particular case of schooling, the Land legislatures could find a different
‘appropriate compromise’ (§47). In so doing, it opened up the possibility for the Länder to opt for a
more ‘laicist’ conception (Baer & Wrase, 2005, p. 244), provided that they would do so by
guaranteeing equality of treatment among members of different religious communities (§71). As is
known, most Länder passed statutes that forbade headscarves but not Christian symbols, or they
introduced a preference for ‘Christian-Western’ values, which led to serious constitutionality doubts
among scholars (Baer & Wrase, 2005, pp. 249–251) and to discordant interpretations.37
In regard to the decision considered here, the First Senate restricts the discretion previously
accorded to the Länder and re-establishes a more pluralist understanding of neutrality (Traub,
2015, p. 1340). This is defined as follows:
‘Die dem Staat gebotene weltanschaulich-religiöse Neutralität ist indessen nicht als eine
distanzierende im Sinne einer strikten Trennung von Staat und Kirche zu verstehen, sondern
als eine offene und übergreifende, die Glaubensfreiheit für alle Bekenntnisse gleichermaßen
fördernde Haltung (§110).’38
37 On the one hand, the Federal Administrative Court attempted a constitutionally conformed interpretation,
which considered ‘Christian’ values and symbols not to be of a religious nature (despite their religious
origin), but a reference to broadly understood cultural values that would underlie the whole constitutional
value system (BVerwG, 24.06.2004–2 C 45.03). This path was followed by the Federal Labour Court (BAG,
20.08.2009–2 AZR 499/08, at §24), the Constitutional Courts of Bavaria (VerfGH Bayern, 15.01.2007–11-VII-
05) and Hesse (StGH Hessen, 10.12.2007–P.St. 2016). On the other hand, most of the local tribunals have
refused to treat religions differently and disapplied the privileging rule by forbidding not only the
headscarf, but all and sundry religious symbols (see the whole list of seventeen decisions at Henkes and
Kneip, 2010, p. 608). This led to the unplanned result of limiting the space accorded to Christian symbols,
thus shifting from a model of open neutrality to a stricter laicism (pp. 608–610).
38 ‘The ideological-religious neutrality required from the state is however not to be understood as a distancing
one, in the sense of a categorical division of state and Church, but rather as an open and cross-cutting posture,
fostering equally the freedom of belief for all confessions.’ The formulation is identical to the already
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Moreover, the judgment reiterates that the state cannot identify with any particular religion or
acquire any religious or conscience content (§110), and it has to avoid also taking part and
intervening in creeds affairs and cannot judge nor determine the content of a religion (§86, §110).
In addition to these general statements, the Court concretises them in reference to the school
sector and qualifies as ‘bekenntnisoffen’ exactly those interdenominational schools that can convey
to pupils tolerance towards other religions and worldviews (§111, §115). So the daily
confrontation with teachers wearing religious clothing would be balanced by the presence of
other teachers wearing different attire: in this way, interdenominational schools mirror the
religiously pluralist society (§105, §116).
In this regard, the First Senate clearly puts an end to the partly contradicting local tribunals’
interpretations of various statutes forbidding headscarves and privileging Christianity. It rejects
policies that would have had certain forms of religious exercise pushed into the private sphere
and reasserts neutrality as not meaning state indifference towards religion, but rather that the
state can permit religious activities in its sphere and offer them a forum. Clearly, this text entails a
new strong (re-)statement of the significance of neutrality in the German context.
To summarise, the French decision seems to assume a stricter (even for French standards)
conception of laicity, which tends to erase the religious from public spaces. This, thus, favours
negative religious freedom, while the German one reasserts a cooperation model that is more
indulgent towards positive freedom of exercise. Nevertheless, the contextualisation of the two texts
allows some similarities to emerge: first, the degree of religiosity permitted in the public space has
been variating over time. For both countries, it can be said that there is no fixed constitutional
understanding of the neutrality principle to be derived from the provisions concerning the division
between state and Church (Ganz, 2008, p. 44). Second, the very concepts of laïcité and state
neutrality have been developed in historical contexts that were radically different from the present
one, as the state was facing mainly well-established and already institutionalised Christian creeds
(Sacksofsky, 2009, p. 12; Baubérot, 2012, p. 183). Therefore, old understandings of the terms are
unfit to deal with contemporary challenges of religious pluralism, especially in a context where
religious cases are actually intertwined with migration, integration and other socio-economic
issues. This is related more broadly also with the question of national identity: for both countries,
the degree of religiosity allowed in the public sphere is discussed in connection with (or against)
the development of a religious and cultural pluralistic identity. The third commonality is that,
even in a synchronic perspective, different meanings are given to the principle by different
institutional actors (Joppke, 2007, p. 315; Henkes and Kneip, 2010, pp. 612–613).
VI. Conclusions
This paper attempts to locate the conceptions of living together entailed in two judgments
concerning veiling within the respective context of different legal cultures. This has been done by
analysing the conceptions of the individual, of the national societal bond and of religion in public
that are inscribed in the texts of the decisions. The differences in context result in different
approaches to balancing rights in both increasingly pluralistic societies and also result in different
understandings of living together. The main finding concerning the two legal cultures to which
the compared decisions belong is that they both are highly inhomogeneous and contain
contradicting elements. In other words, the context has been studied highlighting its complexity.
mentioned §43 of the 2003 judgment. All threemain quotations used in this paper are reiterations of what had
already been stated in 2003: I take this to mean that, even though the object of the two rulings is not the same,
the conceptions of individual, of pluralistic society and of open neutrality are shared by the two Senates.
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Trying to recapitulate the three central sections (III, IV and V) of this paper might cause a certain
amount of bewilderment. The enlightened autonomous individual can be forced to be free, while the
community-determined one can be actually freer to express herself as she pleases. A civic conception
of the state is not incompatible with strong ‘national identity’ claims, while an ethnic-cultural one
can develop both into favouring Western-Christian values and into being more pluralistic. Finally,
the legal setting concerning the role of religion in public needs to be renegotiated in the present
pluralist situation. One might feel the temptation to surrender to this conceptual chaos. Indeed, if
one conclusion can be drawn, it is that (legal) meanings are fluctuating and that (legal) traditions
are hybrid in nature.
There are at least three levels of understanding the conceptions of ‘living together’ enshrined in
the two decisions. The first one is by relating the court’s position to the respective ‘stereotypical’
image of the legal culture. I hope to have shown how these images do not exist in a coherent
form. Communities are imagined and traditions are invented, and one main concern of this paper
has been to avoid reifying national stereotypes. If legal cultures, like all cultures, are a product of
the contingencies of history and are always undergoing change (Nelken, 2004, p. 5), then a
complex outcome should not be considered as a failure. Legal cultures rather manifest an attitude
of ‘tending towards’ one or the other model. In this way, also the decisions considered here are
cases, themselves crossed, belonging to inhomogeneous traditions. As a consequence, the living
together they envisage is not a fully and coherently instantiated modus vivendi, but a patchwork
of different elements.
A second possible reading stresses the political aspects of the different kinds of judicial review
that are carried out in the two judgments. The French a priori and abstract constitutionality check
was tightly integrated into the legislative procedure. The objective understanding of freedom and
equality, as well as the extended conception of public order and the re-delineation of the meaning
of public and private when referred to the space religion is allowed to take, can all be inscribed
into a coherent political project. Therefore, it may be plausible to read this judgment as part of the
political campaign traversing multiple state institutions that led to affirming a certain conception
of living together in French law (Ouald Chaib & Brems, 2013, pp. 12–13). This campaign did not
focus on stressing the autonomy of the individual, but rather on the ‘threat’ of communitarianism
and reclaimed the authority at the central level to determine the required level of the population’s
homogeneity. Critical voices indeed exist but are to be found in the literature and in other sources,
such as the media, that were not taken into consideration here. In contrast, the German judgment
holds a completely different structural position. Here, the control of the constitutionality of the
statute was carried out as a response to two constitutional complaints, so the Court had to play a
different role: it did so by prioritising the position of the individual and her freedom of religion,
rather than pursuing any vision of ‘how the German society should be’. German constitutional
complaints are meant for defending the individual’s rights, and this may explain the Senate’s focus
on the person, her rights and freedoms. In so doing, it stopped the legislators of the Länder, who
were on the whole more focused on affirming the ‘Christian and Western’ values that had to be
transmitted at school. The point here is that different types of judicial review and their timing
(a priori or a posteriori) do affect the framing of the issue.
Third, the two texts can bemade sense of by highlighting their exceptionality: the French decision
has been described as ‘a stretch, if not an impossibility, given the prevailing jurisprudence and legal
opinion’ (Joppke and Torpey, 2013, p. 45). The German decision had two dissenting justices and was
going (partly) against a decision taken by the other Senate only twelve years earlier and the Länder
legislatures. The two cases entail statements on a crucial topic, which is the conception of living
together. They reveal the high level of divergence of views; both judges could have written a text
putting forward an opposite vision of their respective society and would have found elements to
sustain such a view within their own tradition.
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To conclude, understanding law as an expression of culture does not mean having a romantic or
essentialising vision of law. The texts analysed here can be effectively made sense of as a result of the
circulation of models and the (temporary) outcome of political debates on topics of immigration and
religious symbols. This paper attempts to show how trying to understand legal terms by placing them
in their cultural context does not necessarily entail essentialisation, uncritical acceptance or
justification. Rather, it means looking for oppositions and contradictions that are inherent in
every legal culture and understanding law as being the result of power struggles in their political
contingency.
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